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A Proposal for Changing Florida's Civil Commitment
System
Winsor C. Schmidt*
For purposes of this analysis, "civil commitment" is a form of non-
criminal confinement for those who are legally found to be mentally
ill.1 With the minor exception of rare confinement for some communi-
cable diseases, there is no analogue of involuntary commitment for
physical illness.
Florida's civil commitment system, the "Baker Act,' 2 is in need of
change because it has not kept pace with legal developments of recent
years. To the extent developments in the law occur conservatively, and
to the extent these developments could not have occurred without a
consensus of professional and social opinion, it is also fair to say the
Baker Act has not kept pace with developments in the mental health
disciplines.
The changes in the Baker Act proposed here (see Appendix) are
the product of comparison with a nationally circulated model act, the
* Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Research Associate of the
Community Mental Health Research Center, Florida State University; J.D. American
University, 1973; A.B. Harvard University, 1970.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of Tom Dye, former Director of
the Policy Sciences Program; the research assistance of Robert Beitler, Steven Burwell
and Clifford Nilson; the consultation of Robert Pass of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Eman-
nuel, Smith & Cutler, Tampa, Florida; and the encouragement of Kent Miller.
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222-23 (5th ed. 1979). See also T. SZASZ,
LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL
HEALTH PRACTICES 39 (1963): "Commitment is compulsory or involuntary detention
of a person in an institution designated as a mental hospital."
The civil liberties subfield of mental health policy analysis has certain areas of
unexpected inattention: "for example, the problems posed by trying to 'treat' or 'help'
people through the rehabilitative model (including problems of mental commitment,
psychosurgery, and chemotherapy) appear not to have become grist for the scholarly
mill (but see The Civil Liberties Review)." CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY AND POLICY
MAKING ix-x (S. Wasby ed. 1977).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-.481 (1981).
3
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
386 Nova Law Journal 6:1982
Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, 3 and consideration of such
recommendations as the Report of the President's Commission on
Mental Health.4 The author's original intent was to draft a new mental
health act as a substitute for the Baker Act, using the Suggested Stat-
ute on Civil Commitment. Upon analysis, however, the Suggested Stat-
ute is quite verbose and difficult to follow. In addition, the Baker Act
already has several features of the Suggested Statute. Thus, the pro-
posed changes to the Baker Act constitute improvements from the Sug-
gested Statute added to the existing Florida civil commitment structure
and language, without changing either the basic structure or words.
The comparison Suggested Statutes on Civil Commitment is part
of a project suggested by the Mental Health Association involving the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and the Mental Health
Law project (the leading multidisciplinary, mental disability law, pub-
lic interest firm in the country) to prepare analyses and suggested
model statutes on such state mental health care issues as civil commit-
ment. 5 During drafting, the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment
was reviewed and critiqued by a broadly representative, sixteen person,
national interdisciplinary advisory panel, and by more than seventy
other national mental health professionals, professional and consumer
groups, lawyers, judges, and law professors.6
During the 1979 legislative session in Florida, the Suggested Stat-
ute on Civil Commitment was endorsed by such organizations as the
Florida Mental Health Association, the National Association of Social
Workers, the Florida Center for Children and Youth, and the District
Two Human Rights Advocacy Committee for Florida State Hospital.,
3. See American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled, 2
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 57, 129-59 (1977). [hereinafter cited as MENTAL DISA-
BILITY L. REP.].
4. REPORT OF THE TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES TO PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, Vol. IV, App. (1978).
5. The other issues covered are: mental health advocacy service; mental health
standards and human rights; zoning for community residences; therapeutic confidenti-
ality (including electronic data processing); guardianship; mental health treatment for
minors; right to education; state imposed disabilities; discrimination; incompetence to
stand trial on criminal charges; insanity defense; and, mental health treatment for
prisoners.
6. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 61.
7. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(7) (1981), a third-party mechanism for protecting consti-
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Despite widespread opinion that the Baker Act had not kept pace
with national developments expressed in judicial decisions, legislative
changes, and mental health care, the Florida legislature has not ad-
dressed the Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, primarily because
it is difficult to identify the differences between the Baker Act and the
lengthy Suggested Statute. The Suggested Statute on Civil Commit-
ment is twenty-eight pages long, including annotations; the introduc-
tory analysis is forty-nine pages long. In contrast, the Baker Act fills
only eleven pages in the statute book, and includes issues addressed
separately in the Suggested Statutes on Mental Health Standards and
Human Rights (ten pages), 8 Procedures for Voluntary Treatment (four
pages),9 and Mental Health Treatment for Minors (ten pages). 10
In late March 1981, changes to the Baker Act proposed here (Ap-
pendix A) were unanimously endorsed by both the Board of Governors
for the Florida Bar and, in principle, by the Mental Health Association
Board of Directors for the Florida Mental Health Association. These
proposed changes to the Baker Act represent a distillation of an item
by item comparison to the Suggested Statutes. The changes are not
exhaustive; they cover those areas most needing amendment. The
changes also attempt to be politically realistic. For example, the follow-
ing proposals, however desirable, were omitted: jury trial; 1 protection
from being a witness against oneself;1 2 "beyond a reasonable doubt" or
tutional and human rights of clients.
8. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 291.
9. Id. at 329.
10. Id. at 459.
11. See, e.g., Note, Confinement of Mabel Jones: Is There a Right to Jury Trial
in Civil Commitment Proceedings?, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 103 (1978). Seventeen juris-
dictions (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have a right to a jury trial in civil commitment as of
November, 1978. 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 205, 206-14 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to
Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1973); Fielding, Com-
pulsory Psychiatric Examination in Civil Commitment and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 117 (1973); Wesson, The Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination in Civil Commitment Proceedings, WIS. L. REV. 697, (1980); Comment,
Defective Delinquent Commitment Proceedings and the Constitution: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Counsel at the Examination Stage, 22
AM. U.L. REV. 619 (1973).
3871
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"clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" as a standard of proof.13
Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 447 U.S. 934 (1981). (Prosecution's use of psychiatric testi-
mony at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial to establish future dangerous-
ness violated respondent's constitutional rights to fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel, where respondent was not
apprised of his rights and did not knowingly decide to waive them when faced while in
custody with a court-ordered psychiatric inquiry, and where respondent was not given
prior opportunity to consult with counsel to decide whether to submit to psychiatric
examination).
13. Fifteen jurisdictions (California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin) require proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"
in civil commitment proceedings; two states (Oklahoma and Tennessee) require "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing" evidence; and three states (North Carolina, Washington,
and West Virginia) require "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence. The other states,
including Florida, merely require "clear and convincing" evidence for an individual to
be involuntarily committed to a mental institution.
The standard of proof needed to involuntarily commit an individual to a state
mental hospital for an indefinite period has been established by the United States Su-
preme Court to be at least "clear and convincing" evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979). Whatever standard of proof is required under state law, if the stan-
dard does not "inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases," due process
demands are not met. Id. at 433. If the required standard of proof is "beyond a reason-
able doubt," or an equivalent, such as "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence,
their is serious question that the state should be able to prove anyone to be both men-
tally ill and dangerous. See Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Pre-
vent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 227, 266-67 (1974); Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1291 (1968); Note,
Due Process and the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commitment
Adjudications, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 624 (1974).
Chief Justice Burger's lack of consistency in mental disability law decisions
emerges in Addington and has not gone unnoticed. See Shuman, Warren Burger and
the Civil Commitment Tetralogy, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 155 (1980). In Adding-
ton, the Chief Justice introduced the idea that an individual's interest in liberty in-
cludes not only physical liberty, but also mental freedom: a "free to be free" considera-
tion for involuntary commitment. 441 U.S. at 429 (citing Chodoff, The Case for
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 498
(1976); Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, Psychiatric Labeling and the Rehabilitation of
the Mental Patient, 31 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 329, 335 (1974)). He used these ref-
erences, provided by Joel Klein, counsel for the American Psychiatric Association, as
amicus curiae, to reach the value judgment that unlike the criminal justice system,
"[i]t cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go
388 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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This article reviews the proposed changes in the Baker Act issue
by issue. The justification for each proposed change will be presented
with respect to legal developments and, where appropriate, develop-
ments in mental health disciplines.
Definition of "Mentally Ill"
In Florida, the current definition of "mentally ill" is "having a
mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder which substantially impairs
the person's mental health.""' Circular and tautological, this definition
identifies mental illness as an absence of mental health, without defin-
free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed." 441 U.S. at 429. See Brief
for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, in P. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 297, 303 (1979). Ironically, Klein, former
clerk to Justice Powell and former attorney with the Mental Health Law Project (the
Project provided counsel for appellant Addington), is reported to have been involved
with Justice Stewart's clerks in formulating the following response to Chief Justice
Burger's statement in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1965), ("There can be
little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a state may confine individuals solely
to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicable dis-
ease." Id. at 582-83):
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living
standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community?. . .[T]he
mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from prefer-
ring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State
may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarcertation is
rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those
capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-490.
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as
well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are
physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or an-
imosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physi-
cal liberty.
Id. at 575. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SU-
PREME COURT 370, 373-74, 376-77,(1979).
For a review of what, in civil commitment, must be proved by at least "clear and
convincing" evidence, see A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 1980 SUPPLEMENT 127-28 (1980).
14. FLA. STAT. § 394.455(3) (1981). This definition was amended during the
1982 legislative session, while this article was in publication. See infra note 16.
389[1
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ing mental health.
"Mentally ill" is a legal definition; it is one of the criteria for civil
commitment. As a legal definition, it should give notice of those cir-
cumstances under which a person can be deprived of his freedom. The
current definition of "mentally ill" has so far withstood constitutional
challenge for vagueness because statutorily" it must be read in con-
junction with the other criteria for commitment (e.g., likely to injure
others, or likely to injure self). 16 Some courts, such as Pennsylvania's,17
have found even better definitions of mental illness18 to be unconstitu-
15. FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2)(a) (1981).
16. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977). The definition enacted in 1982
is:
an impairment of the emotional processes, of the ability to exercise con-
scious control of one's actions, or of the ability to perceive reality or to
understand, which impairment substantially interferes with a person's abil-
ity to meet the ordinary demands of living, regardless of etiology, except
that, for the purposes of this act, the term does not include retardation or
developmental disability as defined in chapter 393, simple intoxication, or
conditions manifested only by antisocial behavior or drug addiction.
FLA. STAT. § 394.455(3)(effective July 1, 1982). While this definition is substantially
similar to the one here proposed, the 1982 changes in the Baker Act fell far short of
those needed.
17. Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 960 (1976). See Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Md. 1979) (medical
concept of mental illness insufficient, legal definition should be relied upon in taking
personal liberty); Bell v. Wayne County Gen'l Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
Compare, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 330.1400a (1980): "'mental illness'
means a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life"; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(13)(b) (1981): "Mental illness, for purposes of involun-
tary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orienta-
tion, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize real-
ity, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not incldue alcoholism."
These are examples of new legal definitions for mental illness accepted by state legisla-
tures in response to successful litigation against older definitions. They are similar to
the definition of mental illness for Florida proposed here.
18. The unconstitutionally vague Pennsylvania definition specified mental illness
that "so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control; judgment
and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary
or advisable for him to be under care." 339 A.2d at 775 n.14 (quoting section 201 of
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 codified in 50
8
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tionally vague for failure to give fair warning of legally proscribed con-
duct, or to set a standard for restricting governmental discretion. The
current Florida definition may be subject to more successful constitu-
tional challenge in the future.
The proposed definition now substantially enacted, is as follows:
"Mentally ill" means a substantial impairment of emotional
processes, ability to exercise conscious control of one's actions or
ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand, which impair-
ment is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior; it
does not include retardation or developmental disability as defined
in Chapter 393, brief periods of intoxication caused by substances
such as alcohol or drugs, or dependence upon or addiction to any
substance such as alcohol or drugs.
This definition limits legal involvement to situations of major mental
impairment. The definition covers the three aspects of mental function-
ing (emotion, volition and cognition) in words understandable to lay
persons, judges and attorneys, and mental health professionals.19 It pre-
vents mental health professionals from usurping judicial responsibility
for determining the circumstances under which persons can be deprived
of liberty. The definition excludes mental retardation, developmental
disability, intoxication, and dependence or addiction to such substances
as alcohol or drugs. These conditions are addressed by other statutes
and programs in Florida.20
The definition is comparatively conservative. There is substantial
psychiatric literature21 supporting the position that mental illness is a
PA. CONS. STAT. § 4102 (1966)).
19. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 89. See Keiter, A Constitutional Analysis
of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wyoming, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 141, 158
& 160 (1980) (statutory definitions of mental illness are frequently circular or ambigu-
ous and fail to give the term any context; behavioral definition should be used); Note,
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Leg-
islation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1284, 1373, 1428 (1979) (Suggested Statute on Civil Com-
mitment definition of mental illness is specifically recommended).
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 393.061-.20 (1981) deals with developmental disabilities; FLA.
STAT. §§ 396.012-.171 (1981), alcoholism; FLA. STAT. §§ 397.011-.20 (1981) drug
dependency.
21. See, e.g., D. COOPER, PSYCHIATRY AND ANTI-PSYCHIATRY (1967); R.
GEERTSMA, CLINICAL ASSESSMENT IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 238 (1972);
391116:1982
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theory for identifying behavior or thought processes which we do not
S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMA OF CRIME 36, 219 (1967); L. HOHMAN,
CURRENT APPROACHES TO PSYCHOANALYSIS (1960); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF
PUNISHMENT 117-18, 130 (1968); P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND (1958); T. ROTH-
MAN, THE FUTURE OF PSYCHIATRY 247 (1962); T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1966); THE MEDICAL MODEL OF MENTAL ILLNESS (S.L.
Sharma ed. 1970); T. SZASZ, supra note 1; T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS:
FOUNDATION OF A THEORY OF NORMAL CONDUCT (1961); Agnew & Bannister, Psy-
chiatric Diagnosis as a Pseudo-Specialist Language, 46 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 69
(1973); Albee, Models, Myths, and Manpower, 52 MENTAL HYGIENE 168 (Apr.
1968); Ausebel, Relationships Between Psychology and Psychiatry: The Hidden Is-
sues, in CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN TRANSITION (J. Braur ed. 1966); Baur, Legal Re-
sponsibility and Mental Illness, 57 Nw. L. REV. 12, 14 (1962); Cavanagh, A Psychia-
trist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATH. U. L. REV. 25 (1955); Coles, The Limits
of Psychiatry, 31 THE PROGRESSIVE 32 (May 1967); Davidson, The Semantics of Psy-
chotherapy, 115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 410 (1958); Davidson, Point of View, 52 MENTAL
HYGIENE 5 (1967); Eysenek, The Outcome Problem in Psychotherapy, THE INVESTI-
GATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (A. Goldstein ed. 1966); Furrow, Defective Mental Treat-
ment: A Proposal for the Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58
B.U.L. REV. 391 (1978); Goldstein, The Fitness Factory Part I: The Psychiatrist's
Role in Determining Competency, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1144, 1147 (1973); Guiora
& Harrison, What is Psychiatry? A New Model of Service and Education, 130 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1275, 1275 (1973); Halleck, The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process, 2
PSYCHIATRY TODAY 24 (1969); Jackson, 20 STAN. MED. BULL. 202 (1962); Kaschak,
Therapist and Client: Two Views of the Process and Outcome of Psychotherapy,
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 271 (May 1978); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifi-
cations for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); Mariner, A Critical
Look at Professional Education in the Mental Health Field, 22 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
271 (1967); McReynolds, DSM-III and the Future of Applied Social Science, PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125 (Feb. 1979); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An
Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Pugh, The Insanity
Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 104; Robitscher, The New Face of Legal Psychiatry, 129 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 91 (1972); Roche, Symposium on Criminal Responsibility and Mental
Disease: Medical Aspects, 25 TENN. L. REV. 221 (1959); Salzman, Changing Styles in
Psychiatric Syndromes: Historical Overview, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 147 (1973);
Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitude of the Public Toward
Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1970); Sarbin &
Mancuso, Paradigms and Moral Judgments: Improper Conduct is not Disease, 39 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 6, 7 (1972); Shah, Crime and Mental Illness:
Some Problems in Defining and Labeling Deviant Behavior, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 21
(1969); Shepherd, A Critical Appraisal of Contemporary Psychiatry, 12 COMPREHEN-
SIVE PSYCHIATRY 302, 304, 312 (1971); Strupp & Hadley, A Tripartite Model of
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/1
6:1982 Florida's Civil Commitment System 393
understand, rather than a disease susceptible to diagnosis and treat-
ment in the same manner as physical illness. Indeed, the problems of
defining and classifying these conditions remain an ongoing issue. The
new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
111)22 favors the use of the general term "mental disorder" over
"mental illness" or "mental disease." More specific classification of the
disorder may vary with the individual making the classification. The
results of field studies conducted to determine the reliability and corre-
lation of classifications done by different individual raters under the
new "multiaxial system" are given in the manual;23 they show good
Mental Health and Therapeutic Outcomes with Special Reference to Negative Effects
in Psychotherapy, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 187 (1977); Tarrier, The Future of the Med-
ical Model, a Reply to Guze, An Editorial, 167 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 71
(1979); Taylor & Heiser, Phenomenology: An Alternative Approach to Diagnosis of
Mental Disease, 12 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 480 (1972); Tuma, May, Yale &
Forsythe, Therapist's Experience, General Clinical Ability and Treatment Outcome in
Schizophrenia, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1120 (1978); Van Praag,
The Position of Biological Psychiatry Among the Psychiatric Disciplines, 12 COMPRE-
HENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 1 (1961); Wooten, Academic Lecture: The Place of Psychiatry
and Medical Concepts in the Treatment of Offenders, 17 CAN. PYSCHIATRIC A.J. 365
(1972) "[lIt is time to admit that the sick and the wicked are not scientifically distin-
guishable ... ." Id. at 371.
But see, e.g., M. SIEGLER & H. OSMOND, MODELS OF MADNESS, MODELS OF
MEDICINE (1976); Ausubel, Personality Disorder is Disease, 16 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 69
(1971); Guze, The Future of Psychiatry: Medicine or Social Science? An Editorial,
165 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE, 225 (1977); Paris, Diagnosis Before Treatment,
20 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC J. 305 (1975); Reiss, A Critique of Thomas S. Szasz' 'Myth of
Mental Illness,' 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1081 (1972); Shagrass, Editorial Book Re-
view, 164 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 380 (1977).
See generally A. FLEW, CRIME OR DISEASE? (1974); Boorse, On the Distinction
Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHILOS. & PUB. AFFAIRS 49 (1975); Coryell & Wetell,
Attitudes Towards Issues in Psychiatry Among Third Year Residents: A Brief Survey,
135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 732 (1978); Houlgate, Rights, Health and Mental Disease, 22
WAYNE L. REV. 87 (1975); Kety, From Rationalization to Reason, 131 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 957 (1974); Macklin, Mental Health and Mental Illness: Some Problems of
Definition and Concept Formation, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW (J. Humber
& R. Almeder eds. 1976); Moore, Some Myths About "Mental Illness", 32 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1483 (1975); Shuman, The Right to be Unhealthy, 22 WAYNE L.
REV. 61 (1975).
22. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980).
23. Id. at Appendix F.
11
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reliability. However, the extent to which this favorable reliability is de-
pendent upon a statistic called the "kappa coefficient" renders the prof-
fered reliability questionable. 4 Other criticisms cite additional sub-
stantive deficiencies in the manual. 25 This is only to suggest that DSM-
III is no panacea to the problems of definition of the term "mentally
24. See, e.g., J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TES-
TIMONY 138-41 (3d ed. 1981), (citing Cohen, Weighted Kappa: Nominal Scale Agree-
ment with Provision for Scaled Disagreement or Partial Credit, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULL. 213 (1968)); Fleiss, Spitzer, Endicott & Cohen, Quantification of Agreement
and Multiple Psychiatric Diagnosis, 26 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (1972);
Helzer, Robins, Taibleson, Woodruff, Reich & Wish, Reliability of Psychiatric Diag-
nosis, 34 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 129 (1977); Janes, Agreement Measurement
and the Judgment Process, 167 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 343 (1979); Spitzer,
Cohen, Fleiss & Endicott, Quantification of Agreement in Psychiatric Diagnosis, 17
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 83 (1967); Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the
Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 125 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 341 (1974).
25. E.g., McLemore & Benjamin, Whatever Happened to Interpersonal Diagno-
sis? A Psycho-social Alternative to DSM-III, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 17 (1979); Mc-
Reynolds, supra note 21; Schacht & Nathan, But Is It Good for the Psychologist?
Appraisal and Status of DSM-II, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1017 (1977); Zubin, But Is
It Good for Science?, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (1977-1978).
Newmark noted that preliminary drafts of DSM-III were beseiged by criticism
concerning lack of specificity in the definition of terms defining schizophrenia. New-
mark, Konanc, Simpson, Boren & Prillaman, Predictive Validity of the Rorschach
Prognostic Rating Scale with Schizophrenic Patients, 167 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 135 (1979). The ultimate value of DSM-III awaits use and tests for reliability
in the various categories, but recent studies continued to note the difficulty of defining
schizophrenia or determining appropriate diagnostic criteria. See, e.g., Newark, et al.,
MMPI Criteria for Diagnosing Schizophrenia, 42 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 366
(1978); Newmark, et al., The Discriminative Value of the Whitaker Index of Schizo-
phrenic Thinking, 42 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 636 (1978); Reade & Wertheimer,
A Bias in the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 44 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 878 (1976). Similarly, critical recent studies of depression have been available.
See, e.g., Endicott & Spitzer, Use of the Research Diagnostic Criteria and the Sched-
ule for Affective Disorders and Schizophreia to Study Affective Disorders, 136 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 52 (1979); Hirschfield & Klerman, Personality Attributes and Affective
Disorders, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1979); Klerman, Endicott, Spitzer, & Hirsch-
field, Neurotic Depressions: A Systematic Analysis of Multiple Criteria and Mean-
ings, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 57 (1979); Owens & Maxmon, Mood and Affect: A
Semantic Confusion, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 97 (1979); Winokur, Behar,
Vanvalkenburg & Lowry, Is a Familial Definition of Depression Both Feasible and
Valid?, 166 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 764 (1978).
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ill."
The proposed definition should reduce inappropriate use of the
mental health system by emphasizing substantial mental impairments,
while excluding civil commitment for conditions such a retardation, de-
velopmental disability, intoxication, substance dependence, and addic-
tion. The civil commitment process will be more efficient once mental
illness is more narrowly and appropriately defined.
Definition of "Likely to Injure Himself"
Currently, there is no statutory definition in Florida for "likely to
injure himself." The Florida Supreme Court stated in In re Beverly:
"In order to conclude that the person is likely to injure himself. . ., the
judge must conclude that there is such a threat of harm as to compre-
hend the positive infliction of injury . . 6
The proposed definition is as follows:
"Likely to injure himself" means that it is more likely than
not that in the near future the person will attempt to commit sui-
cide or inflict serious bodily harm upon himself by violent or other
actively self-destructive means, as evidenced by behavior causing or
attempting the infliction of serious bodily harm upon himself within
twenty days prior to the initiation of the proceeding.
This definition, another part of the criteria for involuntary commit-
ment, incorporates provisions requiring a showing of recent, overt, self-
injurious behavior.
With "likely to injure himself" now statutorily undefined in the
Baker Act, mental health professionals are left with the uncomfortable
and inappropriate discretion to do something, they cannot do: accu-
rately and consistently predict dangerousness to self. Mental health
professionals predict dangerousness to self much more frequently than
self-injury actually occurs. One study indicated that psychiatric predic-
tions of suicide would produce five erroneous commitments for every
person who might actually commit suicide. 7 Another researcher con-
26. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487.
27. Greenland, Evaluation of Violence and Dangerous Behavior Associated with
Mental Illness, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 345, 354 (1971). See generally Under-
395 I1
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cluded that highly accurate predictive tools are not even available for
such supposedly high risk populations as suicide attempters.28
The base rate for suicide is extremely low. Despite what one might
think from the media's portrayal, only about one percent of people at-
tempting suicide actually succeed in killing themselves within one year
of the attempt.2 9 Identifying and helping the truly suicidal present
many problems. It has been proposed that a mental health professional
who could correctly identify four out of five potential suicides would
possibly erroneously hopitalize five individuals for every person who
might actually kill himself.30
The inability to predict suicide, and especially the broader behav-
ior of self-injuriousness, is further complicated by the following consid-
erations. Suicide is not necessarily a mentally disordered act. Suicide
may be an appropriate response to such circumstances as terminal ill-
ness, the loss of a loved one or extreme degradation. Thus, suicide can
be the product of conscious, rational decision-making, and may even
correlate with "mental health." 31 "Mental health professionals usually
cannot judge the rationality of a suicide attempt on any medical or
objective scale. They must rely, instead on their own subjective deter-
wood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
28. Murphy, Clinical Identification of Suicidal Risk, 27 ARCHIVES GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 356, 357 (1972).
29. Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 227, 239 (1974) and literature reviewed in Id. at 237-40.
30. Id. at 259-62 where Greenberg developed the following example. In a hypo-
thetical medium sized city where 1,000 people survive a suicide attempt, ten will kill
themselves within the following year. If mental health profesionals were 80% efficient
in predicting suicide (80% correctly identified as suicides and nonsuicides, 20% mis-
identified), eight of the ten suicides will have been accurately identified, and only two
of the 794 [80% of (1000 minus eight)] predicted non-suicides will suicide. However,
only eight of the 206 (1000 minus 794) predicted suicides will suicide (4% accuracy).
This means that for every one person (4%) who will suicide committed as dangerous to
self, 24 people will be erroneously committed; for every ten truly suicidal persons cor-
rectly committed, 240 persons who would not suicide will be committed. In order for all
surviving suicide attempters to be appropriately at liberty, the prediction decisions of
mental health professionals should be 99% efficient because only one percent of suicide
attempters actually kill themselves within a year of the attempt.
31. Id. at 234-36 n.46; Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of
the Mentally 1Il, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1227 n.141 (1974).
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mination of normal and abnormal responses to events, a function for
which they are not specially qualified by training or experience. ' 32 Ex-
cept for obvious cases like slashed wrists, distinguishing suicidal behav-
ior from other potentially self-destructive behavior is difficult. Smoking
cigarettes, racing cars or climbing mountains does not result in involun-
tary commitment, yet such behavior may be quite hazardous to self.
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson was told in 1954 that a return
to the Court following a heart attack would kill him. When he died five
days after returning to the bench, his choice was praised.33
Unless Florida is prepared to engage in preventive detention for
alleged suicides, which would further exacerbate at enormous cost Flor-
ida's already high per capita rate of confinement, the statutory defini-
tion for "likely to injure himself" should require recent, overt, self-inju-
rious behavior. The reported suicide rate for the United States in 1974
was one out of every 8500 persons.34 On the other hand, of those who
attempt suicide, the death rate reported has varied from one in seventy
to one in fifty.35 The recent overt behavior requirement will at least
reduce the extent to which the current civil commitment system inef-
ficiently and unsuccessfully engages in pure speculation.
An argument can be made that the recent overt behavior require-
ment should not apply for continued involuntary commitments because
of the alleged "masking" effect.36 "Masking" is the artificial suppres-
sion of violence accomplished by a controlled institutional environment.
A short time period, e.g., twenty days within which overt behavior must
have occurred, enhances the validity of a dangerousness prediction; the
shorter the time period, the more accurate the prediction, and the
greater the reduction of erroneous. and inappropriate commitments.
This benefit should be weighed against the nominal impact of any so-
called "masking effect." In the California experience, by permitting no
32. B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 51 (1978).
33. In Memoriam Mr. Justice Jackson, 349 U.S. XXVII, XXVIII-XXIX
(1951).
34. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 87.
35. Tuckman & Youngman, Identifying Suicide Risk Groups Among Attempted
Suicides. 78 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 763 (1963).
36. See People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978)(en banc); Scopes v.
Shah, 59 A.D.2d 203, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911 (App. Div. 1977). These cases are critiqued
in a letter from Robert Pass to Winsor Schmidt (Sept. 25, 1980).
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more than two 14-day periods of involuntary commitment for suicidals,
fewer than one percent over a two-year period required the second 14-
day period, with none of them suiciding. This compares with a suicide
rate of three percent within six months for those committed for longer
periods under the previous statute.87 If commitment of suicidals
"masks" anything, it may mask the possible harm of commitment to
suicidals.
The requirement of recent, overt, self-injurious behavior in the
definition for "likely to injure himself" will effect statutorily what is
already constitutionally required by many courts"8 and widely endorsed
by commentators.8 9 The proposed definition will also reduce inappropri-
ate and potentially harmful commitments and should enhance the
37. See ENKI, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-
71) 152 (1972). Indeed, long periods of commitment may increase the rate of suicide
rather than decrease it. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 236, 250, 256-59; Light,
Treating Suicide: The Illusions of a Professional Movement, 25 INT'L SOC. ScI. J.
475, 482-84 (1973); Pokorny, Myths About Suicide, SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR: DIAGNOSIS
AND MANAGEMENT (H. Resnick ed. 1968).
38. See Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (D. Md. 1979); Bension v.
Meredith, 455 F. Supp. 662, 673 (D.D.C. 1978); Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106,
1110 (D. Hawaii 1977); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen.
Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976); Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 960 (1976).
But see United States ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill.
1978); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 515, 309 N.E. 733 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L.
REV. 157, 205 (1979)(even an overt act is not enough without further explanation and
circumstances); Elliott, Procedures for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Al-
leged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 231 (1970); Griffith & Griffith, Duty to
Third Parties, Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic Con-
cepts for Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 241 (1978); Keiter, supra note
19, at 161-62; Note, supra note 19, at 1376, 1384, 1431 (because of inaccuracy in
predicting dangerousness, the entire dangerousness standard from the Suggested Stat-
ute on Civil Commitment is recommended, including the requirement of a recent overt
act within the past 20 days); Note, Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment in
Pennsylvania, 38 U. PITr. L. REV. 535 (1977). But see, e.g., Tanay, Law and the
Mentally Ill, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 781 (1976).
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treatment of persons who are likely to injure themselves.
Definition of "Likely to Injure Others"
Florida's present statute does not define the term "likely to injure
others." The Florida Supreme Court attempted to fill the gap in In re
Beverly: "In order to conclude that the person is likely to injure...
others, the judge must conclude that there is such a threat of harm as
to comprehend the positive infliction of injury.
The proposed definition is as follows:
"Likely to injure others" means that it is more likely than not
that in the near future the person will inflict serious, unjustified
bodily harm on another person, as evidenced by behavior causing,
attempting or threatening such harm, including at least one inci-
dence thereof within twenty days prior to the initiation of the
proceeding.
This definition for the police power criterion in civil commitment incor-
porates provisions requiring a showing of recent, overt, dangerous be-
havior to others.
Just as mental health professionals are unable to accurately and
consistently predict suicidal behavior, so too, are they unable' to predict
behavior that injures others. Psychiatrists overpredict violence; "for
every correct psychiatric prediction of violence, there are numerous er-
roneous predictions. ' 1 Pressure from the legal system is perceived as
too great for mental health professionals to do other than the "safe"
thing, i.e., predict dangerousness. 2
A dramatic illustration of the invalidity of predictions of violence
occurred in the aftermath of the United States Surpeme Court decision
40. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487. The Florida Supreme Court elaborates:
"Ordinarily, this would refer to physical injury, but the judge may very well conclude
that the person is likely to inflict emotional injury to another. The statute contemplates
the latter as well as the former." Id.
41. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that
Cuts Both Ways, 2 PHYCHIATRY TODAY 43 (Feb. 1969)(reviews existing prediction
studies).
42. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
439, 447 (1974).
1 6:98
17
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
400 Nova Law Journal 6:1982
in Baxstrom v. Herold,4' regarding New York's maximum security fo-
rensic hospitals. The 969 allegedly "dangerous" mentally ill (criminally
insane) persons, detained in forensic facilities after expiration of their
prison terms, were ordered released or committed to civil facilities be-
cause the holdover detention was a constitutional violation. Despite the
original psychiatric determinations that inmates were mentally ill and
too dangerous to be released or even transferred to a civil hospital, one
year after the Supreme Court's order, 702 were in civil hospitals posing
no problems to the staff, 147 had been discharged into the community,
and only seven had to be returned to the forensic facility." Several
years later, 27% were living in the community, two were convicted of
felonies, seven of misdemeanors, and three percent were in maximum
security institutions."5
43. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
44. Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 974, 976 (1968). The balance consisted of deaths (24), transfers (10), convales-
cents (62), and miscellaneous (24).
45. Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of
the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 304, 309 (1972).
A very similar experience ocurred in Pennsylvnia. See Dixon v. Attorney Gen.,
325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY
INSANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (1977) (only four-
teen percent of 438 released "mentally disordered offenders" engaged in injurious be-
haviors within four years of release). See also Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Cocozza & Steadman, Some Refinements in the Mea-
surement and Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1012, 1013-
14 (1976); Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerous-
ness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1972); Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism
among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 200 (1977).
In reassessing their Baxstrom reasearch, Cocozza and Steadman suggested the
generalizability of their results to contemporary patient populations could be limited
because of the high average age (47) and mean length of continuous institutionaliza-
tion (almost 15 years) of the Baxtrom group, and because their retention in institutions
for the criminally insane could have been the result of administrative inertia or discre-
tion rather than dangerousness. Cocozza & Steadman, supra at 1093-94. However,
Cocozza and Steadman concluded elsewhere that incorporating age variables yielded a
false positive ratio of two to one and "if we were to attempt to use this information for
statistically predicting dangerous behavior our best strategy would still be to predict
that none of the patients would be dangerous." Cocozza & Steadman, supra at 1013-
18
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In short, the psychiatrists "lacked the ability properly to diagnose
dangerous mental illness and to determine the necessity for maximum
security confinement."46 Mr. Chief Justice Burger concluded: "There
can be little responsible debate regarding 'the uncertainty of diagnosis
in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' ,47 Reli-
ance upon mental health professional's predictions of dangerousness re-
sults in commitment of several nondangerous persons for every truly
harmful person,48 a minimum overcommitment of several hundred
percent.
Courts now hold that a better approach to the police power crite-
rion for civil commitment is to require findings of specific violent be-
havior rather than to rely solely on a medical assessment of dangerous-
ness.49 Many state civil commitment statutes also require additional
Monahan weathered the bureaucratic inertia suggestion by concluding: "It is not
an acceptable retort to the research for psychiatrists and psychologists to say, after the
fact, that they did not really believe the patients to be violent. If bureaucratic pressure
influences prediction, then that pressure is part of the social reality that should be
empirically studied." J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
51 (1981). Following his extensive review of the dangerousness prediction literature,
Monahan concluded: "It may be that short-term 'emergency' predictions in a person's
normal environment generate more accurate estimates of violent behavior." Id. at 60.
However, a "judicious assessment of the research to date is that we know very little
about how accurately violent behavior may be predicted under many circumstances."
Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
46. Morris, Criminality and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784,
796 (1969).
47. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (citing Greenwood v.
United States, 350 U.S. at 375 and Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption
of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 697-719 (1974)).
See Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371, 390-91 (1972); Wenck, Robison & Smith, Can Vio-
lence be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 395-96 (1972).
48. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 27-33
(1975); Diamond, supra note 42; Laves, The Prediction of Dangerousness as a Crite-
rion for Involuntary Civil Commitment: Constitutional Considerations, 3 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 291 (1975); AMERICAN PSYCIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE REPORT 8:
CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-28 (1975).
49. See Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. at 1173; Bension v. Meredith, 455 F.
Supp. at 672; Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. at 453; Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378; Finken v. Roop, 233
Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764. (1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
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factual information to reduce the unfairness and speculation in involun-
tary commitment for dangerousness.50 The accuracy and imminence of
predicted dangerousness is enhanced by requiring, as suggested in the
proposed definition, evidence of recent behavior that causes, attempts,
or threatens infliction of "serious, unjustified bodily harm on another
person." As noted above,51 the recent overt act requirement mirrors
current legal trends. 2
Definition of "Lacks Sufficient Capacity to Make a Reasonable
Application On His Own Behalf"
Before the Baker Act was amended in 1979, the criteria for invol-
untary hospitalization included mental illness and either 1) likelihood
of injuring self or others, or 2) need for care or treatment and lack of
sufficient capacity to make a responsible application for treatment. 3
The "need for care and treatment and lacking capacity" provision,
challenged as unconstitutionally vague, was upheld by the Florida Su-
preme Court in In re Beverly by incorporating the following judicial
criteria:
If the person is non-dangerous, the judge must conclude that
he is in need of care and treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to
make a responsible application on his own behalf. A mere conclu-
sion that the person is "in need of care and treatment" is insuffi-
cient. The judge must further conclude that such person "lacks suf-
ficient capacity to act for himself."
If the judge concludes that the mental illness manifests itself
in neglect or refusal to care for himself, that such neglect or refusal
poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his well-be-
ing, and that he is incompetent to determine for himself whether
treatment for his mental illness would be desirable, then the crite-
ria of the statute have been met.
However, even though the other criteria are met, a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in free-
50. See 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 206-14 (1978).
51. Supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 36-37.
52. E.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. at 517; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
at 391; Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764.
53. FLA. STAT. §§ 394.467(1)(a)-(b) (1977).
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dom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends should never be hospitalized involuntarily.5 4
Most of the third paragraph is verbatim from the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson.55
The 1979 amendments to the Baker Act removed the "lacks suffi-
cient capacity" language from the statutory criteria, and replaced it
with some of the language from Beverly: "In need of care and treat-
ment which, if not provided, may result in neglect or refusal to care
for himself, and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat
of substantial harm to his well being."5
The problem with the 1979 revision is its failure to incorporate all
of the criteria required by the Florida Supreme Court. There was no
provision, for example, that the person be "incompetent to determine
for himself whether treatment for his mental illness would be desira-
ble. '57 The changes proposed here restore the "lacks sufficient capacity
to make a reasonable application on his own behalf" language required
by the Florida Supreme Court, and provide a statutory definition for
this parens patriae commitment criterion. The suggested definition is as
follows:
"Lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on
his own behalf" means the person's inability, by reason of mental
condition, to achieve a rudimentary understanding, after conscien-
tious efforts at explanation, of the purpose, nature or possible sig-
nificant benefits of treatment; provided that a person shall be
deemed incapable of understanding the purpose of treatment if,
due to impaired mental ability to perceive reality, he cannot realize
that he has recently engaged in behavior likely to injure himself or
others; and provided further that a person shall be deemed to lack
sufficient capacity if his reason for refusing treatment is expressly
54. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487 (emphasis added).
55. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 576: "In short, a State cannot constitu-
tionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family mem-
bers or friends."
56. See FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2)(a)(2) and § 394.467(1)(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis
added).
57. 342 So. 2d at 487.
16:1982 403 1
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based on either the belief that he is unworthy of treatment or the
desire to destroy, harm or punish himself.
This definition specifies objective standards relating to an individ-
ual's mental functioning. 58 It appropriately focuses on the individual's
ability to understand the purpose, nature and benefits of treatment.59
The definition provides for a finding of incapacity when an individual
believes himself unworthy of treatment, or expressly desires to be self-
destructive.
As suggested by Beverly, a finding of incapacity should be a con-
stitutional pre-condition for acceptable parens patriae commitments, 0
i.e., commitments based on the authority to protect individuals who
cannot act for themselves.6" Because civil commitment results in loss of
individual liberty, "due process requires that the nature . . . of com-
mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed. '6 2 The compelling state interest for parens pa-
triae commitment is to provide mental health care for individuals who
cannot address their own mental health needs. Because many mentally
ill persons are as capable of making their own hospitalization decisions
as physically ill persons,63 due process requires a finding of individual
incapacity or incompetence before a mentally ill person can be hospital-
ized involuntarily.
The individual's interest in freedom from inappropriate parens pa-
triae commitment is bolstered by the constitutional right to privacy and
58. For a more specific explanation, see 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. AT 91-93.
59. Halleck, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Behavior Control, 131 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 381 (1974).
60. See 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 90.
61. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). See generally Cole-
man & Solomon, Parens Patriae "Treatment". Legal Punishment in Disguise, 3 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 345 (1976); Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The
State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (1976); Custer, The Origins of
the Doctrine of "Parens Patriae," 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978) (parens patriae jurisdic-
tion, which came to be vested in courts of equity, is based on "a logical but incorrect
restatement of a misprinted precedent"); Horstman, Protective Services for the Eld-
erly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1975).
62. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
63. See, e.g., Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 88-89 (1968).
6:98 I
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autonomy.64 The Florida Constitution states: "Right of Privacy--every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
"165herein ... .
A number of courts have already recognized that the mentally ill
person, like the physically ill person, must be allowed to decide whether
to seek hospitalization, unless the state can show his inability to make
such a decision because of the illness. 6 Other courts have relied on the
reasoning and language of O'Connor v. Donaldson67 to find unconstitu-
tional state laws based only on the parens patriae authority.68 Several
courts have either eliminated parens patriae as a rationale for involun-
tary commitment or found the parens patriae standard so vague and
unreviewable as to violate due process.69
The proposed definition for "lacks sufficient capacity" salvages the
constitutionality of the parens patriae criterion for involuntary commit-
ment and provides more objective standards for assessing such
competency.70
64. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to terminate preg-
nancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception in the
privacy of the home); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976) (right
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances).
65. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
66. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65,
68 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist.
Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D.
Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1978 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
67. 422 U.S. at 575-76.
68. E.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Stamus v. Leonard,
414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Finken v. Roop, 233 Pa. Super. 762, 339 A.2d 764
(1975).
69. E.g., Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Bell v. Wayne
County Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va.
417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974); In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973); In re
Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973).
70. See Note, supra note 19, at 1429 (specifically recommending the adoption of
this suggested incapacity standard).
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Payment for Care of Involuntary Patients
Florida currently allows the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services to require involuntary patients, their spouses, parents of
involuntarily committed children, and third party payors to participate
in the cost of services or to pay fees for services, even if the services are
unwanted. 1 This creates a financial incentive for public mental institu-
tions to admit involuntary patients and to retain them longer than
might otherwise be necessary. Requiring maintenance fees for involun-
tary patients places public mental institutions in a conflict of interests
between expeditious treatment and discharge on one hand, and eco-
nomic reward for holding involuntary patients on the other. The prac-
tice is a financial disincentive to high quality and low cost mental
health care. Furthermore, facilities are thus discouraged from compet-
ing with each other.
The suggested amendment to section 394.457(7) is as follows:
(7) PAYMENT FOR CARE OF PATIENTS.-Fees and fee
collections for patients in treatment facilities shall be according to
s. 402.33, except that no person evaluated, detained, committed or
treated involuntarily pursuant to the provisions of this part, or par-
ents or spouse of the person, or third party payor, shall be required
to participate in the costs or to pay fees incurred for their evalua-
tion, treatment, care, maintenance or custody pursuant to this part;
provided that if, upon the patient's request the patient is placed in
any private facility, the patient shall bear the expense of the pa-
tient's care, maintenance and treatment at such facility.
This amendment codifies the right of involuntarily committed pa-
tients not to pay the costs of unwanted services through their families
or third party payors. There is already some legal support for the pro-
position that involuntary patients should not be required to pay for un-
wanted services.72 While, the state might argue that treatment of invol-
71. FLA. STAT. § 394.457(7) & § 402.33 (1979).
72. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974), 386 F.
Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975);
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1964); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Holey, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d
22, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America, 3
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untary patients results in an implied contract with unjust enrichment of
the involuntary patient; this theory is unlikely to succeed.7 3 The double-
taxation aspects of requiring involuntary patients to pay for state man-
dated treatment is a more viable argument against such payments.7 '
Policy objections to requiring involuntary patients to pay for care
they do not request, include: maintenance fees extracted from involun-
tary patients are not always expended for purposes of their mental
health; enforcement frequently requires those with very little to support
those with even less (rather than a rich relative supporting a poor one);
enforcement creates breaches and rifts in family relationships; and en-
forcement can deplete and exhaust resources that could finance dis-
charge followed by a less restrictive alternative placement, thus perpet-
uating dependence and prolonged involuntary hospitalization. 5
Right to Treatment Plan
While a constitutional right to treatment has not been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court,7T Florida does provide a "statu-
Cal. App. 3d 949, 83 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969); Miller v. State Dep't of Treasury (Reve-
nue Div.), 385 Mich. 296, 188 N.W.2d 795 (1971); Boldt v. State, 98 Wis. 2d 445, 297
N.W.2d 29 (Wis. App. 1980) (state has no claim for support from social security bene-
fits of a person held incompetent to stand trial in mental institution pursuant only to
pending criminal charge); Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State
Mental Patients Held Deprivation of Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 858 (1964);
Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 363 (1968) (discusses attack theories of class legislation, double
taxation, impairments of the obligations of contracts, taking of property without just
compensation, undue delegation of legislative power to administrators, and defective
title).
But cf. Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1979) (not unreasonable to re-
quire contribution from criminally insane person); Ivory v. Wainwright, 393 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 1980) (upholding prisoner pay law); In re Nelson, 98 Wis. 2d 261, 296 N.W.2d
736 (1980) (payment for care upheld for acquittee by reason of mental disease); Op.
Atty. Gen., 074-271 (Fla., Sept. 6, 1974) (patient may be involuntarily committed to
private facility if the cost is born by the patient or guardian).
73. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 32, at 156-58.
74. See, e.g., id. at 158; Annot., supra note 72, at 378.
75. See A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 935
(1974).
76. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573 ("there is not reason now to decide whether
mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment
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tory right to receive individual treatment. 7 The scope of the required
treatment is not clear, however. The current statute merely provides
that no one shall have mental health treatment denied or delayed, that
the least restrictive available treatment shall be utilized, and that a
physical examination must be given within twenty-four hours of
admission. 8
The suggested amendment to section 394.459(2) is as follows:
(d) Not more than 5 days after the beginning of treatment,
each patient shall have and receive an individualized treatment
plan in writing that the patient has maximum opportunity to assist
in preparing. Each plan shall contain at least:
1. A statement of the specific problems and.specific needs of
the patient;
2. A statement of intermediate and long-range objectives, with
a projected timetable for their attainment;
3. A statement and rationale for the plan of treatment for
achieving these objectives;
4. A statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of placement;
5. A specification of treatment staff responsibility and a
upon compulsory confinement by the State"). Id. at 577-78 n.12 (Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), finding a constitutional right to treatment,
vacated; "deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opin-
ion and judgment as the sole law of the case"); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981) ("this Court has never found that the involuntarily commit-
ted have a constitutional 'right to treatment'..."); Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 933
(5th Cir. 1977).
But cf. Burnham v. Department of Mental Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (no constitutional right to treatment), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974) (cit-
ing Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) and Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507).
See also Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W.
4681 (June 18, 1982) (persons involuntarily committed to state institutions for the
mentally retarded have due process rights to: conditions of reasonable care and safety,
freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and "such training as an appropriate pro-
fessional would consider reasonable to ensure [the patient's] safety and to facilitate
[the patient's] ability to function free from bodily restraints." Id. at 4683).
77. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 566-67 n.2; FLA. STAT. § 394.459(2) (1981).
78. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, enforced 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343-
44 (1971), supplemented Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 384 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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description of proposed staff involvement with the patient in order
to attain the objectives;
6. Criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions;
7. The additional disclosure information required in s. 394.459
(3)(a).
The requirement for individualized treatment plans and their elements
are taken from federal court decisions in Alabama and the fifth circuit.
Individualized treatment plans are one of the three fundamental condi-
tions (along with a humane psychological and physical environment,
and sufficient numbers of qualified staff) for minimally adequate treat-
ment in public mental institutions. This does not involve legislative pre-
scription of treatment, but rather identifies and specifies a condition
without which treatment cannot possibly occur.
This amendment would not appear to be unnecessary since these
elements are already prescribed by judicial decision. However, some in-
stitution staff do not know the elements of a treatment plan, or its sig-
nificance; thus this amendment would facilitate implementation of each
patient's statutory right to treatment for mental illness.79
Definition of "Safety Justifying Emergency Treatment"
Regarding the right to express and informed consent, Florida's
statute until recently provided that treatment "may" be rendered a pa-
tient, who refuses treatment and is not discharged, "on an emergency
basis, upon the written order of a mental health professional when such
mental health professional determines treatment is necessary for the
safety of the patient or others." 80 Treatment without consent was only
authorized when an emergency jeopardized the safety of the patient or
others. This section was recently held to be unconstitutional.8 "
79. See also W. SCHMIDT, THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH
LAW (Nat'l A. of Att'y Gen. 1976); Spece, Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the
Least Restrictive Alternative As a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Com-
mitment and the Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1049 (1979);
Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive
Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1
(1978).
80. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (1981).
81. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) and § 394.467(4)(h) have been declared uncon-
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The suggested amendment would add the following language:
"Safety is jeopardized only by a situation threatening death or seri-
ous bodily harm."
It is elementary tort law, according to Prosser quoting Mr. Justice
Holmes, that "'[t] he absence of lawful consent is part of the definition
of an assault.' "82 Consent can be implied "in an emergency which
threatens death or serious bodily harm, [but] the mere desirability of
treatment cannot justify. . .going ahead without the consent of the pa-
tient, or at least that of a near relative."83 Furthermore, "[if the plain-
tiff is known to be incapable of giving consent because of. . .mental
incompetence, his failure to object, or even his active manifestation of
consent will not protect the defendant.""4
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services neverthe-
less changed the presumably clear legislative intent regarding the right
to consent by defining "safety" as "the physical and emotional well
being of an individual separate and apart from threat or violence, ei-
ther physical or verbal. 8 5 There is little direct authority to justify
"emotional well being" as a definition for "safety." The most recent
substantial definition of that word consists of a remand by the United
stitutional because they allowed hearing examiners to make the judicial decision re-
garding competence to consent to treatment during recommitment hearings in violation
of FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(3). Bentley v. State ex rel. Rogers, 398 So. 2d 992 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Section 20(c)(3) gives the circuit courts jurisdiction over
proceedings relating to "guardianship, involuntary hospitalization, the determination of
incompetency." (By similar reasoning, the provisions allowing hearing examiner juris-
diction over continued involuntary hospitalization should also be unconstitutional).
The 1982 legislature addressed the problem identified by Bentley through passage
of CS/HB 665 which changed "hearing examiner" to "court" in section 394.
459(3)(a), and provided that the hearing examiner may issue a recommended order to
the court regarding incompetence to consent to treatment in section 394. 467(4)(h).
The decision in Bentley and the legislative activity occurred while this article was
being written. The proposal here regarding the definition of "safety justifying emer-
gency treatment" is otherwise viable.
82. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 102 (3d ed. 1964).
83. Id. at 104.
84. Id. at 103-04. See also Furrow, Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposal for
the Application of Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U.L. REv. 391 (1978).
85. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. IOE-5.09(10) (1977).
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States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "for consideration of al-
ternative means for making incompetency determinations in [parens
patriae] situations where any delay [in administration of antipsychotic
drugs] could result in significant deterioration of the patient's mental
health."8 Even this decision held, for the police power situation, that
first there must be procedures for ensuring that patient interests, such
as side effects in refusing antipsychotics, are taken into consideration
by a qualified physician; second, that forcible administration of anti-
psychotics does not occur absent findings that patient interests are out-
weighed by a need to prevent violence; and third, that less restrictive
alternatives are unavailable.87
Other courts have defined "emergency" as a situation in which a
physician certifies there has been "a sudden, significant change in the
patient's condition which creates danger to the patient himself or to
others in the hospital,"88 or "where a patient presents a danger to him-
self or other members of society" (or is judicially declared incompe-
tent).89 An administrative bulletin of the New Jersey Division of
Mental Health and Hospitals allowed emergency administration of
medication "if a physician certifies that it is essential to administer
psychotropic medication in order to prevent death or serious conse-
quences to a patient." 90 The prior Florida law that was tracked in
drafting 394.459(3)(a) provided for emergency surgical treatment only
where it is deemed lifesaving, or following a mandatory adversarial
hearing to determine the appropriateness of surgery.91
Notwithstanding some questions regarding procedures for imple-
menting the right to consent,92 the mental patient's constitutional right
86. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 660 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated, 50 U.S.L.W.
4676 (U.S. June 18, 1982) (for consideration in light of In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40
(Mass. 1981). But see note 40 supra.
87. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657.
88. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1313 (D.N.J. 1979).
89. In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980).
90. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1149 (D.N.J. 1978).
91. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(b) and (c) (1979).
92. See Bentley v. State ex rel. Rogers, 398 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981). (FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) and § 394.467(4)(h) violate article 5, section
20(c)(3) of the Florida Constitution regarding circuit court jurisdiction over guardian-
ship, involuntary hospitalization, the determination of incompetency.) By similar rea-
soning, the provisions allowing hearing examiner jurisdiction over continued involun-
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to refuse intrusive treatment, such as the administration of psycho-
tropic (antipsychotic) medication, is becoming recognized in Florida. 3
There are many legal bases for the right to consent to, and refuse,
treatment: privacy and personal autonomy (including the ninth amend-
ment); 94 first amendment protection of thought processes or religious
beliefs; eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment protection
prohibiting use of drugs for control or aversive conditioning; procedural
and substantive due process; equal protection; and using the least re-
strictive alternative.95
As noted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court: "There is no support
in common law for the proposition that treatment, medical or psychiat-
ric, constitutes a legally nonreversible medical decision. . . .In a soci-
ety ruled by laws [rather than by individuals], social actions that in-
fringe or control individual freedoms must be judged by legal
tary hospitalization should also be unconstitutional.
93. In re Rewis, Case No. 80-2011B (Division of Administrative Hearings, Feb.
20, 1981) (citing Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3rd Cir. 1976)); Davis v. Hub-
bard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360
(D. Mass. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978),
enforced, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), refusing stay, 481 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J.
1979) (appeal pending in the Third Circuit); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980);
Geodecke v. Department of Insts., 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979) (en banc) (de-
cided on basis of state law); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976); Kaimowitz v. Department
of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 147, Case No. 73-18434-AW (Mich.
Wayne Co. Cir. Ct. filed July 10, 1973).
94. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23: "Right of Privacy--every natural person
has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life
except as otherwise provided herein."
95. See generally Dubose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug
Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treat-
ment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1976); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy:
Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. L. REv. 461 (1977); Schwarz, In
the Name of Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and the Right to Refuse
Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 808 (1975); Comment, Madness and Medicine:
The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497; Com-
ment, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48
TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975). See also Comment, Brave New World Revisited: Fifteen
Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 879 (1980).
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standards."9 The American Pyschiatric Association has thus recog-
nized the individual's right to refuse treatment:
Except in emergencies, if a patient who is competent to par-
ticipate in treatment decisions declines to accept treatment recom-
mended by staff, we accept the patient's right to refuse. If the phy-
sician believes the patient is not competent to participate in
treatment decisions, he should ask a court to rule on the patient's
competency. If the patient is found not competent, an impartial
third party, designated by the court, should be given the authority
of consent.9"
Many psychiatrists consider forced treatment to be unethical.98
The rule 9 promulgated by the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services flies in the face of this consensus, and the clear
legislative intent.100 The rule, if honored, makes the statutorily man-
dated right to express and informed consent meaningless. The rule re-
quires treatment to occur with the label of "emergency treatment or-
der" whenever there is refusal to consent by a patient, or refusal by the
guardian or guardian advocate of an incompetent patient, or failure to
discharge the refusing patient. The rule does not allow the refusal of
treatment to be honored under any circumstances.
The suggested definition of "emergency" would further clarify leg-
islative intent, and conform Florida's law to recent legal developments.
96. In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d at 751.
97. Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE
RIGHT TO TREATMENT, THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE CARE AND TREATMENT FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL AND MENTALLY RETARDED 12 (Final Draft, May 8, 1975)). But see In
re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. Supp. Jud. Ct. 1981) (a court, not a third party, must
determine what an incompetent patient living in the community would have preferred
when competent before allowing the state to administer antipsychotic drugs; also, only
the least restrictive of either involuntary confinement, or compulsory medication, may
be used-not both).
98. Address by Lewis H. Gaughan, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, Univ. of Richmond Law School (March 6,
1978). See Gaughan & LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychot-
ic Drugs in an Institution, 4 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43 (1978).
99. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1OE-5.1 l(3)(b) (1977).
100. Compare FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (declared unconstitutional, see note
81 supra).
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Treating without consent an individual whose "emotional well being" is
jeopardized is neither constitutionally nor therapeutically appropriate.
"[I]t is universally recognized as fundamental to effective therapy that
the patient acknowledge his illness and cooperate with those attempting
to give treatment."101 Forcibly drugging patients without consent is un-
acceptable in a society ruled by law.
Clinical Record: Confidentiality
The proposed amendment for Florida Statutes section 394.459(9)
is underlined below:
(9) CLINICAL RECORD: CONFIDENTIALITY. -
A clinical record for each patient shall be maintained. The re-
cord shall include data pertaining to admission and such other in-
formation as may be required under rules of the department. Un-
less waived by express and informed consent by the patient or his
guardian or attorney, the privileged and confidential status of the
clinical record shall not be lost by either authorized or unautho-
rized disclosure to any person, organization, or agency. Notwith-
standing s. 90.503(4)(b), no communication made by a patient to a
mental health professional, including but not limited to a psycho-
therapist, may be used for any purpose other than a proceeding
under this chapter. The clinical record shall not be a public record
and no part of it shall be released, except:. ...
Section 90.503(4)(b) is one of the exceptions to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. The exception provides that there is no psychothera-
pist-patient privilege for communications made during a court-ordered
examination of a patient's mental condition.
The proposed amendment preserves the confidentiality and fifth
amendment right of a person examined for his mental condition, in-
cluding a court-ordered examination, not to be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself in a criminal prosecution. With this amendment,
disclosures to a mental health professional could only be used in pro-
ceedings under chapter 394.
A strong case can be made for generally affording the right to
101. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 584.
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remain silent to individuals in the civil commitment process.102 An ex-
ception to the right can be made when refusal precludes the presenta-
tion of evidence regarding treatability and capacity to make informed
decisions concerning treatment. Some courts disagree,10 3 but other
courts apply the privilege against self-incrimination to involuntary civil
commitment proceedings. 104
The Florida Supreme Court decided that the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege provision 0 5 of the old evidence code did not apply to
testimony of the examining physician where the patient was previously
warned that communications would not be privileged. 10 6 Florida's new
102. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 101-04 (applicability of the fifth amend-
ment to civil commitment proceedings and the right to remain silent as a due process
requirement); sources in note 12 supra.
A person in the custody of the police is warned that he or she has a right to
remain silent because of the probability of indirect or subtle coercion to make a state-
ment. Hospital custody in civil commitment is at least as coercive as police custody
because: (1) involuntary mental patients are deprived of liberty and segregated from
friends and family; (2) the person is in an unfamiliar hospital environment at a time of
greatest depression or agitation; (3) patients do not have a right to bail and are depen-
dent upon hospital staff discretion for discharge; (4) patients do not get an attorney
within a matter of hours; (5) patients may not be as mentally capable of protecting
their interests as persons accused of crime; (6) patients receive treatments that can
lessen their ability to remain silent or resist coercive confinement measures; (7) mental
health professionals act as both therapist and agent of the state, whereas police have a
clear adversarial role to persons in custody; and (8) mental health professionals are
probably more experienced and adept at eliciting information than police officers. B.
ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 32, at 75. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 450 U.S. 929 (1981)
(prosecution use, during sentencing phase of capital murder trial, of unwarned state-
ments, without assistance of counsel, to psychiatrist violates fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel).
103. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1980); French v.
Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affid, 443 U.S. 901 (1979);
People ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 38 I11. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967); McGuffin v.
State, 571 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Ramsay v. Santa Rose Medical Center,
498 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
104. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1102; Finken v. Roop, 339 A.2d
764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, Case No. 441-417 (Cir.
Ct. Milw. Wis. filed Aug. 18, 1976), on appeal 249 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1977).
105. FLA. STAT. § 90.242(3)(a) (1973).
106. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489. In addition to the appropriateness of a
warning, the best practice would be to have an attorney present during any psychiatric
interview for civil commitment. See Finken v. Roop, 339 A.2d at 764. See also Lee v.
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evidence code 107 fails to require such a warning, thus increasing the
importance of one commentator's suggestion that the extent of any self-
incrimination protection should be clearly set out in the Florida com-
mitment statutes.10 8
The amendment proposed here is a compromise position. The posi-
tion was recognized in a recent California Supreme Court decision
holding the privilege against self-incrimination only protects mentally
disabled individuals from giving evidence that would tend to implicate
them in criminal activity or subject them to potential criminal prosecu-
tion.109 The amendment would clarify the extent of self-incrimination
protection enjoyed by persons subject to civil commitment in Florida.
Rights of Mental Health Professionals
The suggested amendments to Florida Statutes section 394.460 re-
lating to the rights of mental health professionals are as follows:
(2) Mental health professionals testifying at hearings con-
ducted pursuant to this part may, if appropriately qualified, give
expert testimony:
(a) Describing the present mental functioning of a person
whom the witness has personally examined;
(b) Stating an opinion as to what the prospects are that pro-
posed and available treatment will improve the person's mental
condition;
(c) Stating an opinion whether the person has a mental illness,
as defined in s. 394.455(3); provided that any witness so testifying
shall provide a detailed explanation as to how any such descriptions
and opinions were reached and a specification of all behaviors and
other factual information on which such descriptions and opinions
are based.
County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971) (defendant in criminal proceeding has a right to counsel at
pretrial mental examination).
107. FLA. STAT. § 90.242(3)(a) (1976).
108. Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally IlI Under Florida's
Baker Act: Procedural Due Process and the Role of the Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L. REV.
508 (1974).
109. Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 783, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979).
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(3) Mental health professionals testifying at such hearings
shall not be permitted to give opinion testimony:
(a) Stating the diagnostic category applicable to a person, un-
less the person raises the issue through cross-examination or the
presentation of evidence, or
(b) Notwithstanding s. 90.703, stating a conclusion that a per-
son is likely to injure himself or others, or that a person's neglect or
refusal to care for himself poses a real and present threat of sub-
stantial harm to his well being.
Much has been written about the rights of mental patients, but
comparatively little is said about the rights of the mental health profes-
sionals charged with the care, treatment and honoring of the rights of
mental patients. Mental health professionals complain about spending
an inordinate amount of time in court, in a role they are neither trained
nor qualified to exercise and in an inappropriate adversarial relation-
ship to their patient.110 The suggested amendments delineate the testi-
mony that mental health professionals may offer, limiting it to that
which they are qualified to give.
The amendments excuse mental health professionals from invoking
inconsistent, unreliable and invalid diagnostic labels often established
by vote (e.g., homosexuality voted in and out as a disease) rather than
by scientific verification. Diagnostic labels in the courtroom frequently
communicate impressions of disturbed or incapacitated conditions with-
out providing information useful to the commitment process.111
Also specific psychiatric diagnoses are extremely unreliable and
often contradictory.
Civil commitment proceedings call for detailed information
about the individual's mental and emotional functioning. Descrip-
tive information can be supplied by psychiatric and psychological
witnesses without any reference to diagnostic conclusions which are
often of questionable utility to professionals and meaningless or
110. See generally LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS: FRICTION AT
THE INTERFACE (W. Barton & C. Sanborn eds. 1978); Galie, An Essay on the Civil
Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned to Hate the Adversary System, 6 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 71 (1978); Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1977).
111. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 47, at 741.
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misleading to laymen."
The amendments also relieve mental health professionals of the
uncomfortable responsibility of deciding the legal criteria for commit-
ment. The responsibility of determining whether an individual meets
the legal criteria for commitment lies with the judge or hearing exam-
iner, based on the evidence presented, not with a psychiartrist. A neu-
tral judge is particularly important in view of the considerable evidence
that psychiatric diagnosis is strongly influenced by the socio-economic
histories of both patient and clinician, with a lower patient socio-eco-
nomic history biasing the diagnosis toward greater illness and poorer
prognosis than is actually presented by the clinical picture. 113 This ef-
112. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 105 (citing V. NORRIS, MENTAL ILLNESS
IN LONDON 42-53 (Maudsley monograph No. 6, 1959)) (60% are of agreement on
diagnosis of 6,253 patients when second diagnostician knew the original diagnosis). A
1962 research project illustrates this point: Beck, Ward, Mock, & Erbaugh, Reliability
of Psychiatric Diagnoses: 2. A Study of Consistency of Clinical Judgments and Rat-
ings, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 356 (1962) (average rate of agreement for specific
diagnoses under controlled conditions was only 54%). See generally J. ZISKIN, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 123-45 (1970); Ash, The Relia-
bility of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCH. 272 (1949) (three psychia-
trists all agreed on specific diagnoses in only 20% of the cases and all three disagreed
31% of the time). Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitments, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968) ("The diagnostician has the ability to
shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes. .. ."); Schmidt
& Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A New Look, 52 J. ABN. & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 262 (1956) (47% agreement as to classification of non-organic
psychoses).
See supra notes 22-25. DSM-III probably constitutes an improvement over DSM-
II, but whether reliability and validity are sufficiently high for legal use remain to be
thoroughly reseached. J. ZISKIN, supra note 24 and numerous sources cited therein.
In addition to endorsement by the Florida Bar, the suggested provisions regarding
rights of mental health professionals have been specifically and unanimously endorsed
by the Board of Directors for the Florida Mental Health Association. FLORIDA
MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, BAKER ACT REVIEW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT
(Oct. 1981).
113. See Lee & Temerlin, Social Class, Diagnosis, and Prognosis for Psycho-
therapy, 7 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRAC. 181 (1970) and sources
cited in Ennis & Litwack, supra note 47, at 724 n.108.
See also Roth & Lerner, Sex-Based Discrimination in the Mental Institutional-
ization of Women, 62 CAL. L. REV. 789 (1974) (Psychiatric bias based on sex makes it
easier for a woman to be committed than a man under the same circumstances, results
1418 Nova Law Journal 6:1982
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fect combines with the extremely deficient predictions of assaultive and
suicidal behavior discussed earlier. A review of the literature and re-
search 114 necessarily leads to the conclusion that psychiatric predictions
of dangerousness to self and others, and predictions of the need for care
and treatment, are invalid; that psychiatric judgments are not suffi-
ciently reliable or valid to justify their admissibility under traditional
rules of evidence; and that psychiatric judgments do not convey mean-
ingful or otherwise unavailable information about the issues relevant in
a civil commitment proceeding.
Whether the suggested amendment to the statutory section titled
"Rights of mental health professionals" actually increases or abridges
the rights of mental health professionals probably depends upon the
perception of the individual professional. Some would say the sug-
gested amendments abridge their right to speak freely, the right to use
specialized terminology and expertise to provide greater justice and hu-
manity for their patients. Others would say the suggested amendments
promote efficiency in their court appearances, lessen their adversarial
approach to their patients and free them of judgmental roles.
Admission for Court-Ordered Evaluation, Involuntary
Placement, and Continued Involuntary Placement
The suggested amendments in the last sections of the proposed bill
(Appendix) do the following things:
(1) provide that the "need of care or treatment" criterion for
court-ordered evaluation and involuntary placement be manifest
rather than predicted;
(2) restore the "lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable ap-
in different treatment for women-such as more use of electro-convulsive therapy and
psycho-surgery-and makes it more difficult for women to be released. Women are
often hospitalized for exhibiting traits which would not lead to hospitalization for a
man, such as aggressiveness, running away, or sexual promiscuity.)
114. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 47. The uncertainty, tentativeness, fallibility,
and subjectivity of psychiatric diagnosis and judgment have been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor, 422 U.S. at
584.
See generally Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psy-
chiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP.
U.L. REv. 11 (1976).
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plication in his own behalf" criterion to court-ordered evaluation
and involuntary placement, as required by the Florida Supreme
Court to maintain constitutionality;
(3) change the maximum period of initial involuntary placement
from six months to three months if likely to injure others, or in
need of care or treatment, and from six months to two weeks if
likely to injure self;
(4) allow one continued involuntary placement;
(5) require substantial probability that treatment will significantly
improve the patient's mental condition before continued involun-
tary placement can occur.
Many of the justifications for these suggestions have been dis-
cussed above. Requiring manifest evidence of need for care or treat-
ment, rather than prediction of need, is consistent with the legal trend
toward requiring recent overt acts; this minimizes the extent to which
commitment becomes preventive detention, and recongizes the inability
of any witness to accurately predict another's future behavior.
Restoring the "lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable ap-
plication on his own behalf" criterion to court-ordered evaluation and
involuntary placement assures the constitutionality of the commitment
criteria as required by the Florida Supreme Court in Beverly.115 A
finding of incompetence seems to be a constitutional pre-condition to
commitment against one's wishes.
The suggested amendments also shorten the maximum period of
initial involuntary placement and allow one continued involuntary
placement. Prolonged hospitalization is antitherapeutic and harmful to
patients. One review of earlier studies concluded: "The major thrust of
the evidence is that living in an institution has harmful physical and
psychological effects . . . regardless of the particular characteristics of
the population or the unique qualities of the total institution."116 The
115. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487.
116. Prock, Effects of Institutionalization: A Comparison of Community, Wait-
ing List and Institutionalized Aged Persons, 59 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1837 (1969). See
BARTON, INSTITUTIONAL NEUROSIS (1966); WING & BROWN, INSTITUTIONALIZATION
AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1970); Gruenberg, From Practice to Theory: Community
Mental Health Service and the Practice of Neurosis, 1969 THE LANCET 721; Myerson,
Can Institutionalization Be Prevented?, MASS. J. MENTAL HEALTH 17 (Summer
1972).
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negative effects of prolonged institutionalization so outweigh any bene-
fits of continued confinement that staff ultimately expend more energy
treating the negative secondary effects than they do treating the origi-
nal condition. 117 The issue then becomes the appropriate maximum pe-
riod of involuntary commitment. The broadest proposal for amending
civil commitment standards presented by the President's Commission
on Mental Health limits the original commitment to six weeks, with
one possible six week extension.11 8 The initial commitment period in
Michgan has been sixty days,119 ninety days in California12 0 and Wash-
ington, 21 and four months in Maine.1 22 There is statistical support for
an involuntary commitment period of no more than ninety days. 23 The
American Psychological Association, the American Orthopsychiatric
Association and leading commentators agree with the amendments pro-
posed here: no one should be involuntarily committed to a mental insti-
tution for more than a total of six months. 24
California has had different commitment periods for persons
presenting different problems. For example, when a patient demon-
strates at least an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to
others (likely to injure others), the commitment period is limited to
ninety days. Persons presenting at least an imminent threat of taking
See also Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalization
as Potential Public Policy for Mental Patients, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982)
(reviewed ten studies randomly assigning treatment modes of seriously ill psychiatric
patients and found no case where hospitalization was more beneficial than alternative
treatment).
117. LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, 437-50, 514-20, 749-55
(B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973). See also O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574-75.
118. TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE
TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, reprinted in 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 117-22
(1978). [hereinafter cited as TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES].
119. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1472 (1980).
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5300-5304 (Deering 1979)(the Code pro-
vides for 14 days of intensive treatment plus further treatment not to exceed 90 days.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.320 (1975).
122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2334 (Supp. 1978).
123. See Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental Health in the Handling of
Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674 (1974).
124. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 32, at 130; B. Ennis & P. Friedman,
supra note 117, at 437.
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their own life (likely to injure self) are subject to two fourteen-day
commitment periods. 125 This different policy for suicidals is consistent
with the lack of substantial evidence that mental health services suc-
cessfully prevent suicides.1 28 In fact, there is some evidence that invol-
untary treatment may increase the rate of suicide.1 27 The President's
Commission on Mental Health suggests a forty-eight hour commitment
for suicide attempters.1 28 Greenberg recommends physical and medical
interference for twenty-four hours maximum. 29
One evaluation of California's overall experience with limited term
commitments came to the following conclusions:
-"patient discharge was affected by time periods at which staff
decisions were forced by non-therapeutic requirements;"
-"the 14-day certification time period for involuntary patients
conforms closely to the optimum time periods utilized by profes-
sional staff without any legally imposed limitations;"
-"having the patient committed until medically ready for dis-
charge did not result in any better prognosis than when the pa-
tient was mandatorily released;"
-"results indicate little correlation between prognosis and keep-
ing individuals hospitalized until medically ready for discharge;"
-prior to the statutory limitations, "involuntary patients were
hospitalized longer than voluntary," while as a result of the limi-
tations, "the trend reversed;"
-the study "supports the contention by some professionals that
there is little correlation between treatment duration and later
outcomes;"
-the results "negate the prediction that mandatory discharge at
a specified time would result in a significant detriment to treat-
125. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5150-5152, 5200-5213, 5250-5268 (Deering
Supp. 1979). There is also a provision for a 72-hour evaluation.
126. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 256 (the few controlled studies on the
effectiveness of treatment for suicidals are inconsistent or negative); Light, Treating
Suicide: The Illusions of a Professional Movement, 25 INT'L SOC. SCl. J. 475, 482-84
(1973).
127. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 236, 250, 256-59.
128. TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL IssuEs, supra note 118.
129. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 243.
1 422 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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ment and functional level of the discharged patient." '
Several United States Supreme Court decisions support limited pe-
riods for involuntary commitment. The Court held in Jackson v. Indi-
ana that persons incompetent to stand trial can be confined only for a
limited period of time: "At the least, due process requires that the na-
ture and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed."1 31 In McNeil v. Direc-
tor, the Court held that "just as the [Jackson] principle limits the per-
missible length of a commitment on account of incompetence to stand
trial, so it also limits the permissible length of a commitment 'for ob-
130. A. Urmer, A Study of California's New Mental Health Law (1969-1970),
ENKI Research Institute, 1242-51.
131. 406 U.S. at 738. In Jackson, a mentally defective deaf mute was found
incompetent to stand trial in cases involving two separate robberies of four and five
dollars respectively, and was committed indefinitely for treatment until competence
could be restored. At the time of the appeal, the petitioner had been confined for three
and one-half years; the record indicated it was unlikely he would ever be able to fully
participate in his trial. The Court indicated there must be progress toward that degree
of competence, the goal of his confinement. If it was not likely that goal would be
achieved, then the State must either release him or initiate the customary civil commit-
ment proceeding. The Court set no specific time limits, but noted his three and one-half
year confinement to date and cited New York legislation providing that a misdemeanor
defendant could be committed for no more than ninety days nor a felony defendant
committed for more than two-thirds of the maximum sentence permissible if convicted.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 730.50(1), (3) (1971).
Jackson is an incompetence-to-stand-trial commitment case, rather than a civil
commitment case, but it illustrates the duration of commitment must relate to the pur-
pose of confinement.
Cf Flicker v. Florida, 352 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (concern
expressed about six months detention in jail after discharge from hospital as competent
to stand trial); Williams & Miller, The Processing and Disposition of Incompetent
Mentally I11 Offenders, 5 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 245 (1981) (Florida mentally ill
offenders spend unnecesarily long periods of time in jail and hospital awaiting court
processing).
See generally, e.g., Comment, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Duration of
Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205 (1981) (proposed a quantitative declining-marginal-benefit criterion for civil com-
mitment based upon a net benefit principle legally grounded in Jackson v. Indiana).
The declining-marginal-benefit criterion appears more technical than may be legisla-
tively or judicially feasible at this time.
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servation.' "132 In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court cited these two
cases for the proposition that involuntary commitment cannot "consti-
tutionally continue" after the basis for commitment ceases.1 33
Extended involuntary commitments in Florida are an inappropri-
ate use of limited resources. Commitment periods seem to correspond
to the length of time that government reimbursement is available
rather than to patient needs. Involuntary commitment periods should
be limited to a maximum of two three-month periods for those who are
likely to injure others or are in need of care or treatment. A maximum
of two two-week periods should be given to those likely to injure them-
selves. Persons who are so dangerous that they commit crimes should
be prosecuted in the criminal justice system. Persons with chronic disa-
bilities should be processed pursuant to guardianship law.
Finally, the amendments provide that the additional involuntary
commitment period can occur only if there is substantial probability
that treatment during the additional period will significantly improve
the patient's mental condition. The two concepts encompassed by this
treatability criterion are:
First, the individual's condition should be susceptible to improve-
ment or cure through techniques that may properly be adminis-
tered involuntarily. A second and equally important aspect of
treatability is that the resources needed to achieve improvement or
cure are available and will be applied."'
132. McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245, 248-50 (1972). In McNeil, a person con-
victed of two assaults in 1966 and sentenced to five years imprisonment was referred to
Patuxent Institution for examination to determine the appropriateness of indefinite
commitment to Patuxent under Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law, MD. CODE
ANN. art. 31B (1971). The prisoner allegedly refused to cooperate with the examina-
tion. No determination was made, the sentence expired, and confinement in Patuxent
continued. Citing Jackson, the Court in McNeil held it was a denial of due process to
hold someone for observation indefinitely, without sufficiently safeguarding his rights,
where there is no reason to anticipate the person will be easier to examine in the future.
McNeil involved commitment of a convicted person for observation and evaluation,
rather than civil commitment; but it illustrates when the purpose of confinement no
longer exists, confinement for that purpose must cease. Thus, confinement of the men-
tally ill cannot constitutioially continue if the basis for commitment (e.g., treatment
for dangerousness to others, treatment for dangerousness to self) no longer exists.
133. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
134. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 93.
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/1
Florida's Civil Commitment System6:1982
The treatability criterion is a corollary and rough equivalent of Judge
Johnson's ruling in Wyatt v. Stickney that persons who are involunta-
rily committed to a mental institution have a "right to receive such
individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to
be cured or to improve his or her mental condition."135 Unless an invol-
untarily committed person is treatable, "the hospital is transformed
into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted
offense." ' In short, "[t]o deprive any citizen of his or her liberty
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeu-
tic reasons and then fail to provide adequate resources violates the very
fundamentals of due process. '13 7
Deliberations about limiting the duration of commitments and re-
quiring treatability should address the consequences of such changes.
The anticipated results include reduced commitment of the many peo-
ple predicted to be dangerous who do not actually inflict harm;
"criminalization" of some frightening or annoying behavior; increased
diversion of persons from the criminal justice system to mental health
treatment program participation agreements; effective intervention in
suicide attempts similar to the successful British program "Samari-
tans"; increased voluntary mental health services; increased utilization
of guardianship; increased demand for and provision of non-mental
hopsital custodial care for the elderly poor; less harm to people in pub-
lic mental hospitals; and more appropriate use of limited resources.""
Conclusion
The Florida Mental Health Act (Baker Act) does not reflect re-
cent developments in mental disability law. Despite its intended design,
135. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784. For a recent exhaustive and sophisticated reha-
bilitation of the right to treatment, relying upon the constitutional principle of the least
restrictive alternative, see Spece, supra note 79.
136. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784 (citing Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943,
950 (1960)).
137. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 785.
138. See 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 94-96.
Cf MD. CODE ANN. art. 31B (1977) (abolishing indeterminate sentence; making
program participation optional with eligible offenders; establishing mandatory twenty-
five year sentence for third-time violent offenders, without parole except through
Patuxent).
1 6:1982
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to encourage voluntary admissions for mental health care, an exces-
sively high proportion of admissions are involuntary. Commitment
hearings in much of Florida are embarrassingly short, especially con-
sidering that the consequences (lifelong stigma, prolonged institutional-
ization) can be worse than conviction for a crime. There are hundreds
of persons in Florida's unaccredited public mental institutions who have
received institutional care for dozens of years, even though institution-
alization is neither the most appropriate nor least restrictive placement.
The result is that their primary problem is the institutionalization syn-
drome itself. Many have the anomolous and illegal classification of be-
ing "voluntary," though incompetent, and without a guardian.
Many of these problems result from a lack of less restrictive alter-
natives. However, they are also the product of any bureaucracy's ten-
dency to follow the path of least resistance. It is still comparatively
easy to have a person involuntarily committed, and recommitted, in
Florida.
The suggested amendments to Florida's Baker Act reviewed here,
reflect recent legal developments. They are consistent with the recom-
mendations of the President's Commission on Mental Health, the na-
tional Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, and the experiences in
other states and countries. Based on the following conclusions of a re-
cent survey of psychiatrists, it is also fair and accurate to say: "Most
psychiatrists are generally in favor of extending civil rights to their pa-
tients" 13 9 and "phychiatrists would be better characterized as support-
ing the increased concern over [legal] rights than as opposing it."140
-Psychiatrists do not favor involuntary civil commitment for in-
dividuals who are mentally ill but not dangerous.
-Psychiatrists favor a restrictive definition of dangerous to
others which is based on recent behavioral evidence and the immi-
nent likelihood of a future ocurrence.
-Psychiatrists hold that "commitment hearings should be
mandatory."
139. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 677 (1978).
140. Kahle & Sales, Due Process of Law and the Attitudes of Professionals
Toward Involuntary Civil Commitment; LISPETT & SALES, NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSY-
CHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (1978).
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-Psychiatrists favor extending a number of rights to the subject
of a commitment petition during the process of involuntary civil
commitment proceedings.
-Psychiatrists favor extending a number of rights to individuals
who have been involuntarily committed.
-There is little in the way of major "differences between the phi-
losophy of psychiatrists and the philosophy of lawyers" which
should influence the wording of involuntary civil commitment
laws. . . . [T]he philosophical rivalry appears to be between the
American Psychiatric Association leadership and membership.
While the leadership prefers to ignore past psychiatric abuses and
to defend the "right" to be "unencumbered by complicated legal
procedures," the membership prefers to protect against future
abuses through legislation. 141
Rather than reflect a so-called "criminalization" of civil commit-
ment, the suggested amendments change the present situation whereby
persons accused of crime are accorded more rights and protections than
persons committed to a mental institution against their will. Legal pro-
tections are particularly important for persons subject to involuntary
commitment, who are least able to protect themselves, or get someone
else to protect them.
The suggested amendments orient Florida's Baker Act toward a
health care model,"4 2 and away from a preventive detention social con-
trol model. The amendments will reduce cost by minimizing inappro-
priate use of expensive mental health facilities and resources.
The manner in which a society deals with its less fortunate and
disadvantaged is often said to be the measure of a civilization. More
immediately the question should be asked: what protections would I
want for myself, my family, or a friend, if we were subject to involun-
tary civil commitment in Florida?
141. 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 677-78.
142. See Cumming & Gover, Therapeutic Consequences of the Involuntary
Commitment Process, 2 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37 (1979) (commitment process
has therapeutic value for patients; adversary process presents role model for rational
approach to problem solving).
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Appendix
A bill to be entitled
An act relating to mental health; amending s.
394.455(3), Florida Statutes, and adding subsection (23),
(24), (25) to said section; providing definitions; amending s.
394.457(7), Florida Statutes; providing an exception to pay-
ment for care; amending s. 394.459(3)(a), (9), Florida Stat-
utes, and adding subsection (2)(d) to said section; specifying
when safety is jeopardized; providing for confidentiality; pro-
viding for individualized treatment plan; amending s.
394.460, Florida Statutes, adding subsections (2), (3) to said
section; prescribing testimony of mental health professionals;
amending s. 394.463(2)(a), Florida Statutes; providing addi-
tional criterion; amending s. 394.467 (1)(b), (2)(d), (3)(a),
(4)(f), Florida Statutes; providing additional criteria; estab-
lishing time limitations.
Be It Enacted By the Legislature of the State of Florida
Section 1. Subsection (3) of section 394.455, Florida Statutes, is
amended and subsections (23), (24), and (25) are added to said section
to read:
394.455 Definitions. - As used in this part, unless the context
clearly requires otherwise.
(3) "Mentally ill" means a substantial impairment of emotional
processes, ability to perceive reality or to reason or understand, which
impairment is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior; it
does not include retardation or developmental disability as defined in
Chapter 393, brief periods of intoxication caused by substances such as
alcohol or drugs, or dependence upon or addiction to any substances
such as alcohol or drugs.
(23) "Likely to injure himself" means that it is more likely than
not that in the near future the person will attempt to commit suicide or
inflict serious bodily harm upon himself by violent or other actively
self-destructive means, as evidenced by behavior causing or attempting
the infliction of serious bodily harm upon himself within twenty days
prior to initiation of the proceeding.
1 428 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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(24) "Likely to injure others" means that it is more likely than not
that in the near future the person will inflict serious, unjustified bodily
harm on another person, as evidenced by behavior causing, attempting
or threatening such harm, including at least one incident thereof within
twenty days prior to initiation of the proceeding, which behavior gives
rise to reasonable fear of such harm from said person.
(25) "Lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application
on his behalf" means the person's inability, by reason of mental condi-
tion, to achieve a rudimentary understanding, after conscientious ef-
forts at explanation of the purpose, nature or possible significant bene-
fits of treatment; provided that a person shall be deemed incapable of
understanding the purpose of treatment if, due to impaired mental abil-
ity to perceive reality, he cannot realize that he has recently engaged in
behavior likely to injure himself or others; and provided further than a
person shall be deemed to lack sufficient capacity if his reason for re-
fusing treatment is expressly based on either the belief that he is un-
worthy of treatment or the desire to destroy, harm or punish himself.
Section 2. Subsection (7) of section 394.457, Florida Statutes, is
amended to read:
394.457 Operation and administration.-
(7) PAYMENT FOR CARE OF PATIENTS. - Fees and fee col-
lections for patients in treatment facilities shall be according to s.
402.33, except that no person evaluated, detained, committed or
treated involuntarily pursuant to the provisions of this part, or parents
or spouse of the person, or third party payor, shall be required to par-
ticipate in the costs of pay fees incurred for their evaluation, treatment,
care, maintenance or custody pursuant to this part; provided that if,
upon the patient's request the patient is placed in any private facility,
the patient shall bear the expense of the patient's care, maintenance
and treatment at such facility.
Section 3. Subsections (3)(a) and (9) of section 394.459, Florida Stat-
utes, are amended and subsection (2)(d) is added to said section to
read:
394.459 Rights of patients. -
(2) RIGHT TO TREATMENT. -
(d) Not more than 5 days after the beginning of treatment, each
patient shall have and receive an individualized treatment plan in writ-
429 1
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ing that the patient has maximum opportunity to assist in preparing.
Each plan shall contain at least:
1. A statement of the specific problems and specific needs of the
patient;
2. A statement of intermediate and long-range objectives, with a
projected timetable for their attainment;
3. A statement and rationale for the plan of treatment for achiev-
ing these objectives;
4. A statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions
necesary to achieve the purposes of placement.
5. A specification of treatment staff responsibility and a descrip-
tion of proposed staff involvment with the patient in order to attain the
objectives;
6. Criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions;
7. The additional disclosure information required in
s.394.459(3)(a).
(3) RIGHT TO EXPRESS AND INFORMED PATIENT
CONSENT. -
(a) All persons entering a facility shall be asked to give express
and informed consent for treatment after disclosure to the patient if he
is competent, or his guardian if he is a minor or is incompetent, of the
purpose of the treatment to be provided, the common side effects
thereof, alternative treatment modalities, the approximate length of
care, and that consent given by a patient may be revoked orally or in
writing prior to or during the treatment period by the patient or his
guardian. If a voluntary patient refuses to consent to or revokes consent
for treatment, such patient shall be discharged within 3 days or in the
event the patient meets the criteria for involuntary placement, such
proceedings shall be instituted within 3 days. If any patient refuses
treatment and is not discharged as a result, treatment may be rendered
such patient in the least restrictive manner on an emergency basis,
upon the written order of a mental health professional when such
mental health professional determines treatment is necessary for the
safety of the patient or others. Safety is jeopardized only by a situation
threatening death or serious bodily harm. If any patient refuses con-
sented to treatment or revokes consent previously provided, and if, in
the opinion of the patient's mental health professional, the treatment
not consented to is essential to appropriate care for such patient here-
under, then the administrator shall immediately petition the hearing
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examiner for a hearing to determine the competency of the patient to
consent to treatment. If the hearing examiner finds that the patient is
incompetent to consent to treatment, he shall appoint a guardian advo-
cate, who shall act on the patient's behalf relating to provisions of ex-
press and informed consent to treatment. A guardian advocate ap-
pointed pursuant to the provisions of this act shall meet the
qualifications of a guardian contained in part IV of chapter 744, except
that no mental health professional, department employee, or facility
administrator shall be appointed.
(9) CLINICAL RECORD: CONFIDENTIALITY. -
A clinical record for each patient shall be maintained. The record
shall include data pertaining to admission and such other information
as may be required under rules of the department. Unless waived by
express and informed consent by the patient or his guardian or attor-
ney, the privileged and confidential status of the clinical record shall
not be lost by either authorized or unauthorized disclosure to any per-
son, organization, or agency. Notwithstanding s. 90.503(4)(b), no com-
munication made by an individual to a mental health professional, in-
cluding but not limited to a psychotherapist, may be used for any
purpose other than a proceeding under this act. The clinical record
shall not be a public record and no part of it shall be released,
except: . . .
Section 4. Section 394.460, Florida Statutes, is amended and subsec-
tion (2) and (3) are added to said section to read:
394.460 Rights of mental health professionals. -
(1) No mental health professional shall be required to accept pa-
tients for treatment of mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders. Such
participation shall be voluntary.
(2) Mental health professionals testifying at hearings conducted
pursuant to this part may, if appropriately qualified, give expert
testimony:
(a) Describing the present mental functioning of a person whom
the witness has personally examined;
(b) Stating an opinion as to what the prospects are that proposed
and available treatment will improve the person's mental condition;
(c) Stating an opinion whether the person has a mental illness, as
defined in s. 394.455(3); provided that any witness so testifying shall
provide a detailed explanation as to how any such descriptions and
4311
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opinions are reached and a specification of all behaviors and other fac-
tual information on which such descriptions and opinions were based.
(3) Mental health professionals testifying at such hearings shall
not be permitted to give opinion testimony:
(a) Stating the diagnostic category applicable to a person, unless
the person raises the issue through cross-examination or the presenta-
tion of evidence, or
(b) Notwithstanding s. 90.703, stating a conclusion that a person
is likely to injure himself or others, or that a person's neglect or refusal
to care for himself poses a real and present threat of substantial harm
to his well being.
Subsection 5. Subsection (2)(a) of section 394.463, Florida Stat-
utes, is amended to read:
304.463 Admission for emergency or evaluation. -
(2) COURT-ORDERED EVALUATION. -
(a) Criteria. - A person may be admitted to, or retained in, a re-
ceiving facility for evaluation if there is reason to believe that he is
mentally ill and because of his illness is:
1. Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty;
or
2. In need of care or treatment that manifests itself in neglect or
refusal to care for himself, that such neglect or refusal poses a real and
present threat of substantial harm to his well being, and that he lacks
sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application oh his own behalf.
Section 6. Subsections (1)(b), (2)(d), (3)(a), and (4)(f) of section
394.467, Florida Statutes, are amended to read:
394.467 Involuntary placement. -
(1) CRITERIA. -
(b) Any other person may be involuntarily placed if he is mentally
ill and, because of his illnes, is:
1. Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty;
or
2. In need of care or treatment that manifests itself in neglect or
refusal to care for himself, that such nelgect or refusal poses a real and
present threat of substantial harm to his well being, and that he lacks
sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf.
(2) ADMISSION TO A TREATMENT FACILITY. -
(d) A written notice that the patient or his guardian or representa-
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tive may apply immediately to the court to have an attorney appointed
if the patient cannot afford one.
The petition may be filed in the county in which the patient is
involuntarily placed at any time within 6 months of the date of the
certificate. The hearing shall be held in the same county, and one of
the patient's physicians at the facility shall appear as a witness at the
hearing. If the hearing is waived, the court shall order the patient to be
transferred to the least restrictive type of treatment facility based on
the individual needs of the patient, or, if he is at a treatment facility,
that he be retained there. However, the patient can be immediately
transferred to the treatment facility by waiving his hearing without
awaiting the court order. The involuntary placement certificate shall
serve as authorization for the patient to be transferred to a treatment
facility and as authorization for the treatment facility to admit the pa-
tient. The treatment facility may retain a patient for a period not to
exceed 6 months from the date of admission if the patient is likely to
injure others or is in need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient ca-
pacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf, or for a
period not to exceed 2 weeks from the date of admission if the patient
is likely to injure himself. If continued involuntary placement is neces-
sary at the end of that period, the administrator shall apply to the
hearing examiner for an order authorizing not more than one continued
involuntary placement.
(3) PROCEDURE FOR HEARING ON INVOLUNTARY
PLACEMENT. -
(a) If the patient does not waive a hearing or if the patient, his
guardian, or a representative, files a petition for a hearing after having
waived it, the judge shall serve notice on the administrator of the facil-
ity in which the patient is placed and on the patient. The notice of
hearing must specify the date, time, and place of hearing; the basis for
detention; and the names of examining mental health professionals and
other persons testifying in support of continued detention and the sub-
stance of their proposed testimony. The judge may serve notice on the
state attorney of the judicial circuit of the county in which the patient
is placed, who shall represent the state. The court shall hold the hear-
ing within 5 days unless a continuance is granted. The patient, his
guardian or representative, or the administrator may apply for a
change of venue for the convenience of parties or witnesses or because
of the condition of the patient. Venue may be ordered changed within
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the discretion of the court. The patient and his guardian or representa-
tive shall be informed of the right to counsel by the court. If the patient
cannot afford an attorney, the court shall appoint one. The patient's
counsel shall have access to facility records and to facility personnel in
defending the patient. One of the mental health professionals who exe-
cuted the involuntary placement certificates shall be a witness. The pa-
tient and his guardian or representative shall be informed by the judge
of the right to an independent expert examination by a mental health
professional. If the patient cannot afford a mental health professional,
the judge shall appoint one. If the court concludes that the patient
meets the criteria for involuntary placement, the judge shall order that
the patient be transferred to a treatment facility or, if the patient is at
a treatment facility, that he be retained there or that he be treated at
any other appropriate facility or service on an involuntary basis. The
judge shall consider testimony and evidence regarding the patient's
competence to consent to treatment. If the judge finds that the patient
is incompetent to consent to treatment, he shall appoint a guardian ad-
vocate who shall act on the patient's behalf relating to the provision of
express and informed consent to treatment. The order shall adequately
document the nature and extent of a patient's mental illness. The judge
may adjudicate a person incompetent pursuant to the provisions of this
act at the hearing on involuntary placement. The treatment facility
may accept and retain a patient admitted involuntarily for a period not
to exceed 3 months if the patient is likely to injure others or is in need
of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable
application on his own behalf, or for a period not to exceed 2 weeks if
the patient is likely to injure himself, whenever the patient is accompa-
nied by a court order and adequate documentation of the patient's
mental illness. Such documentation shall include a psychiatric evalua-
tion and any psychological and social work evaluations of the patient.
If further involuntary placement is necessary at the end of that period,
the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order au-
thorizing not more than one continued involuntary placement.
(4) PROCEDURE FOR CONTINUED INVOLUNTARY
PLACEMENT. -
(f) If the patient by express and informed consent waives his hear-
ing or if at a hearing it is shown that the patient continues to meet the.
criteria for involuntary placement, and that there is a substantial
probability that treatment will significantly improve the patient's
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mental condition, the hearing officer shall sign the order for continued
involuntary placement. The treatment facility shall be authorized to re-
tain the patient for a period not to exceed 3 months if the patient is
likely to injure others or is in need of care or treatment and lacks suffi-
cient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf, or
for a period not to exceed 2 weeks if the patient is likely to injure
himself. There shall be no more than one continued involuntary place-
ment period.
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Speedy Trial Rights For Florida's Juveniles: A Survey
of Recent Interpretations by Florida Courts
"Delay of justice is injustice."1 This maxim is embodied in the Bill
of Rights2 and in Florida's Constitution: 3 it is implemented by the fed-
eral government's Speedy Trial Act of 1974" and by Florida's Rules of
Criminal and Juvenile Procedure.5 The right to a speedy trial is incor-
porated into the statutory provisions or court rules of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia.6
This note provides a practical interpretive guide to Florida's un-
derstanding of juvenile rights to a speedy determination when a juve-
nile is accused of a delinquent act.7 It compares and contrasts pertinent
provisions of Florida's Juvenile Justice Act8 with state court rules to
show 1) how the act's language has been interpreted; 2) the results
reached through these interpretations; and 3) how differing fact pat-
terns and rapidly changing law can produce ambiguous precedent.9 In
order to facilitate understanding the importance of juvenile rights in
the context of speedy resolution of pending charges, a brief background
. Walter Savage Landor (1775-1864), an English poet, essayist and novelist.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3161-74 (1976).
5. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180 (1981).
6. See Poulos & Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Stan-
dard in Search of a Statehouse. 28 HASTINGS L.J. 353, 376 n.53 (1976).
7. In 1950, the Florida Constitution was amended to define violations of law by
children as "acts of delinquency" rather than as crimes. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 15. The
new constitution adopted in 1968 preserved this juvenile court concept and philosophy.
Id.
8. The short title of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes covering proceedings re-
lating to juveniles, FLA. STAT. § 39.05, the speedy trial right, was amended in 1981.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180, as amended, became effective Jan. 1, 1981.
9. The diligent practitioner must be alert to the subtle and frequent changes in
the language of the juvenile statutes and rules which could render relatively current
decisions inapplicable because they were based on language in effect at the time of the
offense.
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of the historic speedy trial guarantee to all criminally accused will be
given. 10
The United States Supreme Court recognized the diverse functions
served by speedy trials. Speedy trials are an important safeguard
against oppressive pre-trial incarceration and an effective means for
minimizing anxiety accompanying public accusation. Speedy trials
limit impairment of an accused's defenses to the extent impairment re-
sults from lost witnesses or fading memories.11 The Court has also
stressed societal interests at stake in securing an accused's speedy trial;
preventing overwhelming case bacdogs which enable defendants to ne-
gotiate pleas to lesser offenses and curtailing the accused's opportunity
to commit other crimes if free on bond while awaiting trial.12
The United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision Barker
v. Wingo,1 established a framework for guidelines to assist courts in
determining when trial delay violated a defendant's constitutional right
to speedy trial. 4 The Court declined to set precise limits, believing this
function more appropriate for legislatures. In Florida, both the legisla-
ture and supreme court delineated these speedy trial limits for
juveniles. 15
The language of Florida's juvenile rules appears unambiguous.
Uncertainty develops when the language of the rules and the language
of their legislative counterpart conflict,16 or when situations not ex-
pressly resolved by the language of either arise. These circumstances
necessitate consideration of persuasive authority, most often found in
10. Juveniles in Florida were not granted the speedy trial right until 1973 when
chapter 39 was revised to reflect the procedural mandates of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). The creation of shorter time limits than due process required was based on the
theory that the juvenile justice system should operate swiftly. See generally CONTINU-
ING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, FLA. Juv. L. & PRAC. (1979) for
history and development of the juvenile system in Florida.
1I. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
12. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
13. Id.
14. Relevant factors include the length of delay, the reason for delay, assertion of
defendant's right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530.
15. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(a) (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(a) (1981).
16. Compare FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(e) (1981) with FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6)
(1981). For discussion of this conflict, see infra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying
text.
55
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Speedy Trial Rights for Florida Juveniles6:1982
the language and interpretation of analogous criminal procedure rules
used in adult court.1 7 This need for logical persuasive case law is prob-
lematic since Florida courts traditionally adhere to the philosophy that
"juveniles constitute a special and distinct class of citizens with partic-
ularized needs to be afforded unique treatment by the state."' 8 If
juveniles are in fact deserving of "unique treatment" it is arguable that
decisions and procedures adopted in adult criminal cases are inapplica-
ble and inappropriate for juvenile delinquency cases despite factual
similarities.' 9
During its 1981 session the legislature substantially revised Flor-
ida's Juvenile Justice Act.20 These revisions, the most significant since
the Act's major overhaul in 1978,21 call for harsher treatment of juve-
nile offenders. They are the legislature's response to public alarm over
rise in juvenile crime. They may also protend serious erosion of the
enhanced procedural benefits currently afforded juveniles. The avowed
purpose of the Act is to assure all children "the care, guidance, and
control, preferably in each child's own home, which will best serve the
moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child and the
best interests of the state. '2 2 The delicate balance between the interests
of the state and the interests of the child is threatened now that one
interest is gaining preeminence. Earlier provisions, now more severe,
permit serious and repeat offenders to be removed from the juvenile
system and treated as adults in all respects. 23 Florida courts must re-
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (1981).
18. A.D.T. v. State, 318 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
19. See L.G. v. State, 405 So. 2d 252, 253 n.3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(availability requirement of adult criminal rule not pertinent to juvenile rule); In re
D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980) (delinquency proceedings exist to remove children
from the adult criminal justice system and punish them in a manner suitable and ap-
propriate for children); G.A. v. State, 391 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (expressed state policy of treating juvenile offenders differently from adult
offenders).
20. See Evans, Juvenile Justice: The Legislature Revisits Chapter 39, 55 FLA.
B.J. 697 (1981).
21. Ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws 1318-66.
22. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(b) (1981).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(c)(3) (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(b)
(1981) (providing for waiver to adult court of a child fourteen or older under certain
circumstances); FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981) (granting authority and discretion
439 1
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main alert to jealously safeguard the distinctive rights of those minors
who remain within the juvenile system. Otherwise, the longstanding
objectives of juvenile court-rehabilitation and restitution rather than
punishment and retribution 2 -- could be sacrificed to appease public an-
ger with the juvenile system.
Supporting the view that the unique aspects of juvenile courts
should be preserved, the remainder of this note will examine the unset-
tled "speedy rights"2 5 guaranteed juveniles and suggest possible ave-
nues for resolving exisiting conflicts.
When the Speedy Right Attaches
Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.180(a)26 Time. Every case in
which a petition has been filed alleging a child to be delinquent or
dependent shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing without de-
mand within ninety (90) days or the earlie(r) of the following
dates:
(1) The date the child was taken into custody.
(2) The date the petition was filed."'
to the prosecutor to file a charge directly in the adult criminal division if the child is
sixteen or seventeen and public interest requires adult sanctions be considered); FLA.
STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981) (providing for grand jury indictment of a child, regardless
of age, if the crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment).
24. G.A., 391 So. 2d at 722 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966))
and FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2) (Supp. 1978).
25. The term "speedy rights" will hereinafter be used since a corresponding right
to a timely-filed instrument of accusation, unique to juveniles, will also be discussed.
Provisions of FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180 (1981) not dealt with in this note are the effect of a
mistrial or order of a new trial (8.180(e)) and the exemption from the rule for perma-
nent commitments of children for adoption or placement in a licensed agency
(8.180(f)). These subsections have remained unchanged and virtually unchallenged
since they provide few grounds for controversy.
26. The corresponding FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(a) (1981) reads: "If a petition has
been filed alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act, the adjudicatory hear-
ing on the petition shall be commenced within 90 days of the earlier of the following
dates: .... " (The remainder is identical to the rule).
27. A petition is the accusatory instrument equivalent to the adult information
and is filed in the same fashion by the state attorney. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 140(b)
which reads: "The indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried
shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constitut-
ing the offense charged." The distinctive vocabulary used for juveniles further symbol-
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Unlike the corresponding adult criminal speedy trial rule, the juve-
nile speedy trial rule does not distinguish between misdemeanors and
felonies in setting time limits.28 Nor is the juvenile rule invoked by de-
fendant's demand.29
There are several reasons why swift resolution of pending charges
are especially important to this age group. Adolescents are in the midst
of rapid developmental changes.30 Any enforced delay during a critical
stage of their learning process can have serious deleterious conse-
quences on their ability to mature into responsible adults.31 It is well
established that the efficacy of discipline is a function of its timing.32
Another forceful argument against unnecessarily prolonged exposure to
the adjudicatory process is the strong influence that peers have on a
child's behavior and the possibility of corruption due to association with
delinquents in the system 3 Where an innocent child is mistakenly held
accountable for the delinquent act of another, the stigmatizing effect
can be devastating unless corrected with all possible speed. Where a
izes the intent that they should not be treated as criminals nor dealt with by the pro-
cess used for criminals. Other changes include: summons instead of warrant, finding of
involvement or adjudication instead of conviction, disposition instead of sentence, com-
munity control instead of probation.
28. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(1) (1981) provides a 90-day limit for misdemean-
ors and 180 days for felonies.
29. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(2) (1981) requires a trial within 60 days upon
motion by a defendant demanding it. This aspect of the juvenile rule is disadvantageous
to those juveniles who have previously waived their speedy trial rights and now wish to
proceed swiftly but have no procedural mechanism to reactivate them.
30. L. Kohlberg & R.B. Kramer, Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood
and Adult Moral Development, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 12, 93-120 (1969).
31. Id.
32. R. Walters, R. Park & V. Cane, Timing of Punishment and the Observation
of Consequences to Others as Determinants of Response Inhibition, J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, 2, 10-30 (1965).
33. In 1966, a study of peer influence was conducted by the behavioral research
team of Costanzo and Shaw. They asked children to compare the lengths of a pair of
lines, one line obviously longer than the other. All but one of the children were confed-
erates of the investigators and were told to choose the incorrect line. The child who was
not a confederate altered his own judgment, denying evidence of his senses, and agreed
with the obvious incorrect judgment of the group to conform with his peers. P. Co-
stanzo & M. Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Level, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 37,
967-975 (1966).
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guilty child is appropriately held accountable for his own delinquent
act, he is equally disserved by learning that justice may be thwarted by
dilatory tactics.
The time in which the adjudicatory hearing must be held begins to
run at the earlier of two events: when the child is taken into custody or
when a petition is filed by the state attorney.34 What constitutes "taken
into custody" has been a source of confusion to prosecutors, defense
lawyers and trial judges in determining the moment the speedy trial
right is triggered. The Juvenile Justice Statute defines the phrase
"taken into custody" as "the status of a child immediately when tem-
porary physical control over the child is attained by a person author-
ized by law, pending the child's release, detention, placement, or other
disposition as authorized by law." 5 Notwithstanding the "plain" lan-
guage of the statute, three district courts of appeal have reached dispa-
rate results when asked to determine when custody begins.
In D.L.M. v. State,s a nine-year-old child was seen emerging from
a house that was burglarized. He was apprehended by the police, taken
back to the house where he was identified by a witness, and then re-
leased to his parents. He was not formally arrested until thirty days
later. The Third District Court of Appeal held that these facts did not
constitute custody within the meaning of the rule.37 Instead of using
the definition set out by the juvenile statute, which might have led logi-
cally to the conclusion that the child had been in temporary physical
control of one authorized by law, the court sought guidance from the
committee note tracing the history of the Florida Rule of Juvenile Pro-
cedure pertaining to speedy trial. Finding that the present rule "evolved
from the criminal speedy trial Rule 3.191, and looking to interpreta-
tions under that rule,"3 8 the court determined that the actions of the
police officers did not constitute "custody", since the criminal standard
is defined as "arrest".39
34. This occurs most frequently when a child was not apprehended at the time of
the offense but a complaint was filed againt him at a later date.
35. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(32) (1981).
36. 397 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
37. Id. at 440.
38. Id.
39. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(4) (1981) has an explicit provision defining cus-
tody as arrest or summons. Juvenile rules, however, differ in purpose and intent. See
1442 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reached the same result us-
ing a different analysis in State v. C.B..40 This was a consolidated ap-
peal by the state seeking reversal of three juvenile dismissals where the
juveniles were taken into custody but released the same day.41 Al-
though the court looked first to the statutory definition of custody
found in Chapter 39, it based its finding on a subsection of the statute
in effect at that time which said, "the person taking the child into cus-
tody and detaining the child shall, within 3 days, make a written report
to the appropriate intake officer,.... .42 From this language the court
surmised that the legislature intended to limit speedy time application
to cases where a juvenile was actually detained for a period of time
rather than being released immediately after being taken into custody.
That analysis is no longer valid in light of the legislature's deletion of
those words in its 1981 revision of Chapter 39.43
In G.A. v. State,44 a juvenile shot and killed his mother. The First
District Court of Appeal ordered the boy discharged, finding his cus-
tody effected by law enforcement officers who exercised temporary
physical control by detaining him for questioning before he was re-
leased to a family member.4 5 Instead of filing a delinquency petition
the state attorney immediately sought, without success, a grand jury
indictment for murder.4 When the delinquency petition finally was
filed, it was 26 days beyond the statutory custody limit which, as the
appellate court ultimately found, attached at the time G.A. was first
questioned.4 7
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010 (1981) which mandates that the juvenile rules are to be used
under the Florida Juvenile Justice Act (chapter 39).
40. 401 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
41. Id. at 920.
42. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(2) (1979).
43. Effective July 1, 1981.
44. 391 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
45. Id. at 723. The officer testified that G.A. would not have been allowed to
leave the premises had he attempted to do so before the questioning was completed.
46. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981). An indictment can be returned against a
child of any age who commits an offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment.
The child is then tried and handled in all respects as if he were an adult. If the grand
jury returns a no true bill or fails to act within 21 days, the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction and may proceed as it would in any other case.
47. 391 So. 2d at 724.
4431
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The precise meaning to be given "custody" has not been illumi-
nated by these cases; rather they illustrate the term's elusive nature.
These diverse results suggest a case by case approach is necessary in
determining the custody question, since investigatory questioning by
police officers should not always be viewed as equivalent to custody.
Nevertheless, the anxiety accompanying accusation by an authority
figure and the unique vulnerability of minor children require strict in-
terpretation of the definition set out by the legislature in Chapter 39 to
assure that, in those instances where a child is under physical control of
a law enforcement officer and is not free to leave at any time, the
speedy provisions of the statutes and rules are activated.
The Juvenile Right to a Speedy Accusation
On a question certified to the Florida Supreme Court in S.R. v.
State,48 the court expressly ruled that timely filing of the charging in-
strument is a substantive right guaranteed juveniles by statute.49 Com-
monly called the 45-day rule, this uniquely juvenile right,50 closely re-
48. 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977).
49. Id. at 1019. The tangential issue of substantive versus procedural rights has
significant impact on decisions reached when the statutes and the rules conflict. How-
ever, a discussion of this is beyond the scope of this note. See M.G. v. State, 404 So. 2d
420 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980), State v. L.H., 392 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), S.M. v. State, 398 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), State v.
G.B.P., 399 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) and P.L.H. v. Brownlee, 389
So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) for the diverse treatment given this question
by the five district courts of appeal.
50. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(1)-(7) (1981) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(a)(1)-(3)
(1981). There is no adult rule or statutory counterpart, nor is there a constitutional
equivalent. The United States Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment
speedy trial right is inapplicable to the period prior to arrest or filing of formal charges,
but that due process may still require dismissal if delay was purposeful and caused
substantial prejudice to the defense. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
There are also some statutes of limitations on pre-arrest or pre-filing delays, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3282 providing a five year limit on the filing of federal charges. See also U.S.
v. MacDonald, - U.S. __., 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982) reversing the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' dismissal based on violation of MacDonald's speedy trial rights
under the sixth amendment (MacDonald v. U.S., 632 F.2d 258 (1980)). This cele-
brated murder case involved an army doctor accused of killing his wife and two daugh-
ters. He was arrested but the charges were dismissed. Five years later the grand jury
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lated to the speedy trial right, mandates dismissal with prejudice if a
petition is not filed within 45 days of a specified event. Potential con-
flict exists since the statute triggers the timeclock's start when the child
is "taken into custody"; 51 the juvenile rules require filing a petition
within 45 days from the date the complaint is referred to the "intake
office".52 The intake office is the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services (HRS). HRS personnel are responsible for interviewing
the juvenile with his parents or guardian and recommending appropri-
ate disposition of the charge (i.e., judicial or non-judicial treatment) to
the state attorney.
Conflict could be avoided if, as suggested before, the statutory
"custody" provision is triggered once control over the child is effected
by a law enforcement officer, despite immediate release of the child to
his parent or guardian. This would logically resolve any remaining in-
consistency since the rule would apply only to those clearly non-custo-
dial situations. Both the rule and the statute permit a fifteen day exten-
sion upon motion by the state attorney.'0
Whether the 45-day rule applies to those 16 or 17-year-old
juveniles charged by information directly in the criminal division of the
circuit court remains unclear." In State v. Puckett" the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that the 45-day rule did not apply to an
information filed against a juvenile who was to be prosecuted as an
adult. Puckett sought and won dismissal in the trial court, arguing that
Florida Statute § 39.05(6), which requires timely filing of a juvenile
petition, existed prior to Statute § 39.04(2)(e) which permits the state
indicted him; he was tried and convicted. Chief Justice Burger wrote that once charges
are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable.
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1981).
52. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(e) (1981).
53. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6), as amended in 1981, substituted "for good cause
shown" for the original wording "when in the opinion of the court additional time is
justified because of exceptional circumstances." FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(e) (1981) re-
tains the statute's original language.
54. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981) gives the state attorney authority to file
an information if in his judgment the public interest requires that adult sanctions be
considered or imposed. For a discussion of this provision, see Comment, Prosecutorial
Waiver of Juveniles Into Adult Criminal Court: The Ends of Justice... Or the End
of Justice? State v. Cain, 5 NOVA L.J. 487 (1981).
55. 384 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
4451
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attorney to file an adult information."8 In reversing and reinstating the
information, the appellate court reasoned by negative inference that
since both statutes were amended in the same session, 57 if the legisla-
ture meant to include the filing of informations within the 45-day pe-
riod it would have so specified. 58
In contrast to Puckett, the First District Court of Appeal in LH. v.
State9 equated an information with a petition for purposes of the 45-
day rule where a sixteen-year-old burglary suspect had successfully
transferred his case from the criminal division back to juvenile court.60
The juvenile appealed on the ground that no petition had been filed in
the juvenile division within 45 days as required by statute and there-
fore, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter. The appel-
late court pointed out that "the information filed in adult court was
authorized by statute and gave the adult court jurisdiction over the
cause. By the same token, the transfer to juvenile court was authorized
by the same statute and gave the juvenile court jurisdiction." 61 The
court held that while a juvenile has a substantive right to have the
charge dismissed if it is untimely filed, the information could serve as
the petition, though better practice would call for a petition to be sub-
stituted for the information. 62 Since the information was filed against
I.H. within a week after he was taken into custody, timeliness posed no
problem, but it can be inferred that had it not been filed within the 45
days, the appellate court would have granted the dismissal.
56. Id.
57. Ch. 78-414, 1978 Fla. Laws 1334 amended FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) to allow
45 days rather than the previous 30 days.
58. 384 So. 2d at 661.
59. 405 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
60. On motion of a child, if he can show he has not previously been convicted of
two delinquent acts, one of which is a felony, he must be returned to the juvenile court
for prosecution. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1979). The 1981 revision of this subsec-
tion permits return to juvenile court only for those sixteen or seventeen-year-olds who
are charged with a misdemeanor and do not have the prior record.
61. 405 So. 2d at 452.
62. Id. at 453. As this note went to press the Fourth District Court of Appeal
decided State v. D.C.W., No. 81-1699 (filed Sept. 1, 1982). The court held that the 45-
day rule is not activated until the accused is transferred to the juvenile division. Id.
D.C.W. involved a juvenile originally indicted on an offense that was later reduced
making him eligible for juvenile court treatment.
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The 45-day rule was not raised in State v. Perez,63 where two
juveniles were being held as adults on other charges but were re-ar-
rested for the commission of a sexual assault at the Dade County jail.
The information on this new charge was not filed until 90 days had
lapsed. They moved for a discharge on the ground that as juveniles
they had the right to be brought to trial within ninety days of their
arrest." The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the discharge
holding that the juvenile's speedy trial rights had vested, "and until
such time as the State notifies a juvenile that he is to be considered as
an adult as to certain charges, the juvenile has the right to rely on the
statutes and the rules that protect him in the status of a juvenile."' 5
Implicitly, the 45-day rule is one of those protections.
In view of S.R. v. State6' it can be argued that until the juvenile
court is divested of its jurisdiction over a juvenile, the state must not
deny any juvenile substantive rights to which he is entitled. If this ar-
gument is accepted, the state must file an information on any juvenile
to be prosecuted in adult court within 45 days of arrest or risk
dismissal.
The Dismissal Sanction
The language in Chapter 39 and the Juvenile Rule pertaining to
dismissal for violation of the speedy trial right are identical. Both
provide:
If the adjudicatory hearing is not begun within ninety days or an
extension thereof as hereinafter provided, the petition shall be dis-
missed with prejudice.6"
Neither the statute nor the rule require a motion by the defendant to
activate this provision.68 Thus, it appears not only to be mandatory, but
63. 400 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
64. Id. at 94. They had not yet been found guilty of their other crimes which
would activate section 39.02(5)(d) (stating that once a child is found guilty of a crime
as an adult he shall thereafter be handled as an adult for subsequent crimes).
65. Id.
66. 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977).
67. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(b) (1981); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(b) (1981).
68. Compare with the 45-day rule. Both FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(e) (1981) and
447 1
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automatic. Once the outer limit has expired a juvenile court has no
choice but to discharge the defendant.69
When the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo70 set
forth the four elements that are to be balanced against each other on a
case by case basis in order to determine a defendant's constitutional
right to speedy trial, it also lamented "the unsatisfactorily severe rem-
edy of dismissal" when that right had been deprived .7 The Court went
on to say: "This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that
a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free."7 2 In
Barker the Court found that there had been no denial of speedy trial
even though the delay had been well over five years.
Certainly the mandated dismissal in consequence of exceeding
much stricter statutory or rule-determined lirpits for juveniles must
trouble lower courts even more so. Nevertheless, the dismissal sanction,
whether procedural or constitutional, serves the goal speedy trial is
designed to effectuate-a system disposing of cases with reasonable dis-
patch. Although sometimes both prosecutors and defendants perceive
speed as antagonistic to their interest, 3 there is the public's interest in
maximizing the deterrent effect of prosecution7 4 and in minimizing the
considerable costs of lengthy pretrial detention. 5 Delay of justice also
diminishes victims' respect for the judicial system, especially if victims
perceive the slow process as concern for only the defendant. Victims
FLA. STAT. § 39.05(6) (1981) start with the words "On motions by or in behalf of a
child. . . .
69. Compare with FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(1) (1981) for adults which specifi-
cally provide for a motion for discharge. Moreover, subsection (d)(3) requires the trial
court to make a complete inquiry of possible reasons to deny discharge.
70. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See State v. Bonamy, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 421 (5th
Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1982) for Florida's application of the Barker guidelines.
71. Id. at 522.
72. Id.
73. This is often the situation where a defendant wants to wait and see the out-
come of a co-defendant's separate trial, hoping for an acquittal so he may not be tried.
Barker was such a case.
74. Footnote 8 in Barker referred to a 1968 estimate that over 70% of those
arrested in Washington D.C. for robbery and released prior to trial were rearrested
while on bail.
75. Overcrowded conditions and spiraling costs of running detention centers and
holding facilities are nationwide problems.
1448 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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and witnesses are further angered and inconvenienced when required to
make repeated trips to court due to continuances and other delaying
devices.
Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights
Presumably the harsh realities of the dismissal sanction have man-
ifested in a liberalizing trend regarding exceptions to the speedy right.
This is evident on both national 6 and state levels.7 Generous interpre-
tations of waiver, extension and exclusion provisions make the speedy
countdown appear a flexible restraint. The exceptions are ambiguous in
some situations, creating traps for the unwary. One potential pitfall in
Florida's juvenile rules is misuse of its new waiver provision, which
states simply: "In a delinquency proceeding the child may voluntarily
waive his right to a speedy trial."78
The waiver provision became effective January 1, 1981, and no
appellate decisions have yet construed the rule. The only statutory ref-
erence to waiver of speedy trial is in the section of the Act entitled
Hearings, which says in part: "The right to a speedy trial shall be gov-
erned by the provisions of § 39.05(7), but such right may be volunta-
rily waived by the child in accordance with the Florida Rules of Juve-
nile Procedure."7 (Emphasis supplied). There is no corresponding
provision in the rules of criminal procedure.80
On its face the new provision would favor the conclusion that an
affirmative act by the child is necessary to effectuate a waiver. The
inclusion of the word voluntary should preclude any automatic or un-
76. See Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat.
327. For commentary on these amendments, see Misner, The 1979 Amendments to the
Speedy Trial Act: Death of the Planning Process, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1981).
77. See Poulos & Coleman, supra note 6, at 378-79.
78. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(c) (1981).
79. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(a) (1981).
80. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(2) (1981) and 1980 committee note I declare that
the terms waiver, tolling, or suspensions have no meaning within the context of the
section as amended. The section addresses extensions for a specified period of time. The
juvenile rules retain the term "tolling" in one subsection only - when a child intends
to plead insanity as a defense. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.170(b)(2) (1981) provides that when a
continuance is granted for the purpose of an examination it will "toll the speedy time
rule."
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knowing waiver of speedy time without the child's express acquies-
cence.81 It has been determined that silence or inaction by an adult
defendant does not constitute waiver.82
The accused (whether adult or juvenile) has no duty to bring on
his own trial.83 Nevertheless, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
A.F. v. Nourse8 4 reluctantly discharged the juvenile when defense
counsel stood by without objection to the setting of the adjudicatory
hearing beyond the ninety-day limit. The court held it was bound by
Stuart v. State85 inasmuch as the Florida Supreme Court refused to
equate waiver with defense's failure to point out that the trial date ex-
ceeded speedy limits. 8  Moreover, Judge Hersey, though concurring
with the result reached by the majority in A.F., expressed dismay: "De-
fense counsel, after all remains an officer of the court. . . .Counsel
should not be encouraged to invite error. . . or acquiesce in error. So-
ciety, as well as an individual accused, has rights which merit our at-
tention.1187 The new waiver provision may be more liberally applied in
future decisions if Judge Hersey's displeasure with such defense tactics
is shared among the judiciary.
The ramifications of waiver in the context of the defense motion
for continuance are also unresolved. The Florida Supreme Court in
Butterworth v. Fluellen88 allowed an adult defendant's motion for con-
tinuance to be treated as a waiver of the speedy trial rule. The Fluellen
court held that once the motion was granted, the limitation set out by
the criminal rule was no longer applicable and only federal and Florida
constitutional guarantees remained.8 9 This ruling seems inappropriate
for juveniles, however, since adults retain the right to demand trial
within sixty days, a right unavailable to juveniles. The better practice
would be for the trial court to cite a defense continuance as one reason
81. It cannot be presumed that the Florida Supreme Court would include the
word without intending that it be given full force and effect.
82. State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
83. Dickey v. Fla., 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
84. 383 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
85. 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
86. Id.
87. 383 So. 2d at 759.
88. 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980).
89. Id. at 970.
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for extension of the time for speedy trial rather than as an automatic
"voluntary" waiver by the juvenile.
The waiver provision is most appropriate when non-judicial ac-
tions, such as diversionary programs,90 are employed to resolve minor
infractions best settled out of court. If the infraction cannot be resolved
in this matter the juvenile's charge should not be dismissed for lack of
time to prosecute. Once the juvenile voluntarily waives speedy trial, the
question arises as to whether a new ninety-day period starts to run9 or
whether, under the Fluellen rationale, only the defendant's constitu-
tional rights remain.
Extension of Speedy Time
Florida's juvenile rule and its juvenile statute substantially agree
in their provisions for extending time:
The court may extend the period of time . . . on motion of any
party, after hearing, on a finding that the interest of justice will be
served by such extension. The order will recite the reasons for such
extension. The general congestion of the court's docket, lack of dili-
gent preparation, or failure to obtain available witnesses or other
avoidable or foreseeable delays shall not constitute grounds for
such extension.92
These sections, ostensibly specific and straightforward in their
mandatory language, have been the crux of numerous appeals.93
90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.0333 (1981) authorizing community arbitration as
an alternative to judicial action.
91. This issue was settled for criminal defendants by the Fluellen court, but as
stated earlier, adults retain their right under the Rules of Criminal Procedure to de-
mand a trial within 60 days.
92. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.180(d) (1981). FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7)(c) (1981) differs
only in requiring a finding of good cause or that the interest of the child will be served.
93. See C.S. v. State, 390 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (oral contin-
uance does not extend speedy time. The court must have a finding with reasons cited
and an order); M.M. v. State, 407 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (lack of
written order cannot be cured after time expires); J.R.S. v. Hastings, 374 So. 2d 559
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (must enter order and cite reasons for extension); R.L.P.
v. Korda, 380 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (oral continuance on the
court's own motion does not extend speedy time); M.B. v. Lee, 318 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.
451[11 6:1982
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In clear, unequivocal language three actions are required of the
trial judge: 1) that he conduct a hearing,94 2) that he make a finding of
cause, and 3) that he issue an order reciting the reasons for extension.
The language precludes justifying extensions for the normally avoidable
reasons. By the specific language of both the rule and statute, exten-
sions must be in the "interest of justice" or "the interest of the child. ' 95
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal appeared to reach the
same conclusion in M.B. v. Lee.98 In this case it was unclear whether
the juvenile had made an oral motion for continuance, but the court
stated that even if he had, he was still entitled to dismissal since the
trial judge failed to enter an order reciting the reasons for extension.9"
As discussed earlier" it is an unsettled question whether the crimi-
nal or the juvenile procedural clock applies when juveniles are certified
to be tried as adults. In State v. Benton9" the Florida Supreme Court
held that the criminal speedy time limitation of 180 days begins to run
from the time a juvenile is taken into custody, regardless of when certi-
fication occurs or the juvenile court is divested of its jurisdiction. 100 The
court has not determined the proper time limits for speedy trial in in-
stances where juveniles successfully transfer cases from adult to juve-
nile court pursuant to Florida Statute § 39.04(2)(e)(4).' 1 At least
three of Florida's five district courts of appeal have held that pendancy
in adult court should not be considered in determining the expiration of
the ninety-day period. 102
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (must enter a written order of extension and cite reasons even
if it is a continuance by defendants).
94. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.220 on General Provisions for Hearings, particularly
subsection (a) which requires the presence of a child, with two exceptions, and subsec-
tion (g) concerning reasonable notice. This rule would appear to prevent ex parte mo-
tions by the state for extending time.
95. See supra note 92.
96. 383 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
97. Id. at 1365.
98. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
99. 337 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1976).
100. Id. at 798.
101. As of July 1, 1981, this is possible only where the child is charged with a
misdemeanor and can show he has not previously been found to have committed two
delinquent acts, one of which is a felony.
102. W.M. v. Tye, 337 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State ex rel.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal justified this exclusion of
time by suggesting that without it, a juvenile defendant, aware that he
did not meet the statutory requirement of certification as an adult,
could sit back and wait until the ninety days neared expiration before
moving the case back to juvenile court, resulting in inadequate time for
the state to bring him to trial.103 Notwithstanding the remote possibil-
ity defendants would choose this tactic, and concurring with the court's
opinion that the legislature did not intend such procedural "game play-
ing", 1°4 it is nevertheless unfair to exempt the portion of a juvenile's
speedy rights the state consumes with paper-shuffling. It is unlikely
that the juvenile could successfully return to juvenile court unless the
state had originally filed an information erroneously. 05 An extension
could be granted the state if the defendant is shown to be engaging in
the procedural gamesmanship the Fourth District Court envisioned.
The interest of justice would thus be served. This alternative comports
with a literal reading of the statute and rules which dictate the appro-
priate procedure for extensions but do not provide for exclusions of
time. The public interest in a speedy trial need not be overlooked by
either prosecution or defense. Where counsel uses delay techniques
purely for tactical advantage, the court's contempt power may be
brought to bear upon the offending attorney.
Conclusion
Difficult and complex "speedy" dilemmas are too often left to trial
court decision making on issues not adequately addressed by juvenile
rules or statutes. Nowhere is there guidance as to what actions by
juveniles constitute unexcused delay.' 0 6 Nor is there a test of "continu-
Ortez v. Brosseau, 403 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); I.H. v. State, 405 So.
2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
103. 337 So. 2d at 226.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 101. After all, the state is the record-keeper and should
know if the juvenile's prior record meets the statutory requirement.
106. This possibility often arises when a juvenile fails to show for a hearing. But
is any extension of time permitted without the presence of the defendant or defense
counsel in light of the express provisions requiring his presence? See supra note 94.
4531
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ous availability" applicable to juveniles as there is for adults.1", May
the trial court discount speedy time lost to the state when a minor uses
a false name or invalid address to evade service of summons?108 A myr-
iad of other questions remain unanswered.
Some courts justify applying adult criteria used in the criminal
division where juvenile standards are nonexistent. As the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated in State v. L.H.,109 "absent legislation, a
juvenile's rights are ordinarily similar to those of an adult." ' In con-
trast, other courts steadfastly maintain the position that juveniles are a
"distinct class of citizens" ' requiring unique treatment.
Since the legislature has provided a statutory mechanism for cer-
tain classes of recidivistic juveniles considered appropriate candidates
for adult treatment,11 2 it seems inappropriate that courts arbitrarily
substitute adult standards for all juveniles whenever explicit case or
statutory authority is lacking. 3 The children remaining within juvenile
jurisdiction should not suffer the spillover effect resulting from public
hysteria over a supposed teenage crime wave. Statistics do not justify
it" 4 nor does essential justice permit it. A comprehensive statutory and
107. See supra note 19.
108. See McKenzie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1244, 1246 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (inference that circumstances such as these would be viewed unfavorably to the
defendant despite lapse of speedy time).
109. 392 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
110. Id. at 296 (citing Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975)).
111. See supra note 18.
112. See supra note 23.
113. The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the state had no appellate
rights with respect to a dismissal on speedy trial grounds since there was no statutory
authority for it. W.A.M. v. State, 1982 Fla. Law Weekly 186 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.,
Jan. 13, 1982). Significant in this holding is the court's strict adherence to the principle
of allowing the legislature to enact the laws and the courts to interpret them. Neverthe-
less, for much of the juvenile court's day-to-day decisionmaking there is a woeful lack
of legislative directives.
114. The Uniform Crime Reports accumulated by the United States Department
of Justice from law enforcement agencies across the nation recently released these
figures for the five-year period from 1976 through 1980: Murder arrests for persons
over age 18 increased by 5%; murder arrests for persons under 18 increased by less
than 1%; burglary arrests for adults rose by 15%; burglary arrests for juveniles went
down by 11%; theft/larceny by adults jumped by 18%; theft/larceny by juveniles
dropped 6%; arson by adults was up 34%; arson by juveniles was down 7%; motor
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rule mechanism is needed. Until then, vigilance by the courts in main-
taining a separation of adult and juvenile standards is the only way to
prevent the further erosion of juvenile rights.
Barbara D. Stull
vehicle theft by adults were up 12%; motor vehicle theft by juveniles went down 15%;
overall property crime by adults increased 17%; overall property crime by juveniles
decreased 8%. United States Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports 13, 21,
24, 196 (1980). (Gov't Class. No. J 1.14/7:980).
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The Spousal Notice and Consultation Requirement: A
New Approach to State Regulation of Abortion
Introduction
Historically, state government has regulated certain aspects of the
marital relationship in order to further its interest in maintaining a sta-
ble and well-functioning society.1 Regulation of marriage and divorce,
and of marital duties and obligations, has always been considered
within the purview of state powers. In some circumstances the reach of
state power impacts on the private decision-making processes of fami-
lies. However, state intrusion in child bearing, contraception and abor-
tion decisions has not been condoned.3 The United States Constitution
demands that state administration of family law in this area respect the
individual's right of privacy as well as the zone of privacy protecting
the family relationship. This note examines the history of the state's
role in regulating the abortion decision beginning with Roe v. Wade5
and concluding with Scheinberg v. Smith,6 which addressed the consti-
tutionality of a spousal notice and consultation provision as a condition
to abortion.
Historical Overview
Roe v. Wade7 established that the right of privacy, "founded in the
1. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,
546 (1948).
2. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787,
795 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See also Note, Developments In The Law-The Constitution And The Family, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1156 (1980).
5. 410 U.S. 113.
6. Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Smith, 474 F.
Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Fourteenth Amendment concept of personal liberty and restriction
upon state action," 8 encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy. The Court cautioned that "this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation."9
Any interference with this right requires a showing of "compelling
state interests"10 and narrowly drawn legislative enactments expressing
"only the legitimate state interests at stake."11 Consonant with this
standard of review, the Court in Roe concluded that the state's inter-
ests in the health of the mother and in the protection of the potential
human life of the fetus were not sufficiently compelling in the first tri-
mester of pregnancy to justify interference with an abortion decision
made by a physician and his patient.1 2
Focus on Medical Procedures
Since Roe,13 state legislatures have promoted state interests in
mothers' health and in potential human lives by regulating medical
procedures associated with abortion. Courts have carefully reviewed
regulation of medical procedures to determine whether those legislated
measures constituted justifiable state interference with a woman's con-
stitutional right to elect to terminate her pregnancy during the first
trimester.1 4
One such regulatory measure was shown to be an undue invasion
of privacy and was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Doe v. Bolton.15 The Bolton Court construed a Georgia law
requiring both hospital committee approval of an abortion candidate
8. Id. at 153.
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id. at 155.
11. Id.
12. The Court in Roe noted that in light of present medical knowledge, state
interests in safeguarding the health of the mother assume "compelling" stature approx-
imately at the end of the first trimester. The point at which the state's interest in
potential life becomes "compelling" is at viability, because this is when the fetus has
the "capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 154.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. See Note, supra note 4, at 1304.
15. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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and her physician's decision to terminate the pregnancy. 16 Because
committee review after the physician's approval would be review "once
removed from diagnosis"17 and "basically redundant,"1 8 the Court
could not find any "constitutionally justifiable pertinence"' 9 for that re-
quirement. Additionally, the Court invalidated a provision of the law
which required that the abortion procedure be performed in an accred-
ited hospital. It contended that the state failed to prove "that only the
full resources of a licensed hospital, rather than those of some other
appropriately licensed institution, [satisfied the] health interests."20
Seven years later, Illinois was unable to show any compelling in-
terest furthered by a statutory requirement that doctors inform abor-
tion candidates of possible fetal pain caused by particular abortion
methods.2' The statute also mandated candidates wait twenty-four
hours between the consultation and operation. The Court referred to
the Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth,22 which cautioned that reading more meaning into
the term "informed consent" 23 than "the giving of information to the
patient as to just what would be done and as to its consequences...
might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and uncom-
fortable strait-jacket in the practice of his profession."24 In Colautti v.
Franklin25 the Court struck a Pennsylvania law which defined fetal via-
bility vaguely and ambiguously, and subjected physicians to criminal
liability for failure to follow prescribed standards of care for viable fe-
tuses. This exercise of state power unreasonably burdened the medical
profession. Moreover, this exercise unjustifiably hindered a woman's
choice to terminate first trimester pregnancy, in contravention of Roe.26
16. Id.
17. Id. at 197.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 195.
21. Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
22. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8
(1976).
23. 627 F.2d 772, 782.
24. Id.
25. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
26. 410 U.S. 113.
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Focus on the Marital Relationship
Early abortion legislation, which focused on regulating medical
procedures, was predicated on state interests in protecting mothers'
health and potential human life. Later enactments demonstrate a shift
in focus as legislatures premise new statutes on the state's traditional
and more widely accepted role of regulating the marital relationship. In
support of a statute requiring a husband's written consent to his wife's
first trimester abortion, Missouri referred to its authority to impose
joint-consent requirements as conditions to child adoption and artificial
insemination.27 Despite Missouri's efforts to defend the statute as an
incident of its power to regulate the marital relationship, the United
States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth found the statute violative of standards enunciated in Roe.28
[T]he State cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the
state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy.' Clearly, since the state cannot
regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the phy-
sician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate
authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent
abortion during that same period.29
Florida's statute,30 considered in Poe v. Gerstein,"1 also effected a
husband's unilateral veto power over his wife's abortion decision. Like
Missouri, Florida urged that this statute was a valid exercise of its gen-
eral authority to promote society's interest in the marriage relationship.
The fifth circuit acknowledged the state has power to regulate certain
aspects of marriage or the marital relationship, but concluded that this
27. 428 U.S. 52, 68 (1976).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (citations omitted).
29. 428 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted).
30. Fla. Stat. § 458.22(3) (1975) states:
(3) WRITINGS REQUIRED - One of the following shall be obtained by
the physician prior to terminating a pregnancy:
(a) The written request of the pregnant woman and, if she is
married, the written consent of her husband, unless the hus-
band is voluntarily living apart from the wife.
31. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
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intrusion into intra-familial decision-making processes concerning
childbearing could not be sanctioned3 2 in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Griswold v. Connecticut."3 Moreover, said the fifth circuit,
Eisenstadt v. Baird3 4 determined that the individual's right of privacy
included the right to be free from state interference with the child-
bearing decision.3 5
In Poe, the State of Florida's primary contention was that the con-
sent statute was necessary to protect the rights of a husband whose
wife desires an abortion. This proposition was first examined in light of
a husband's interest in paternity of the fetus. The court criticized this
argument and referred to the common law's refusal to compensate fa-
thers for tortious or criminal injury to the fetus.38 Furthermore, be-
cause the Florida statute did not require that the husband sire the fe-
tus, nor even that the woman be married at time of conception to the
same man whose consent was later required for the abortion, the court
found a husband's interest in paternity of the fetus inapplicable.
The state proposed a second source for a husband's interest in his
wife's abortion decision - protection of procreative potential. Legislat-
ing against procreation outside marriage made a husband completely
dependent on his wife for legitimate offspring. Florida asserted its need
to legislate safeguards for a husband's procreative potential within the
confines of marriage.37 Noting that procreation of offspring is one of
the primary purposes of marriage,3 8 Florida postulated that a wife's
repeated abortions could deny her husband the opportunity to have
children. This result would impede the "right to have offspring" enun-
ciated by the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma.9 The court in Poe4" re-
32. id. at 795.
33. 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
34. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. See, e.g., Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 10 (1959).
For a discussion of the father's right, see Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42
CINN. L. REV. 441, 442-44 (1973).
37. 517 F.2d at 796.
38. See, e.g., Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (1942).
39. In Skinner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court overturned a statute providing for
the sterilization by vasectomy or salpingectomy of habitual criminals on the grounds
that the statute "deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetua-
tion of a race-the right to have offspring." 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
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sponded to this argument, explaining that Skinner" did not guarantee
the individual a procreative opportunity, but merely safeguarded his
procreative potential from state infringement. "As a consequence we do
not read Skinner to permit state infringement upon the woman's funda-
mental right to abortion." '42
The New Breed of Abortion Regulation
The constitutionality of governmental regulation of the marital de-
cision-making process concerning abortion is currently defined by the
holdings in Poe' and Danforth.44 Thus, a statute granting a husband
absolute veto power over his wife's decision to terminate pregnancy will
be found unconstitutional notwithstanding the state's societal interests
in the marital relationship nor the husband's interest in the procreative
potential of the marriage. "However, neither Danforth nor Poe consid-
ered whether less intrusive measures designed to insure a husband's
participation in the abortion decision could, within constitutional con-
tours, be predicated on these interests. 45
Scheinberg v. Smith40 considered a challenge to the validity of a
Florida statute requiring a wife to give her husband notice of the pro-
posed abortion and an opportunity to consult with her concerning the
procedure. The statute pertains only to a wife neither separated nor
estranged from her husband. The notice and consultation provision re-
quires as a condition to securing the abortion, that the wife provide her
physician with either 1) a written statement that notice and opportu-
nity have been given or 2) her husband's written consent.'7 The Act
provides that "[a]ny person who willfully performs or participates in
the termination of a pregnancy in violation of the requirements of this
section is guilty of a felony.' 8
40. 517 F.2d 787.
41. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42. 517 F.2d at 797.
43. 517 F.2d 787.
44. 482 U.S. 52 (1976).
45. Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 539 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
46. Id.
47. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(b) (1981).
48. Id.
1 462
Nova Law Journal 6:19821
78
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/1
Scheinberg v. Smith
In 1979, the Florida Legislature enacted the Medical Practice Act,
which contained the following provision governing abortions sought by
married women:
If the woman is married, the husband shall be given notice of the
proposed termination of pregnancy and an opportunity to consult
with his wife concerning the procedure. The physician may rely on
a written statement of the wife that such notice and opportunity
was given, or he may rely on the written consent of the husband to
the proposed termination of the pregnancy. If the husband and wife
are separated or estranged, the provisions of this paragraph for no-
tice or consent shall not be required. The physician may rely upon
a written statement from the wife that the husband is voluntarily
living apart or estranged from her.'9
Dr. Mark Scheinberg, 50 a licensed physician who performs abor-
tions in Florida, filed a class action suit against state enforcement offi-
cials on behalf of all married pregnant women wishing to terminate
their pregnancies. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief on the
ground this provision unconstitutionally abridged married women's
rights to privacy in the abortion decision.
In July, 1979, the District Court denied Dr. Scheinberg's request
to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the spousal notice provision be-
cause it felt he had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success
for proving the provision violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. On final hearing two months later, the District
Court did, in fact, declare the provision unconstitutional, finding it to
be an overly inclusive means to promote marital harmony. State officers
appealed the decision, and in October 1981, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the case. The appellate court
held state interests in furthering the institutional integrity of the mari-
tal relationship were compelling, and were sufficient justification for en-
acting the spousal notice and consultation provision. In the context of
this state interest the court considered also the relation of paternal in-
49. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(10) (1981).
50. Formerly using the pseudonym John Jones, M.D. in Jones v. Smith, 474 F.
Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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terest in marital procreative potential. The case was remanded for fac-
tual determination of whether proper abortion procedures posed a
greater than de minimis risk to future childbearing capabilities.
The court of appeals examined the burden the notice and consulta-
tion provision imposed upon a woman's constitutionally protected right
to have an abortion. In order to trigger the strict scrutiny standard of
review the district court had required plaintiffs to show the provision
met the direct interference test of Charles v. Carey,51 or constituted a
new obstacle "in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice."' 52 In Charles, the seventh circuit declared unconstitutional a
provision of the Illinois abortion statute which required the physician
performing an abortion to conduct a consent consultation with his pa-
tient at least twenty-four hours prior to the operation. Based upon the
Charles5" court's reasoning, both the district and appellate courts in
Scheinberg required a showing that the burden imposed by the statute
was "not de minimis". 5 State regulation not directly interfering with a
woman's abortion decision is not strictly scrutinized and thus does not
call for a compelling state interest. The court of appeals, while recog-
nizing that the notice and consultation provision of Florida's statute left
a married woman "with something less than the completely untram-
meled freedom of choice," 55 compared that burden with the burden im-
posed by Missouri's statute stricken in Danforth.56 The statute in Dan-
forth required husband consent as a prerequisite to abortion. The
Scheinberg court concluded "the intrusion into a woman's ability to
exercise freedom of choice is thus much less here than in Danforth."5
It is ironic that while citing Charles, the fifth circuit engaged in
that weighing process explicitly cautioned against in Charles. The
Charles decision proposed that "undue" defines the ultimate constitu-
51. 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
52. Harris v. McRae proposed this as an alternative indication for strict scrutiny
review. 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
53. 627 F.2d 772.
54. Id. at 777.
55. 659 F.2d at 486.
56. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
57. 659 F.2d at 485. The court noted here that since the statute requires notice
and not consent, the intrusion into a woman's ability to exercise her freedom of choice
is therefore less here than in Danforth.
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tional issue, not merely the threshold requirement for imposing strict
scrutiny.88 Further, the court in Charles found the defendant's pro-
posed statutory interpretation - that the burden imposed must be un-
due in order to invoke strict scrutiny - contained no guidelines for
defining "undue" and would virtually preclude the application of strict
scrutiny to any state interference with the abortion decision.3 ' The
Charles court recognized the dangers of deferring to state legislative
wisdom and therefore proscribed the permissible reach of state power
into the abortion decision. This reasoning led the Charles0 court to
conclude the Illinois abortion statute, requiring a twenty-four hour
mandatory waiting period between c~nsultation and operation, consti-
tuted a burden unjustified by state interests in a woman's first trimester
abortion decision. Similarly, the court of appeals in Scheinberg, after
acknowledging the provision's burden on a woman's freedom to termi-
nate pregnancy during the first trimester, and recognizing the Court's
recent reaffirmation of Roe's61 mandate, could have invalidated the
statute. A recent sixth circuit case illustrates this point:
Since the State has no compelling interest during the first trimester
of pregnancy, no balancing [of State interests] is required. If a reg-
ulation results in a legally significant impact or consequence on a
first trimester abortion decision, it is invalid.6 2
Instead of ending its inquiry at this point, the Scheinberg court
considered the state's claim of compelling interests in maintaining and
promoting the marital relationship and in protecting the husband's in-
terest in the procreative potential of marriage. It stated:
[T]hese interests, weighed together and, for purposes of analysis,
telescoped into a state interest in furthering the integrity of state-
created and regulated institutions of marriage and the family, are
'sufficiently weighty,' Poe, to justify the burden on a woman's abor-
58. 627 F.2d at 777.
59. Id.
60. 627 F.2d 772.
61. 410 U.S. 113.
62. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198,
1204 (6th Cir. 1981).
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tion decision imposed by the spousal notification requirement. 63
The Scheinberg court manipulated Supreme Court precedents,
Zablocki v. Redhail6  and Griswold v. Connecticut,65 to support its
conclusion that the institution of marriage, the cornerstone of civilized
society, is deserving of heightened protection under the constitution. In
Zablocki,6 6 the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law prohibiting remar-
riage of non-custodial parents under support orders absent court ap-
proval. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion identified "[t]he problem
in this case [as] not one of discriminatory classifications, but of unwar-
ranted encroachment upon a constitutionally protected freedom. 67 The
statute found unconstitutional in Griswold"6 operated directly on an in-
timate relation between husband and wife, as well as their physician's
role in one aspect of that relation."9 The Court viewed the relationship
as "lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. 7 0
Furthermore, the court's decision in Poe7 1 specifically rejected the
notion that state intrusion into intra-familial decision-maling processes
concerning childbearing could be justified by state interests in promot-
ing the marital relationship. The fifth circuit read Zablocki,"2 Gris-
wold"3 and Poeq' to support state regulation of the marriage relation-
ship. Somehow the circuit court avoided the stress those decisions
placed on the importance of marriage as an area of privacy deserving
of respect and protection from government interference. Thus, the logi-
cal extension of the principles denoted in Zablocki, Griswold, and Poe
is that the notice and consultation provision unconstitutionally impinges
upon a husband's and wife's individual right to be free from govern-
63. 659 F.2d at 483 (citations omitted).
64. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
65. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66. 434 U.S. 374.
67. Id. at 391-92 (J. Stewart's concurring opinion).
68. 381 U.S. 479.
69. Id. at 503 (J. White's concurring opinion).
70. Id. at 485 (J. Douglas, opinion for the majority).
71. 517 F.2d 787.
72. 434 U.S. 374.
73. 381 U.S. 479.
74. 517 F.2d 787.
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ment intrusion into their personal relationship.
The Scheinberg court urged that the notice and consultation re-
quirement has the effect of furthering "the integrity of marital, and
hence familial, life."'7 5 This conclusion was adduced from expert testi-
mony on record from the district court. The experts, a professional ar-
ray of communication encouragers, included gynecologists, obstetri-
cians, psychiatrists and psychologists..7 No matter how persuasive the
appellate court found that testimony, the court failed to draw a distinc-
tion between a qualified professional's recommendation that his mar-
ried patients communicate and a state's mandate that its married citi-
zens communicate.
Because "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up," 7 the decision to
terminate a pregnancy is not always the product of mutual agreement.
Differences in individual moral and religious convictions might account
for a deadlock between mates in the abortion decision. Additionally, in
situations where a woman has become pregnant by someone other than
her husband, either voluntarily or as the consequence of rape, and fears
physical or emotional abuse, communication of her intention to termi-
nate the pregnancy could have a deleterious effect on the future of the
marriage.7 8 The experts indicated that forced communication does not
necessarily enhance the quality of a marriage and might in many in-
stances produce anxiety and stress, causing the wife to self-abort or to
procure an illegal abortion. 9 It is ironic that under these circum-
stances, the notice and consultation provision could contribute to the
destruction of the same state interest the legislation was designed to
protect, namely the "authenticity" 80 of marriage. The state's stated
75. 659 F.2d at 484.
76. The precise nature of this testimony and the qualifications of the experts are
explained in Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. at 538.
77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
78. 482 F. Supp. at 538.
79. Id.
80. "By authenticity we mean a marital relationship characterized by institu-
tional integrity ... the concept we wish to convey is that the state has an interest in
attempting to ensure that the institution of marriage maintains its identity with its
conceptual essence." 659 F.2d at 484.
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goal - preserving the integrity of the marital relationship - could be
better achieved by refraining from involvement in private marital com-
munications concerning childbearing. Certainly, this result would be
consistent with the Zablocki,81 Griswold,82 and Poe83 decisions.
The court of appeals remanded Scheinberg for factual findings
necessary to determine whether the provision could withstand constitu-
tional attack despite its failure to limit the notice and consultation re-
quirements to jointly-conceived children." The court also directed the
district court to inquire whether abortion procedures detrimentally af-
fect future childbearing capabilities, 85 which in turn might hamper the
procreative potential of the marriage.
The fifth circuit, by remanding to learn whether abortion has more
than a "de minimis" effect on a woman's fertility, may be indicating
that a husband's procreative potential can constitute a compelling state
interest-a status not acknowledged in previous decisions. The Su-
preme Court in Danforth88 expressed an awareness of the "deep and
proper concern and interest that a devoted and protective husband has
in his wife's pregnancy.187 Yet in balancing a husband's concern
against his wife's freedom of choice in undergoing abortion, the Court
in Danforth concluded: "it is the woman who physically bears the child
and who is more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy
[;therefore,] as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.""
The propriety of a husband's concern in his wife's pregnancy was also
recognized in Griswold.89 From Danforth and Griswold one may de-
duce a husband has a proper concern and interest in his wife's preg-
nancy. But Griswold" and Danforth9" cannot be read to suggest that
81. 434 U.S. 374.
82. 321 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. 517 F.2d 787.
84. 659 F.2d at 486.
85. The authors concluded "that induced abortion has no or little, if any, effect
on risk of ectopic pregnancy in subsequent reproduction under a generally favorable
condition." C.S. Chung, M. Mi, R.G. Smith, P.G. Steinhoff, Induced Abortion and
Ectopic Pregnancy in Subsequent Pregnancies (Rev. man. at 12) (19-).
86. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
87. Id. at 69.
88. Id. at 71.
89. 321 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id.
!
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the husband's interest in the procreative potential of the marriage
should be considered a compelling state interest justifying legislation
which burdens a woman's fundamental right to a first trimester
abortion.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals in Scheinberg, relying upon the
authority of Skinner,92 found the husband's ability to procreate entitled
to constitutional protection. As a corollary to this proposition, the court
acknowledged that the state has a "compelling interest in requiring a
wife to inform her husband when she is contemplating termination of a
pregnancy.19 3 In Skinner," the Supreme Court protected an individual
from sterilization by the State of Oklahoma. The rights established in
that case were intended to protect an individual from unjustified gov-
ernmental intrusion in matters of procreation. As noted earlier, the
court in Poe95 explained, "Skinner did not guarantee the individual a
procreative opportunity; it merely safeguarded his procreative potential
from state infringement." 96 Consequently, Poe97 did not interpret Skin-
ner98 to permit state infringement upon a woman's fundamental right
to an abortion. As noted in appellee's petition for rehearing in
Scheinberg, "the court has misapprehended the decision in Poe as it
interprets the rights established in Skinner,. . . [which] were intended
as a shield against governmental interference with individual rights.
The decision was not intended to be a sword which could be used to
enhance a State's power over its citizens."9 Rehearing was denied.
Constitutional Objections
The notice and consultation provision in the Florida Medical Prac-
tice Act is prone to attack as an infringement upon first amendment
freedom of speech guarantees. Because this provision requires a wife to
91. 428 U.S. 52.
92. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
93. 659 F.2d at 485.
94. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
95. 517 F.2d 787.
96. Id. at 797.
97. 517 F.2d 787.
98. 316 U.S. 535.
99. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, Case No. 80-5023 at 3-4.
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notify and consult with her husband on the abortion decision, it neces-
sarily compels speech in the marital relationship. The court in
Scheinberg'00 failed to address the issue, though the argument was
clearly preserved and the request for a rehearing of the case rested on
it. A statute having the potential to impair an individual's freedom of
speech is deserving of careful consideration.
Historically, first amendment freedom of speech and thought has
received special protection as a fundamental liberty serving as the "in-
dispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 101 Judi-
cial and philosophical justification for free speech emphasizes the im-
portance of individual self-expression and its forwarding impact on the
goals of representative democracy and self-government.10 2 In past
cases, first amendment issues have typically focused upon the permissi-
bility of an individual's exercise of free speech in the public forum.
Government interference with this right, in the form of state regula-
tion, has been upheld where the speech is directed to producing or in-
citing imminent lawless action,103 encouraging subversive activities dur-
ing wartime 04 or interfering with public order and tranquility. 05
The Florida statute represents a significant and novel departure
from first amendment issues considered in the past. A distinguishing
characteristic of the statute is that it attempts to compel speech, rather
than inhibit its free exercise. Additionally, the statute seeks to regulate
purely private speech in the context of the marital relationship, in con-
trast to previous instances of permissible state regulation of speech in
the public forum. There is no case law precedent permitting a state to
compel purely private speech, though several court decisions have inter-
preted the nature of this first amendment right.
Wooley v. Maynard08 establishes that the right of freedom of
thought, protected against state action by the first and fourteenth
amendments, includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all. Both are "complementary components of
100. 659 F.2d 476.
101. Id. at 327.
102. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1108 (10th ed. 1980).
103. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
104. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 444 (1969).
105. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
106. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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the broader concept of individual freedom of mind. ' 10 7 Freedom of
speech and association are not, however, absolute.10 8 "They are suscep-
tible of [state] restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger
to interests which the state may lawfully protect."11 9 Accordingly, state
restrictions on free exercise of speech in the public forum have been
justified by state concerns for public welfare. However, the right to re-
main silent enjoys an even greater protection than the right to speak
freely. Involuntary speech may be "commanded only on even more im-
mediate and urgent grounds"110 than those for which the state can pro-
hibit speech. Following this analysis, a court should determine whether
the notice and consultation requirement prevents an immediate threat
to the husband's procreative ability and whether this threat, like speech
107. Id. at 714.
108. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
109. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
110. Id. at 633. The classic right to silence cases have arisen in the context of
state interests in controlling subversive activities. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative In-
vestigation Comm., the Court reversed a contempt conviction arising from a witness'
refusal to disclose to a state legislative committee names of local NAACP chapter
members. The committee sought this information in connection with its investigation of
local Communist activities. Though this was considered a valid legislative interest, the
Court nevertheless required a showing that this interest outweigh the individual's con-
stitutionally protected right of privacy in his views or associations. Further, in order to
establish an overriding legislative interest, the Court required that a "substantial con-
nection" between the information sought and the subject matter of the inquiry be
shown. Because no nexus was proved between the local NAACP and Communist activ-
ities, the Court refused to compel disclosure. 372 U.S. 539 (1963). Cf. Uphaus v. Wy-
man, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). Thus, in Scheinberg, the state must not only prove that its
interest in the procreative potential of a marriage is a valid legislative concern, but
must also show that this interest outweighs or subordinates the married woman's right
to privacy in her communications. Further, the state must show that a nexus exists
between the information sought to be compelled and its interest in the procreative po-
tential of the marriage. 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
Additionally, the requirement that legislation infringing upon protected speech be
precisely drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake emerged in cases
involving disclosures of organizational membership where an individual sought public
employment or office. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). The Court
in this case held that a governmental employer could not condition employment upon
an oath that the employee has not or will not engage in protected speech activities. Id.
Similarly, the court in Scheinberg should not condition a married woman's access to an
abortion upon consultation with her husband.
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inciting riot, is a lawful subject for state regulation. Since infringe-
ments on the right to remain silent must be justified by more urgent
state interests than those interests justifying restrictions on the right to
speak freely, it is imperative to compare the nature of the state's inter-
ests in both situations. By way of illustration, where dangers of subver-
sive activity and hostile demonstrations are exacerbated by an individ-
ual's exercise of free speech in a public place, the state has the duty to
protect its citizens. When a wife desires an abortion, is it proper for the
state to intrude into the private realm of marital communication by
requiring her to voice such an intention as a means of protecting the
husband's procreative potential?"" The nature of the individual rights
involved in this question render it worthy of a judicial response.
The Right of Privacy
Certain aspects of an individual's right of privacy are infringed by
state limitations on first amendment guarantees of freedom of thought
and speech. Privacy, in the abortion context, involves both an individ-
ual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and indepen-
dence in making important decisions. 12 The Florida statute attempts to
compel a woman to speak on a private matter about which she might
choose to remain silent. Further, if a woman is forced to notify and
consult her husband, she loses that feature of privacy which protects
one's independence in decision-making. These characteristics of the
statute are antithetical to fundamental notions of privacy.
*The Equal Protection Argument
In addition to first amendment and privacy attacks on the statute,
perhaps the most severe criticism is based upon equal protection
grounds. Where fundamental rights are involved the equal protection
11. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein." Id. at 642.
112. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). (But note the Court in
Whalen permitted the state to keep computerized records of the names of persons who
obtain certain drugs by prescription owing to its effective security system to prevent
unauthorized disclosure.)
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inquiry must consider whether the notice and consultation provision is
necessary and effective in furthering state interests and whether the
legislation is narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state inter-
ests at stake.""3
The district court in Scheinberg found the statute inadequately
drawn because it was both over and underinclusive. It was held over-
inclusive because it made "no exception for a married woman carrying
the child of someone other than her husband." '114 As the statute is writ-
ten, the husband's interest in the fetus arises from his marriage, not his
paternity. Despite the district court's analysis, the court of appeals
side-stepped this anomaly, focusing instead on whether the abortion
procedure had more than a "de minimis" effect on his wife's child-
bearing capabilities.11 5 The district court found the statute underinclu-
sive because "it does not require a woman to notify and consult with
her husband about an impending hysterectomy or tubal ligation,"1'
and these surgical procedures altogether foreclose marital procreative
potential. It concluded that these failings in the statute rendered it un-
constitutional. It should also be noted that a husband does not have to
consult with his wife if he desires a vasectomy. The court of appeals
acknowledged that the statute was indeed underinclusive. Nevertheless,
it reversed the lower court's ruling finding that court's analysis unper-
suasive; Florida's legislature may properly choose abortion as singularly
deserving of special legislation.
113. 410 U.S. 113. For a discussion of the necessary relationship between classi-
fications and legislative objectives for equal protection purposes, see Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). The Consti-
tution's demand for equal protection of the laws requires that those who are similarly
situated be similarly treated. The success of a classification is determined by the mea-
sure of its ability to treat similarly those similarly situated with respect to furthering a
valid state interest. Where fundamental rights are involved, the legislative means must
bear a "tight fit" to the legislative ends sought. G. GUNTHER, supra note 102.
114. 482 F. Supp. at 540.
115. "The state interest sought to be furthered by this legislation encompasses
more than merely the husband's interest in a particular fetus .... It encompasses fur-
thering the institutional integrity of the marital relationship, and of the family." 659
F.2d at 486. Cf. 518 F.2d 787.
116. 659 F.2d at 486.
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Conclusion
The spousal notice and consultation provision should have been de-
clared unconstitutional once the court of appeals determined it consti-
tuted an obstacle to a married woman's first trimester abortion choice.
By purporting to balance an individual's actual constitutional guaran-
tee of privacy against a state's compelling interest in marital procrea-
tive potential, the appellate panel invited a novel -albeit ill-advised-
approach to the abortion question. Certainly, opponents of abortion
may take advantage of this new potential weapon and structure restric-
tive statutes under the pretext of procreative potential. One must won-
der whether procreative potential would command equal attention if a
woman sought to regulate or restrict her husband's vasectomy decision.
Finally, one must not ignore the personal protections afforded by Roe
and wonder whether procreative potential will succeed to ultimately
erode what progress Roe has intelligently effected.
Bambi G. Blum
1474 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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Scheinberg v. Smith: Toward Recognition of Minors'
Constitutional Right to Privacy in Abortion Decisions
On October 1, 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in Scheinberg v.
Smith,' that the parental consent provisions of the Florida Medical
Practice Act 2 regarding abortion, unconstitutionally invaded a woman's
right to privacy.3 The judicial precedent leading the court to recognize
this right to privacy for minors was first enunciated by the fifth circuit
in Poe v. Gerstein." The Scheinberg majority found unconstitutional the
Florida Therapeutic Abortion Act's5 requirement that parental consent
must be given children seeking abortion. The requirement violated
young women's fundamental right to privacy in contravention of the
United States Supreme Court's clear pronouncements in Griswold v.
Connecticut' and Roe v. Wade.7
The parental notice and consent cases which led the court to reject
the contested statutory provisions in Scheinberg are the subject of this
comment. Additionally, this comment will briefly examine the history
of privacy afforded children in relation to parental control. The inter-
play of children's abortion rights with the various waiting period provi-
sions of abortion statutes will also be discussed.
I. Children as Chattels
The emerging field of children's rights litigation is a direct result
1. 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
2. FLA. STAT. § 390.001 (4)(a) (1981).
3. Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, (5th Cir. 1981).
4. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. The applicable part of Florida's Statutes section 458.22(3) (1976) reads: "If
the pregnant woman is under eighteen years of age and unmarried, in addition to her
request, the written consent of her parents, custodian, or legal guardian must be
obtained."
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of, and in sharp contrast to, the iniquities to which children were sub-
jected through the centuries. Historically, the law treated minors as
chattels, unable to legally act for themselves.8 In biblical times, as in
the days of the Roman Empire, parental control of an unmarried fe-
male included complete determination of her future. A father had the
right both to sell his daughter in marriage, and to annul her marriage
vows if he chose.9 Though it is true that children's status improved with
the centuries, minors remained charges of their parents.10 There was no
distinction made between the rights or treatment of small children and
of teenagers on the brink of legal or emotional maturity. All were con-
sidered the property of their parents.1
II. Setting the Stage for Scheinberg
The historical treatment of minors would seem to suggest that the
state, in deference to parents' traditional powers, may condition a preg-
nant minor's right to abortion on parental consent. However, in light of
Roe, which established a woman's right to privacy in her abortion deci-
sion, the fifth circuit in Poe v. Gerstein concluded that these privacy
rights must also apply to an unwed, pregnant Florida teenager.
In Roe, the Court held the decision to terminate a pregnancy is
encompassed both in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty and the ninth amendment's reservation of rights to the people.1 2
Thus the right to a "zone of privacy"' s was found to be constitutionally
guaranteed. In Gerstein the appellate court extended Roe's analysis
and held the "fundamental right to an abortion applies to minors as
well as to adults."1 4 The appellate court reasoned that the criteria
enunciated in Roe applied even more forcefully to the pregnant teen-
ager, who could suffer physical and emotional infirmities as a result of
an unwanted pregnancy. Additionally, the pregnant teenager may be
subjected to social condemnation resulting from the abrupt termination
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1167 (1973).
10. 387 U.S. 1.
11. 517 F.2d at 789.
12. 410 U.S. at 153.
13. Id. at 152.
14. 517 F.2d at 791.
1 476 Nova Law Journal
6:1982
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of her education. 5
Because a fundamental right was involved in Gerstein, the fifth
circuit panel strictly scrutinized the Florida statute in order to ascer-
tain whether a compelling state interest justified requiring parental
consent to the minor's abortion. The court found four interests that
could be invoked in defense of the statute: "(a) preventing illicit sexual
conduct among minors; (b) protecting minors from their own improvi-
dence; (c) fostering parental control; (d) supporting the family as a
social unit."'16 None of these interests however, were found sufficiently
compelling to overcome the minor's fundamental right to an abortion.
In Carey v. Population Services International,"7 the Supreme
Court asserted "it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the
state] has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child
. . . as punishment for fornication."18 The Gerstein court observed that
parents do not always act in their child's best interests, and may some-
times act nonsensically or punitively when they learn of their daugh-
ter's pregnancy. 9 Ironically, while the statute considered in Gerstein
authorized parents to make the critical decision in permitting or deny-
ing their daughter's abortion, the Gerstein court made clear that it was
the minor daughter alone who would bear financial and legal responsi-
bility for the coming child.20
The fifth circuit pointed out in Gerstein that the statute requiring
a minor to notify her parents of her pregnancy, effectively impeded the
teenager from procuring an abortion. Certainly the potential for
trauma arises when an unwed teenager must face her parents and tell
them she is pregnant. This can be physically and emotionally
detrimental. 1
15. Id.
16. Id. at 792.
17. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
18. Id. at 695 (citing Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
19. See e.g., Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D.C. Mass. 1975) (In order to
punish their daughter for her pregnancy, the court found that some parents would not
allow the abortion); In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 949, 25 N.Y.S.D.2d 624, 626
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) stating: "There are parents ... who will by act do that which is
harmful to the child and sometimes will fail to do that which is necessary to permit a
child to ... lead a normal life in the community." Id.
20. 517 F.2d at 793. See FLA. STAT. §§ 744.13 & 827.06 (1976).
21. 517 F.2d at 793 n.ll.
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One year after the fifth circuit decided Gerstein, the United States
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth22 in-
validated a state requirement that unmarried minors obtain parental
approval before terminating pregnancies. Relying upon its decision in
Roe v. Wade, the Court held a state cannot proscribe abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy. s The Court reasoned that the state
could not endow a third party with the "absolute and possibly arbitrary
power to prohibit an abortion."2 Nor could the state "delegate . . .a
veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited
from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy. '25 The abortion
decision is so important that not only adults, but unmarried pregnant
minors as well, are protected by the constitution against state
intrusion.26
Supreme Court precedent has established that from the start of
the second trimester of pregnancy, through its duration, the state has a
compelling interest in both the mother's safety and the potentiality of
human life.2 7 States may, therefore, limit the availability of abortions
in the later trimesters and impose place, time and other conditions on
abortion procedures and availability. 28 However, abortions performed
within the first trimester fall outside this significant state interest, even
though "power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches
beyond the scope of its authority over adults. 29 Minors are different
from adults, but are not so different that their most fundamental rights
may be unduly impinged upon. The state's interest in prohibiting mi-
nor's first trimester right to abortion is not compelling enough to with-
22. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23. 410 U.S. at 163.
24. 428 U.S. 52.
25. Id. at 74.
26. Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1156 (1980). But see Miami Herald, Jan. 31, 1982, at 4A, col. 1 which states
that a thirteen year old who "fought her parents all the way to the State Supreme
Court for the right to have an abortion, had changed her mind. Her announcement
came after the Alabama Supreme Court temporarily blocked the operation. . . .The
girl's decision made the case moot and left unanswered the legal question of whether a
minor can have an abortion without parental approval in Alabama."
27. 410 U.S. 113.
28. 410 U.S. 113.
29. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
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stand strict scrutiny when balanced against the interference this state
prohibition exerts on a minor's fundamental privacy right. Moreover,
while parents' power over their children is great, it is not absolute.
"Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children."30
III. Notification Provisions in Abortion Control Statutes
In addition to parental consent requirements, parental notification
requirements have been subjected to constitutional challenges. In Wynn
v. Carey31 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found provisions of the
Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 197732 unconstitutional. The
statute required that an unmarried minor under the age of eighteen
attempt to obtain consent from both her parents prior to obtaining an
abortion. If one or both parents refused consent, the minor was re-
quired to petition for court authorization of the abortion. In addition,
upon the minor's application for judicial relief the court was required
to notify her parents. Thus, whenever a pregnant teenager sought an
abortion, her parents were always notified. 33
The seventh circuit struck these consent and notification provisions
as both over and underinclusive. The act was underinclusive because
married minors who remained married, or who were divorced or wid-
owed were not included. These minors were not required to consult
with or obtain the consent of their parents. Since the ostensible purpose
of the act was to afford minors some measure of parental guidance in
the decision to undergo abortion, there was no apparent reason for dis-
tinguishing between single minors and minors who were,, or had been,
married.3 4 The act was overinclusive because there was no statutory
exception for single minors who were emancipated or mature enough to
make the decision for themselves.
30. Id. at 170.
31. 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-23(4): "If. . .consent is refused . . .[it] may
be obtained by order of a judge of the circuit court. . . after such hearing as the judge
deems necessary. . . .Notice of such a hearing shall be sent to the parents."
33. Id.
34. 582 F.2d at 1387.
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The appellate court also found the act constitutionally deficient in
failing to provide for minors who did not understand what an abortion
entails and what its physical or psychological consequences may be.35 If
the parents of an immature, unknowledgeable girl were notified by the
court that their daughter was attempting to circumvent, by judicial in-
tervention, their refusal to allow her abortion, the parents' negative de-
cision would prevail under the statute despite the best interests of the
child. Since the statute did not allow judicial inquiry beyond whether
the girl understood the consequences of an abortion, if the girl was una-
ble to understand, then the court's hands were tied because it was not
authorized under the statute to take any further action. The immature
minor's fate was back in the hands of both of her parents. Even if one
parent consented to the abortion, and the court agreed it would be best
to terminate the pregnancy, the abortion would still be barred by the
other parent's veto." For these reasons the statute failed to meet the
minimum standards set by the United States Supreme Court in Bellotti
v. Baird,37 "that the statute must be 'speedy,' 'nonburdensome' and
preserve the minor's anonymity when she seeks judicial authorization
for an abortion."38 It is well recognized that the "abortion decision is
one that simply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with
far reaching consequences." 39
While in some familial relationships parental notification can re-
sult in the minor's psychological sustenance and produce beneficial ad-
vice, where poor intra-familial relations exist the results of notification
can be devastating. Two recent federal district court decisions have
held that an unqualified statutory requirement of parental notification
is an unconstitutionally weighty burden on the fundamental right of a
minor to have an abortion.4 °
35. Id. at 1390. While not enumerated by the court, some consequences, in addi-
tion to the death of the fetus, may be physical discomfort to the mother, grief or guilt.
36. Id.
37. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
38. Id. at 144-45.
39. 443 U.S. at 643.
40. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp.
1172, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Women's Community Health Center Inc. v. Cohen, 477
F. Supp. 542, 546-48 (D. Me. 1979). See also Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kansas
City, Missouri Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981) which held unconstitu-
1 480 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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A parent infuriated by the illicit pregnancy may abuse the minor
daughter. Additionally, physical harm caused the minor by parental
footdragging and delay is foreseeable, especially in the abortion context
which mandates time is of the essence. Some of those possibilities were
described by the mother of a girl waiting for an abortion in a Minne-
sota abortion clinic.4 '1 The Minnesota abortion law requires that a mi-
nor under 18 years 1) notify both her parents; 2) offer the clinic proof
that both parents have been notified, and 3) wait for a 48 hour waiting
period before the abortion can be performed. The necessity of securing
a waiver of parental notification is a chilling and frustrating experience.
[F]or many, the abortion itself is preceded by a harrowing day in
court trying to secure a waiver from a judge against having to tell
parents. Not uncommonly, mother and daughter are thrown into a
conspiracy against a wrathful father who they fear will never be
able to understand how his daughter came to such a sorry pass.
Legal maneuvering can delay the abortion, sometimes dangerously.
One mother nods toward her teenage daughter, now 20 weeks preg-
nant: 'Her boyfriend is black,' says the woman who joined with her
daughter in the fight for the waiver. 'My husband told her if he
ever saw her with a black man, he'd kill her."2
The United States Supreme Court in H. L. v. Matheson43 did not
agree that parental notification as a prerequisite unduly burdens a mi-
nor's right to an abortion. The minor in question there was unmarried,
15 years of age; living at home and supported by her parents. She be-
came pregnant and, after consulting with a social worker and a physi-
cian, decided to obtain an abortion. The physician, however, recognized
he would be subject to criminal penalties for noncompliance,"4 and
would not perform the abortion without notifying his patient's parents.
The pertinent part of the Utah statute considered in H. L. pro-
vides: "To enable a physician to exercise his best medical judgement
tional a statute requiring notice to parents of all minors seeking abortions because it
required notice to parents of mature minors and those for whom it was not in their best
interests to give notice.
41. Abortion. Women Speak Out, Life, Nov. 1978, at 45-54.
42. Id. at 48, cols. I & 2.
43. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
44. Id. §§ 76-7-314(3), 76-3-204 & 76-3-301(3) (1953).
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[in considering whether to perform an abortion] he shall: .. .(2) No-
tify if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor. . . ."'I While it was
urged that Bellotti, decided prior to H. L., had settled the question of
parental consent, Chief Justice Burger's majority decision in H. L. con-
trasted the classes of plaintiffs. In Bellotti the principal class consisted
of "unmarried [pregnant] minors in Massachusetts who have adequate
capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." '46 In H. L. the class was comprised of
unemancipated minor girls who were living at home, supported by their
parents; they made no claim of maturity. The H. L. majority concluded
the appellant lacked standing to enlarge its challenge to encompass the
statute's effects on all unmarried minor girls, which included those ma-
ture and emancipated. The Court decided the issue within narrow pa-
rameters, holding that a statute delineating a "mere requirement of pa-
rental notice" 47 does not violate the constitutional rights of an
immature, dependent minor living at home. The statute in question did
not grant parental or judicial power to totally proscribe the abortion
procedure. It did necessitate that the physician notify parents, if possi-
ble, if an abortion was to be performed. The Chief Justice opined the
statute promoted family unity and served a "significant state interest
by providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and
other information to a physician. ' '4s However, parents were not statuto-
rily obligated to fill out medical forms.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall thought it clear that the
parental notice requirement "burdens the minor's privacy right." 49 Al-
though earlier decisions had safeguarded family privacy from invasive
governmental interference, Justice Marshall felt the majority distorted
those decisions to achieve an opposite result, thereby excusing an inex-
cusable incursion into the privacy of families. He noted it was unlikely
the state's statutory notice prerequisite would "resurrect parental au-
thority that the parents themselves [were] unable to preserve."50 Be-
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1974). (emphasis added).
46. 450 U.S. at 406 n.12, (citing 443 U.S. at 626) (emphasis added).
47. 450 U.S. at 409.
48. Id. at 411.
49. Id. at 441.
50. Id. at 448.
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sides attempting to alter familial interaction, the statute may also be
too great an intrusion into the family since it mandates lines of commu-
nication which are not there.51 Justice Marshall accurately pointed out
that "[rather than respecting the private realm of family life, the stat-
ute invokes the criminal machinery of the state in an attempt to influ-
ence the interactions within the family.15 2 When lines of family com-
munication break down, it should be outside the scope of state interest
to force speech among family members. This result is consistent with
Wooley v. Maynard5 3 where the Court suggested the first and four-
teenth amendments protect the individual's freedom of thought, which
includes the right to refrain from speaking. The Utah statute in H. L.
required physicians subject to state regulation and licensing to notify
their minor patients' parents. The state has the right to mandate a doc-
tor comply with its notification requirement; this does not infringe upon
the doctor's constitutional rights. However, in Justice Marshall's view,
the constitution protects a child - as a private person - from being
forced to communicate to her parents something she believes will be
detrimental to her well being.
The Utah statute was found constitutional because it was narrowly
drawn and required notification only to parents of an immature, depen-
dent minor. It would seem that states wishing to structure a constitu-
tional notification provision could do so by following the narrow param-
eters of the Utah statute.
51. See also Miami Herald, Jan. 27, 1982, at 15A, cols. 4-6: "If the draft of the
regulation (now in committee) is finalized HHS [Department of Health and Human
Services] will be able to force any family planning clinic to send a notice to the parents
of a minor seeking prescription birth control. In effect parents would be getting a re-
port . . .that their children are sexually active. [W]ould the threat of clinic-as-in-
former result in more teenage pregnancies? Teenagers who don't talk with their par-
ents can either avoid the clinic or lie about their identity. [Parents] . . .want to be
advised [but] whatever our anxieties, the Federal Government cannot mandate family
communication." Id.
52. 450 U.S. at 454.
53. 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). See also, Note, The Spousal Notice and Consul-
tation Requirement: A New Approach to State Regulation of Abortion, 6 NOVA L.J.
457 (1982).
1 6:1982
483 1Minors' Abortion Decisions
99
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Nova Law Journal
IV. How Long Do Ladies in Waiting Have to Wait?
The question of waiting periods as constituting an undue burden
on the right to an abortion, for both adults and minors, has left the
courts divided. In a recent case, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft,54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found a forty-eight hour waiting period unconstitutionally long. The
court based its decision on the fact that the waiting period necessitated
two separate visits to the clinic or physician with concomitant addi-
tional time and expense. In addition, the court stated waiting periods
increase "delay, and delay increases the risk to the woman.""
In contrast, in Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of
Akron,56 the district court found that even though a twenty-four hour
waiting period made the abortion decision more expensive, the in-
creased cost was not so great that it would burden a woman's decision
to have an abortion. As a result, the court did not invoke strict scru-
tiny, nor require a compelling state interest. The waiting period re-
quirement in Akron, for example, heavily burdens those girls who can-
not afford two trips to a physician or to a clinic which may be far from
home, and who can ill afford to lose time from school or their job.
Additionally, there is a burdensome physical and emotional cost to the
patient who must wait those twenty-four hours after consulting with
her physician. 57 Other courts have suggested that these burdens do re-
quire strict scrutiny.5 8
V. Scheinberg v. Smith
The effect of many of these precedential decisions was weighed
54. 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 866. See also Women's Medical Center of Providence Inc. v. Robert,
50 U.S.L.W. 2483 (Jan. 15, 1982). (Twenty-four hour waiting period held invalid).
56. 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
57. 627 F.2d 785.
58. See also Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 1976). Similar
waiting periods occurred in Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980), wherein
the court stated that "these women will be subject to . . .inconvenience, expense, and
additional anguish attending this rigid requirement." Id. at 785. As a result, the
twenty-four hour waiting period was stricken.
1484 6:1982 1
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heavily in the fifth circuit's construction of the Medical Practice Act,5 9
as enacted by the Florida legislature in 1979. The act included several
subsections regulating abortion conditions for both married and unmar-
ried women. Subsection (4)(a) delineated state requirements for notifi-
cation to and consent of parents of minors who wished to obtain abor-
tions.60 The statute provided that in order for an unmarried minor to be
permitted an abortion, she must have "either the written informed con-
sent of a parent, custodian, or legal guardian or an order from the Cir-
cuit Court."' Failure to comply with these provisions exposed physi-
cians performing abortions to state criminal penalties: "any person who
willfully performs, or participates in, the termination of a pregnancy in
violation of the requirements of this section is guilty of a
felony .. "62
Although the constitutionality of notice and consent requirements
had been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Bellotti v.
Baird,6" the Florida court had not addressed the constitutionality of its
statute until subsection (4)(a) was challenged by Dr. Mark D.
59. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4) (1981).
60. Id. This section reads:
(4) Prior to terminating a pregnancy, the physician shall obtain the writ-
ten informed consent of the pregnant woman or, in the case of a mental
incompetent, the written consent of her court-appointed guardian.
(a) If the pregnant woman is under 18 years of age and unmarried, in
addition to her written request, the physician shall obtain the written in-
formed consent of a parent, custodian, or legal guardian of such unmarried
minor, or the physician may rely on an order of the circuit court, on peti-
tion of the pregnant unmarried minor or another person on her behalf,
authorizing, for good cause shown, such termination of pregnancy without
the written consent of her parent, custodian, or legal guardian. The cause
may be based on a showing that the minor is sufficiently mature to give an
informed consent to the procedure, or based on the fact that a parent un-
reasonably withheld consent by her parent, custodian, or legal guardian, or
based on the minor's fear of physical or emotional abuse if her parent,
custodian, or legal guardian were requested to consent, or based upon any
other good cause shown. At its discretion, the court may enter its order ex
parte. The court shall determine the best interest of the minor and enter
its order in accordance with such determination.
61. 482 F. Supp. at 532.
62. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(10) (1981).
63. 443 U.S. 622.
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Scheinberg in a class action suit on behalf of "all unmarried minor
pregnant women desiring to terminate their pregnancies," 4 and on be-
half of their physicians. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida found that subsection (4)(a) unconstitu-
tionally infringed upon a minor's right to privacy in her abortion
decision. 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in
striking down subsection (4)(a). The appellate court found the issue
had been resolved by Bellotti and held that although judicial authoriza-
tion or parental consent may be required by a state before it permits
an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion, a judge must allow the
abortion if the minor "satisfies the court that she is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her
own." 6 Even if the minor fails to demonstrate this maturity, the court
must permit the abortion if it decides this measure would be in the best
interests of the minor. 7 The appellate court found subsection (4)(a)
"mandates that a Florida court base its authorization of a minor's
abortion on what it finds to be the best interests of the minor, without
regard to the minor's maturity. Thus the provision runs directly afoul
of Bellotti. ... " The unconstitutional section, which placed the en-
tire decision upon the judge where parental consent was not obtained,
ignored the emancipation, intelligence or ability of the minor to under-
stand and cope with the consequences of her situation. Because the lan-
guage of the subsection was deemed mandatory ("the court shall deter-
mine the best interest of the minor and enter its order in accordance
with such determination")69 the subsection failed. Had the statute re-
quired judicial determination of the minor's best interests only in cases
of immature, unemancipated minors, the statute may have escaped the
fatal flaw of being overinclusive.
64. 482 F. Supp. at 532 n.7.
65. Id. at 540.
66. 443 U.S. at 647.
67. Id. at 647-48.
68. 482 F. Supp. at 532.
69. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1981).
Nova Law Journal
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Conclusion
The abortion cases demonstrate the still evolving constitutionally
recognized right of privacy. The middle line drawn by courts protects
certain values considered basic to constitutional rights. Within this
framework, judicial decisions have recognized that unwanted teenage
pregnancies threaten family and social stability.
Since the decision to have an abortion is primarily one of medical
concern"0 and personal morality, the courts and legislatures should re-
frain from imposing moral judgments on, and impediments to, the exer-
cise of this private, personal decision. The state's deference to familial
privacy is a consideration weighty enough to overcome any interest the
state might have in trying to enforce a parental veto over the minor's
abortion decision. Minors, as well as adults, should have the right to
control the reproductive processes of their own bodies. If a minor, in
consultation with a physician, makes the decision to abort within the
"safe" first trimester, the state should not interfere.
Judith L. Weinstein
70. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979).
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The Florida Land Trust: An Overview
In 1963 the Florida legislature, in an effort to stimulate the pro-
ductivity, growth, and development of Florida real estate, sanctioned
use of the land trust and enacted chapter 63-468, Laws of Florida, now
section 689.071.1 The essential purpose of a land trust is to facilitate
1. 1963 Fla. Laws 998; FLA. STAT. § 689.071 (1981) states:
Section 1. Every conveyance, deed, mortgage, lease, assignment or
other instrument heretofore or hereafter made, hereinafter referred to as
the "recorded instrument," transferring any interests in real property in
this State including but not limited to leasehold and mortgage interests to
any person, corporation, bank, or trust company, qualified to act as fiduci-
ary in this State, in which said recorded instrument said person, corpora-
tion, bank, or trust company is designated "Trustee," or, "As Trustee,"
without therein naming the beneficiaries of such trust, whether or not ref-
erence is made in said recorded instrument to any separate collateral unre-
corded declarations or agreements, shall be effective to vest and is hereby
declared to have vested in such trustee full rights of ownership over said
real property or interest therein, with full power and authority as granted
and provided in said recorded instrument to deal in and with said property
or interest therein or any part thereof provided, said recorded instrument
shall confer on the trustee the power and authority either to protect, con-
serve and to sell, or to lease, or to encumber, or otherwise to manage and
dispose of the real property described in said recorded instrument.
Section 2. Any grantee, mortgagee, lessee, transferee, assignee, or per-
son obtaining satisfactions, releases, or otherwise in any way dealing with
the trustees with respect to said real properties held in trust under said
recorded instrument, as hereinabove provided for, shall not be obligated to
inquire into the identification of status of any named or unnamed benefi-
ciaries, or their heirs or assigns to whom a trustee may be accountable
under the terms of said recorded instrument, or under any unrecorded sep-
arate declarations or agreements collateral to said recorded instrument
whether or not such declarations or agreements are referred to therein, nor
to inquire into or ascertain the authority of such trustee to act within and
exercise the powers granted under said recorded instrument, nor to inquire
into the adequacy or disposition of any consideration, if any is paid or
delivered to such trustee in connection with any interest so acquired from
such trustee, nor to inquire into any of the provisions of any said unre-
corded declarations of agreements.
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and provide a flexible and practical method for the acquisition, financ-
ing, and disposition of real estate.
Illinois appears to have been the first state to have recognized and
developed the land trust. By statute they have defined a land trust as:
[A]ny arrangement under which the title, both legal and equitable,
to real property, is held by a trustee and the interest of the benefi-
ciary is personal property and under which the beneficiary, or any
person designated in writing by the beneficiary, has the exclusive
power to direct or control the trustee in dealing with the title and
the exclusive control of the management, operation, renting and
selling of the trust property together with the exclusive right to the
earnings, avails and proceeds of said property is in the beneficiary
of the trust.'
Simply stated, a land trust is an arrangement under which both
legal and equitable title is held by a trustee. At the same time, all of
Section 3. All persons dealing with the trustee under said recorded
instrument as hereinabove provided shall take any interest transferred by
the trustee thereunder within the power and authority as granted and pro-
vided therein, free and clear of the claims of all the named or unnamed
beneficiaries of such trust, and of any unrecorded declarations or agree-
ments collateral thereto whether referred to in said recorded instrument or
not, and of anyone claiming by, through or under said beneficiaries, in-
cluding and without limiting the foregoing to any claim arising out of any
dower or curtesy interest of the spouse of any beneficiary thereof; provided,
nothing herein contained shall prevent a beneficiary of any said unrecorded
collateral declarations or agreements from enforcing the terms thereof
against the trustee.
Section 4. In all cases where said recorded instrument, as hereinabove
provided, contains a provision defining and declaring the interests of bene-
ficiaries thereunder to be personal property only, such provision shall be
controlling for all purposes where such determination shall become an is-
sue under the laws or in the courts of this State.
Section 5. This act is remedial in nature and shall be given a liberal
interpretation to effectuate the intent and purposes hereinabove expressed,
and shall take effect immediately upon becoming a law.
Section 6. This act shall not apply to any deed, mortgage or other
instrument to which section 689.07 Florida Statutes, applies.
2. W.B. GARRETT, LAND TRUSTS (1971).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 8.31 (1969).
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the rights, interests, powers and conveniences of fee ownership are re-
tained and exercised by the beneficiary. The beneficiary retains a per-
sonal property interest." Thus, even with both legal and equitable title
vested in the trustee, most of the usual and necessary attributes of real
estate fee ownership are retained by the beneficiary under the trust
agreement. The only attribute generally ascribed to the trustee is "that
relating to title, upon which third parties may rely in transactions
where title to the real estate is of primary importance."5
The land trust is a modified form of the conventional trust agree-
ment. However, the Florida Land Trust Statute section 689.0716
should not be confused with section 689.07, Florida Statutes, which al-
lows recording of deeds of real estate conveyances in the name of a
trustee. Section 689.07 provides that grantors will be deemed to grant a
fee simple estate to a grantee, if the words "trustee"/"as trustee" are
added to the name of thep grantee, provided no named beneficiaries or
apparent trust purposes are set forth in the instrument of conveyance.7
The section attempts to simplify conveyances of real property made to
a trustee as grantee, as if no trustee reference was used.8 Sections
689.07 and 689.071 are mutually exclusive provisions. Subsection 6 of
section 689.071 expressly provides that the Land Trust Act does not
apply to any transactions to which section 689.07 applies.9
As stated, the land trust is a modified form of the conventional
trust agreement. It does differ, however, from the typical trust arrange-
ment. In a land trust, the res is limited to "an arrangement where the
trustee holds title to the property and all active managerial and admin-
istrative powers are reserved to the beneficiaries. The trustee's only
duty is to deal with the trust when and as directed by the beneficiaries,
and to convey the property . . . when the trust terminates." 10
4. Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926), Ferraro v. Parker, 229
So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Goldman v. Mandell, 403 So. 2d 511 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
5. People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 I11. 2d 479, 488, 389 N.E.2d 540, 543
(1979).
6. FLA. STAT. § 689.071 (1981).
7. Id. § 689.07 (1981).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 689.071(6) (1981).
10. H.W. KENOE, KENOE ON LAND TRUSTS 1-5 (1978) (emphasis added).
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A trust of this nature must, in Florida, meet the same substantive
legal requirements that a conventional trust arrangement must sat-
isfy.11 "The fact that a trust has a corpus consisting of land does not
change the necessary elements requisite to a valid trust. '12
Under the Florida Land Trust Act, the trustee is vested with the
power to deal with all facets of property ownership.1 3 It is to be noted
the Act only applies if the recorded instrument, transferring any title
and interest to the trustee, specifically grants "the power and authority
either to protect, conserve and to sell, or to lease, or to encumber, or
otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property described in the
recorded instrument."1 4
In the states which have recognized and authorized the use of land
trusts1 5 the device's popularity has been based upon its practical appli-
cation for those dealing in real estate. This note provides an overview of
the basic advantages and attributes that may be realized through the
use of a Florida land trust.
Comment on the Statute of Uses
It is apparent that the validity of the land trust depends upon the
effect and construction given the Statute of Uses. Under Florida law
this statute will execute an inactive, or passive, trust of real property,
placing both legal and equitable title in the beneficiary. 6 A passive
trust is one in which the trustee has no active duties to perform.17 Com-
mentators have questioned whether classification of a trust as passive,
or a determination that Florida's Statute of Uses applies to personalty,
could invalidate the design of the land trust and extinguish the trustee's
11. FLA. STAT. § 737.101 (1981).
12. D.R. LOWELL, FLORIDA LAW OF TRUSTS 266 (2d ed. 1976).
13. FLA. STAT. § 689.071 (1981).
14. Id.
15. Other states which have expressly recognized and/or adopted similar land
trust statutes are: Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 558 (Supp. 1979); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 30-4-2-13 (Burns 1971); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-02
(1967); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Supp. 1964).
16. FLA. STAT. § 689.09 (1981). McKillop, The Illinois Land Trust in Florida,
13 U. FLA. L. REV. 173 (1960).
17. Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193 So. 54 (1940).
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title.18 To avoid this result, duties and powers of the trustee must be
sufficiently active to prevent the operation of the Statute of Uses. Both
Professor Scott 19 and the Restatement of Trusts, Second, z0 express the
view that "where a trust is created by the terms of which the trustee is
directed to convey the land to the beneficiary and no other active
dutues are imposed upon him. . . the weight of authority is. . . that
the direction to convey is sufficient to make it an active trust."21
In considering the Florida Land Trust Statute, Florida's courts
have not yet clearly articulated whether the Statute of Uses will apply
both to trusts of.land and trusts of personal property. Commentators,
such as Professor Boyer, suggest that the Florida Land Trust Act "cir-
cumvents the statute"22 by permitting the trust instrument to declare
that a beneficiary's interests are personal property. 3 It has been as-
serted that since historically the Statute of Uses was never applied to
personalty, and since Florida has no statute subjecting personalty to the
statute, trusts in personalty should not be affected by the statute. 4
The Illinois courts have held the Statute of Uses inapplicable to
land trusts due to the active duties imposed upon the trustee and the
fact that beneficiaries' interest is personalty.2 5 The leading Florida case
on this issue is Ferraro v. Parker.28 In Ferraro, the Second District
Court of Appeal indicated that Florida would apparently follow Illi-
nois27 in finding and construing such trusts to be active rather than
passive.
18. McKillop, supra note 16.
19. A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 69.1 (3d ed. 1967).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 69 (1959).
21. Id.
22. R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 178 (1980).
23. FLA. STAT. § 689.071(4) (1981).
24. D.H. REDFERN, Wills § 14.15 (4th ed. 1973). For an excellent overview on
the history of the Statute of Uses in Florida, see Wilson, The Florida Statute of Uses,
21 FLA. L.J. 131 (1947).
25. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d
992 (1st Dist. 1939); Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
26. Ferraro v. Parker, 229 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Goldman v.
Mandell, 403 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
27. McKillop, supra note 16.
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Advantages and Attributes of Land Trusts
The single most important aspect of the use of a land trust is that
it converts the beneficiaries' interest from one in real estate to one of
personal property in the possession, control, rents, issues and proceeds,
etc. of the real estate,28 which are attributes of personal property. It
now seems Florida recognizes, as long as the instrument of conveyance
to the trustee so declares, that the beneficiaries' interests are person-
alty.29 This division of the incidents of ownership of real estate is the
quint-essential factor contributing to the ability of a land trust to offer
advantages not available in other devices or arrangements suitable for
the holding of title to real estate.
Nondisclosure or Privacy of Ownership
Under the Florida Land Trust Act, the conveyance of property to
the trustee is effective to place in that named trustee full rights of own-
ership. The recorded trust deed need only disclose the name of the trus-
tee and not beneficiaries' names, nor the names of those having actual
authority or power of direction over the property's management and
control. The trustee may disclose beneficiaries' identities when author-
ized to do so by the beneficiaries or by legal process.30
There are many reasons why owners desire anonymity from the
public record.3 1 Developers' secretly assembling large parcels of acre-
age for development are a good example. The protection that privacy
affords in some circumstances eases developers' negotiating processes
during acquisition thus minimizing unreasonable or unrealistic de-
mands sellers might otherwise make. In addition, "[the] land owner
may simply not wish to disclose his ownership for the wholly proper
reason that he wants his real estate ownership to be private. ,,2 just
as his holdings in other investment portfolios are private.
28. 0. CAPLAN, THE LAW OF LAND TRUSTS 14 (3d ed. 1960).
29. FLA. STAT. § 689.071(4); Ferraro v. Parker, 229 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
30. See Tominberg, Land Trust Secrecy-Perhaps A Secret No More, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 509 (1973).
31. G. Bogert, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 250 (Rev. 2d ed. 1977).
32. W.B. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 6.
109
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
1 6:1982 Florida Land Trust 495
Judgments and Creditors Rights
A judgment against the beneficiary of a land trust does not create
a lien against the property held in a land trust.33 It is essential to the
utility and effective administration of the land trust that this be the
result. Otherwise, a judgment against one of a number of beneficiaries
could restrict and impede the operation of a trust property and frus-
trate its objectives.3 4
In Florida, a court judgment awarding money damages to an un-
secured creditor must be enforced by an execution.3 5 Such judgments
however become a lien only on real property36 and such other property
upon which there may be a levy of execution. 37 By statute this property
is limited to "lands and tenements, goods and chattels, equities of re-
demption in real and personal property. . . ."8 Since a beneficiary in
a land trust has no legal or equitable interest in the trust property, but
only an interest declared as personalty, his interest would not be sub-
ject to either a judgment lien 39 or an execution lien.40 The beneficial
33. Favata v. Favata, 74 II1. App. 3d 979, 394 N.E.2d 443 (1979); Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992
(1939).
34. H.W. KENOE, supra note 10, § 3.2.
35. H. TRAWICK, TRAWICK'S FLORIDA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 415 (1980);
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, CREDITORS' AND DEBT-
ORS' RIGHTS IN FLORIDA 210 (1979).
36. FLA. STAT. § 55.10(1) (1981); Smith v. Venus Condominium Ass'n Inc., 352
So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1977).
37. "A levy of execution has been defined as an absolute appropriation in law of
the property levied onto the payment of a judgment debt." 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Creditors'
Rights § 54 (1981) (citing Early & Daniel Co. v. Brown, 22 Fla. Supp. 155 (1961)).
"In practice, levy usually involves physical seizure of designated property by the sheriff,
inventory and storage of that property and notice culminating in its sale for the benefit
of creditors."CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, supra note
34, at 212. Evins v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank, 80 Fla. 84, 85 So. 659 (1920); Willard v.
Petruska, 402 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1968).
38. FLA. STAT. § 56.061 (1981).
39. Id. § 55.10 (1981).
40. Id. § 56.061 (1981). As to tangible personal property, Florida Statutes sec-
tion 56.061 may not be considered all inclusive:
Florida courts have created and enforced liens on personal property of
judgement debtors when a writ of execution is delivered for docketing to
the sheriff of the county in which the personal property is located. As a
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interest in a land trust, is more in the nature of an intangible interest
or chose in action;41 these trusts, are therefore "not proper subjects of
levy and sale under execution unless made so by statute ... 42
The fact that a beneficial interest in a Florida land trust is not
subject to levy and sale under writ of execution does not suggest that a
beneficiary's interest is completely protected from creditors and third
parties. Since the interest of a beneficiary in a land trust cannot be
reached by execution at law, it may be possible to bring a creditor's bill
in chancery. 43 A creditor's bill is an action brought by a creditor who
sues in equity for the purpose of reaching property that cannot be
reached by execution at law." Whether the interest of a beneficiary in
a land trust may be reached by a creditor's suit has not yet been an-
swered in Florida. The Illinois courts though have clearly made availa-
ble to a judgment creditor the remedy of a creditor's bill.'5
Another equitable remedy potentially available to a judgment
creditor is a proceedings supplementary" which is also based on a valid
unsatisified execution. A judgment granting equitable relief to a credi-
tor, through either a creditor's suit or proceedings supplementary, may
order the sale of the beneficiaries' property interest with proceeds dis-
tributed to satisfy execution of the judgment or utilize any other equi-
result, the lien is created and perfected upon delivery of the writ of execu-
tion to the sheriff. The lien attaches to all personal property of the judg-
ment debtor in the county in which the unit is docketed....
In re Cone, 11 Bankr. 925, 927 (1981), In re Vero Cooling & Heating, Inc., 11 Bankr.
359 (1981); Love v. Williams, 4 Fla. 126 (1850); Flagship State Bank of Jacksonville
v. Carantzas, 352 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
41. FLA. STAT. § 679.10 (1981); Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d
425 (1968).
42. 24 FLA. JUR. 2d Creditors' Rights § 14 (1981); Peninsula State Bank v.
United States, 211 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
43. FLA. STAT. § 68.05 (1981).
44. B.L.E. Realty Corp. v. Mary Williams Co., 100 Fla. 254, 134 So. 47 (1931);
13 FLA. JUR. 2d Creditors' Rights § 281 (1979), H. TRAWICK, supra note 34, § 27-10.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22, § 49 (1980); Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43,
236 N.E.2d 425 (1968); Chicago Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill.
2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670 (1962); Garvey v. Parrosh, 84 Ill. App. 3d 578, 405 N.E.2d
1105 (1980).
46. FLA. STAT. § 56.29 (1981); H. TRAWICK, supra note 34, § 27-9; FLA. R.
SUMM. P. 7.220.
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table remedies available to enforce its judgment. 7
Just exactly what equitable remedy or relief will be afforded a
judgment creditor against a Florida land trust beneficiary remains un-
clear. The Illinois statute on supplementary proceedings48 provides:
(2) When assets . . . of the judgment debtor . . . are discovered,
the court may, by appropriate order, judgment or decree:
(e) Compel any person cited to execute an assignment of any chose
in action or a conveyance of title to real or personal property, in
the same manner and to the same extent as a court of chancery
could do in any proceeding by a judgment creditor to enforce pay-
ment of a judgment or in aid of execution.49
This section clearly authorizes institution of proceedings which
may result in a court order directing sale of the beneficiary's interest in
the land trust with application of proceeds to the satisfaction of the
judgment in the same manner as the relief afforded under a creditor's
bill.
The Florida courts have not yet spoken to the issue of whether
proceedings supplementary, with its concomitant remedies, are applica-
ble to a creditor's judgment against a land trust beneficiary. Certainly,
the courts may follow Illinois in holding such remedy available. Follow-
ing Illinois provisions in this area, the Florida legislature could enact or
amend existing law to provide for the execution by proceedings supple-
mentary of a chose in action, title to personal property, or specifically
the beneficial interest in a Florida land trust.
Elective Share and Spousal Rights
In Florida there is no longer dower or curtesy estates afforded the
surviving spouse in the decedent's real or personal property.50 The new
Florida Probate Code affords the surviving spouse of a decedent domi-
47. H. TRAWICK, supra note 34, § 27-10 (1980).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 73 (1980).
49. Id. § 73(2)(e).
50. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-107 abolished the right of dower in property trans-
ferred prior to death; Florida Statutes section 732.111 abolished dower and curtesy in
Florida.
497 1
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ciled in Florida, an elective share51 equal to thirty percent52 of the
value of "all property of the decedent. 53 This includes both the real
and personal property subject to administration; real estate located
outside Florida is not included.5 The percentage of elective allowance
is computed by the court after deducting from the estate assets valid
claims paid or payable from the estate and "all mortgages, liens, or
security interests thereon. '55 Since the property subject to the elective
share provisions58 includes personal property57 two important issues
concerning land trusts emerge. The first question is whether a spouse
must concur in transactions involving land trust property in order to
release any inchoate dower or elective share rights to which the trust
property may be subject. The second question is whether a surviving
spouse may be defrauded or deprived an elective share when property,
otherwise includable in the probate estate, is placed in a land trust.
The Florida Land Trust Act,58 provides that:
All persons dealing with the trustee . . . shall take any interest
transferred by the trustee . . . free and clear of the claims of all
the named beneficiaries . . . or . . . of anyone claiming by,
through or under said beneficiaries . . . including . . . any claim
arising out of any dower or curtesy interest of the spouse of any
beneficiary .... 59
As a result of this provision, "beneficial interests in land trusts may be
51. FLA. STAT. § 732.201-.213 (1981).
52. FLA. STAT. § 732.207 (1981).
53. Id. § 732.205 (1981).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 732.207 (1981).
56. Id. § 732.206 (1981).
57. Farington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So. 2d 158 (1944); FLA. STAT. §
732.206 (1981); Libberton v. Libberton, 240 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
58. FLA. STAT. § 689.071(3) (1981).
59. Florida abolished dower and curtesy rights with the adoption of the new
Florida Probate Code, effective January 1, 1976 which implemented the elective share
provisions in its place. Since the Florida Land Trust Act was adopted in 1963, prior to
the adoption of the new probate code, references in the text of the statute should
equally apply to claims arising out of a surviving spouse's elective share rights. If in
fact this is the intent of the legislature, it is suggested that the text of the Land Trust
Act be amended accordingly.
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freely transferred and dealt with without the concurrence of the spouse
of the beneficiary." 60 This aspect will clearly aid the efficient and "un-
impeded transactional arrangements of real estate interests particularly
by those who are dealing actively in such properties." 61
With Florida's elimination of dower and curtesy came elimination
too of those inchoate characteristics regarding elective share provi-
sions. 62 Since a surviving spouse of a post-January 1, 1976 decedent, no
longer has any inchoate interest in the deceased spouse's real and per-
sonal estate, only the beneficiary is required for transactions involving
his interests. Thus, the surviving spouse need not concur in the release
of the beneficiary's personal property interests in the Florida land trust.
Another advantage is that the settler of a land trust who retains
the beneficial interest in the property may provide for the interest's
devolution on his death. This may be done in a variety of ways, e.g., to
designated parties as joint tenants with right of survivorship, as life
estates with remainders over, etc. Thus, the beneficial interest passes
directly to the named party or remainderman by operation of the trust
agreement and is not subject to probate.
Where the trust agreement does not so provide, or the beneficial
interest has not been properly designated under appropriate testamen-
tary disposition, the beneficial interest is subject to administration as
part of the probate estate. In that case the beneficial interest, passing
according to the decedent's testamentary plan, is subject to inclusion in
computation of the elective share.63 But, where the beneficial interest
passes by operation of the trust agreement, the interest will not be in-
cluded in computation of elective share property." This raises the ques-
tion of whether in such instances spousal rights can be completely dis-
regarded or whether the land trust can be used to defraud a surviving
spouse of her elective share rights.
In Stoxen v. Stoxen,6 5 the Illinois Appellate Court held that dower
rights do not extend to the beneficiary's personal property interest in a
60. H.W. KENOE, supra note 10, at 3-8.
61. Id.
62. FLA. STAT. § 732.201-.213 (1981).
63. FLA. STAT. § 732.206 (1981).
64. Id., CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, BASIC
PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE 263 (2d ed. 1981).
65. 6 II1. App. 3d 445, 285 N.E.2d 198 (1972).
6:1982
4991Florida Land Trust
114
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/1
land trust. Nevertheless, in Dubin v. Wise,66 a beneficiary's conveyance
of his interest in a land trust to his son for the purpose of depleting his
estate in violation of a prenuptial agreement, was set aside.
Florida's courts have not yet specifically answered this question.
As discussed, there is no longer an inchoate right of dower, but rather
an elective share in property "that is subject to administration. '6 7 It
would seem, therefore, that if a bona fide land trust is created a spouse
may be able to dispose of his property in almost any manner he
chooses. An Illinois case is illustrative. In Matter of Estate of Neme-
cek"8 both the surviving wife and administrator of the decedent's estate
brought an action to recover property (her marital home) which had
been conveyed by the decedent into an Illinois land trust. The trust
instrument provided that upon the decedent's death the trustee was to
sell the property and distribute the proceeds to the decedent's nephew
and sister-in-law. The surviving wife contended the conveyance consti-
tuted an invalid testamentary disposition, was illusory, and amounted
to a fraud on her marital rights. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed
the lower court grant of the defendant trustee's motion to dismiss. The
appellate panel stated that, under Illinois law:
[A] property owner has an absolute right to dispose of his property
during his lifetime in any manner he sees fit. He may convey his
property to another even though the transfer may be for the sole
purpose of minimizing or defeating the statutory marital interest of
his spouse .. . .This type of conveyance is not subject to defea-
sance by the surviving spouse unless it is a sham and is colorable or
illusory and tantamount to a fraud.69
In stating this position the Nemecek court relied on Johnson v. La
Grange State Bank.10 In Johnson, the decedent had placed the major-
ity of her assets in an inter vivos revocable trust. She made herself
trustee and named a bank as successor trustee. Upon her death distri-
bution of the trust res was to be made to her mother, sister, niece, and
66. 41 I11. App. 3d 132, 354 N.E.2d 403 (1976).
67. FLA. STAT. § 732.206 (1981).
68. In re Estate of Nemecek, 85 Ill. App. 3d 881, 407 N.E.2d 655 (1980).
69. Id. at 656.
70. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 73 Il. 2d 342, 383 N.E.2d 185 (1978).
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various charities. Mr. Johnson, the surviving spouse whose net worth
was in excess of $2,000,000, brought an action to set aside the trust
contending he, as surviving spouse, was deprived of his marital rights in
the trust property. At issue was whether the assets of such an inter
vivos trust could be "insulated" from the testator's probate estate"71
insofar as the surviving spouse was concerned. The Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that:
"[A]n inter vivos transfer of property is valid as against the marital
rights of the surviving spouse unless the transaction is tantamount
to a fraud as manifested by the absence of donative intent to make
a conveyance of a present interest in the property conveyed. With-
out such intent the transfer would simply be a sham or illusory
transfer .... 72
In Bee Branch Cattle Company v. Koon,73 the settlor established
inter vivos trusts for the financial well-being of his niece and nephews.
The trust res consisted of shares of stock in a corporation in which the
settlor had been the primary shareholder. After establishing the trusts,
the settlor became incompetent. His spouse, appointed guardian and
curator of his estate, brought an action to cancel the trusts arguing the
trusts constituted a fraud upon her inchoate dower rights in the prop-
erty. The Florida Supreme Court, referring to their decision in Wil-
liams v. Collier,7 4 sustained the trusts and noted that the spouse would
be amply provided for by her dower share in other property of the set-
tlor at his death. The court contrasted their decision to the opposite
result reached in Smith v. Hines" where it appeared "that the husband
had designed by subterfuge to deprive his wife of her dower rights
when she was not properly provided for from his property. '7 6
In In re the Estate of Herron," a surviving spouse elected to as-
71. Id. at 190.
72. Id. at 194.
73. 44 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1950).
74. 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815 (1935). See also Lane v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank
& Trust, 213 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Annot. 39 A.L.R. 3d 14
(1971).
75. Smith v. Hines, 10 Fla. 258 (1863).
76. 44 So. 2d at 690.
77. 236 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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sert dower rights in the proceeds of certain life insurance policies. The
policies constituted the res of an inter vivos trust created by the dece-
dent during his life. The surviving spouse contended that the trust was
illusory or testamentary and therefore invalid. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal held the trust proceeds were not subject to the
spouse's right of dower. In Herron, the court noted that the testator's
intention to create a trust was clearly expressed and under such cir-
cumstances "the manifest intention of the settlor should control as
against a contention that the trust is illusory. '7 8
As articulated in Herron, concern in illusory transfer cases focuses
on the sufficiency, or bona fides, of the settlor's intention to create a
trust. Absent illusory79 or fraudulent transfers,80 or where conveyance
of property was intended merely as a sham scheme to retain settlor's
ownership, a spouse may dispose of his personal property as he sees fit.
In the absence of fraud, then an inter vivos or land trust may be used
to legitimately defeat a surviving spouse of dower or elective share
rights in the property conveyed. 81
78. Id. at 567.
79. An illusory trust is a trust arrangement which takes the form of a trust, but
because of the powers retained, has no real substance and in reality is not a completed
trust. In re Estate of Herron, 237 So. 2d at 566.
80. The Illinois cases on this point indicate that the intent to defraud the surviv-
ing spouse does not involve the traditional meaning of fraud. Their interpretation of the
phrase is to be construed in connection with the words illusory and colorable. Where
the settlor has no real intent to convey any present interest in the property, but, in fact,
intends to retain complete ownership and control, there is no present donative intent
and therefore amounts to a fraud on the spouse's marital rights. In re Estate of Neme-
cek, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 407 N.E.2d at 656; Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 73
Ill. 2d at 359, 383 N.E.2d at 193.
Another factor considered in determining whether an intent to defraud is present
may be ascertained from "transfers of a disproportionate and unreasonable amount of
assets in relationship to the balance of the promisor's property." Dubin v. Wise, 41 111.
App. 3d 132, 354 N.E.2d 403, 409 (1976). In Dubin, a conveyance by the settlor of a
land trust which eliminated a fractional interest which was to have gone to the surviv-
ing spouse upon his death, was set aside on the basis of fraud and an intent to subvert
an antenuptial agreement. Id.
81. Lesnick v. Estate of Lesnick, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 403 N.E.2d 683 (1980);
Estate of Tomaso v. Tomaso, 82 Ill. App. 3d 286, 402 N.E.2d 702 (1980); Annot. 39
A.L.R.3d 14 (1971); Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co., 81 111. App. 3d
1128, 401 N.E.2d 1229 (1980).
117
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
6:1982 Florida Land Trust 503
Multiple Title Holders
Where title to real estate is vested in a number of parties, com-
plexities in conveyancing may arise. Generally, upon any conveyance or
transfer of interest in real property, the signatures of all involved par-
ties must be obtained. In Florida, absentee or non-resident ownership is
very common. The burdens and problems inherent in this ownership
situation can be avoided by the use of a land trust. In land trusts the
power to convey real estate is vested in the trustee who alone executes
instruments dealing with title. In addition, shares owned by benefi-
ciaries may be transferred through assignment of these beneficial trust
interests.
Transferability of Interest
The land trust beneficiary has a personal property interest 2 which
can be transferred easily by any form of assignment adequate to trans-
fer an interest in intangible personal property. In Florida an assign-
ment of beneficial interest need not comply with Florida Statute §
680.06; thus the two party witness requirement is obviated and only the
signature of the assignor is required to assign a beneficiary's interest.8
Fractional interests may be handled with a minimum of documenta-
tion. "The assignment becomes effective when lodged with the trustee
and its acceptance is indicated on a copy of the assignment."'" A sale
or transfer of the ownership may also be made without title examina-
tion under some circumstances. This is because the subject matter of
the transfer is the beneficial personal property interest transferred inde-
pendently of the legal and equitable title which remain in the trustee. 5
This assignment of beneficial interest is distinguishable from a
conveyance or transfer of trust property itself. Florida's Act empowers
the trustee to deal completely with the property, as provided by the
trust agreement itself. Third parties may rely on the trustee's exercise
of those powers without notice or knowledge of the trust beneficiaries
82. This interest could be restricted by agreement of the parties as evidenced in
the trust agreement.
83. FLA. STAT. § 680.06 (1981); Goldman v. Mandell, 403 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
84. H.W. KENOB, supra note 10, at 3-15.
85. G. BOGERT, supra note 31.
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or of limitations placed on the trustee.
Partition
A land trust also provides a convenient vehicle for multiple owner-
ship of property. One of the most useful functions of the
trust-preventing problems and difficulties between multiple benefi-
ciaries of property-would be negated if partition proceedings could be
brought by any dissident beneficiary. While the Florida courts have not
yet addressed the issue of whether land trust beneficiaries may bring an
action for partition, both Wisconsin and Illinois have clearly held that
partition will not lie against property held in a land trust while the
trust is still in effect.86
In Florida, partition is not permitted in "a tenancy in partnership
so long as the partnership is not destroyed," 87 and a partner's interest is
considered by statute to be personal property.88 However, Florida Stat-
utes section 64.091 does provide8 9 that partition will lie against per-
sonal property as far as the nature of the property permits. Though the
effect of this statute on partition of land trust interests is yet to be
decided, it is foreseeable that given the legislative intent and nature of
the Land Trust Act, Florida will follow the Illinois and Wisconsin
courts. Currently the trust agreement or deed in trust should prohibit
beneficiaries from bringing an action to partition the trust property.
Transfer of Beneficial Interest Upon Death
Land trusts can be particularly effective in estate planning. At the
time the trust is established, or by amendment at any time thereafter,
the beneficiary may provide for the devolution of his interest on his
death.
Many property owners hold title to real estate as joint tenants in
order to pass full ownership to the survivor. The joint tenant necessarily
acquires an immediate interest in this type relationship which may not
86. Kinser v. Bidwell, 55 Wis. 2d 749, 201 N.W.2d 9 (1972); Breen v. Breen,
411 111. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
87. R. BOYER, supra note 22, § 20.04.
88. FLA. STAT. § 620.685 (1981).
89. FLA. STAT. § 64.091 (1981).
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reflect the desire of the original owners. The intended result may more
accurately be accomplished with a land trust. The trust agreement may
provide the trust settlor will retain sole possession, control, or manage-
ment, etc. over the property for some stated period or until the settlor's
death. The agreement can provide that upon the beneficiary's death the
beneficial interest shall vest in another effecting joint tenancies, life es-
tates, contingent interests or remainders in named successor benefi-
ciaries. Provisions for transfers of beneficial interests upon the settlor's
or primary beneficiary's death should be carefully drafted. Such re-
mainder interests are present interests which do not circumvent the
Statute of Wills.90 The interests designated for beneficiary remainder-
man must involve only beneficial interests. Since in a land trust legal
and equitable title is vested solely in the trustee, a testamentary re-
mainder anticipating transference of the trust property's legal or equi-
table title will be void.91
In an Illinois case, Favata v. Favata92 the settlor made two
amendments to his land trust. The first amendment provided the ex-
isting trust interest vested in his daughter at his death. However a sub-
sequent amendment provided that title to real estate held in the land
trust was to pass to his son in the event of the settlor's death. Certain
other property was to be held in trust for his daughter. The Illinois
Appellate Court held that under the terms of the first amendment the
daughter received a present remainder interest the moment the trust
was created. As a result, this amendment was valid and did not consti-
tute a void testamentary disposition. However, the second amendment
was held invalid because the "settlor apparently attempted to transfer
legal and equitable title"9' 3 to his children.
Estate Planning, Ancillary Administration
Because land trusts have the basic characteristics of conventional
trust agreements, they may be utilized as effective estate planning de-
vices. As discussed above, upon the beneficiary's death, the beneficial
90. Favata v. Favata, 74 I1. App. 3d 979, 394 N.E.2d 443 (1979).
91. Id.
92. Id. Cf. In re Estate of Nemecek, 80 I11. App. 3d 881, 408 N.E.2d 655
(1980).
93. Favata, 74 I11. App. 3d at 982, 394 N.E.2d at 447.
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interest can be automatically conveyed to successor beneficiaries or
transmitted by the deceased beneficiary's will. By placing title to real
estate in a land trust, the grantor retains a measure of control over the
beneficiaries and the manner in which they hold and maintain the
property. By appropriate language in the trust agreement, the power of
direction may be conferred upon someone other than the beneficiary,
while the income and other benefits of property ownership will still flow
to the beneficiary.
A land trust may also avoid problems of ancillary administration.
"[I]t is uniformly recognized that such beneficial interest is transmitted
by probate administration in the domicile of the beneficiary." 9 There-
fore, a New York or California resident owning Florida real estate can
place title to the property in a Florida land trust. Upon the settlor's
death the beneficial interest will automatically transfer to his successor,
as named in the trust agreement or by the settlor's will, etc., and ancil-
lary probate administration in Florida will not be required 5 The land
trust may also provide for a local agent or representative through
which the property management may be channeled.
Tort Liability for Negligence in Connection with Real Estate
Held in Trust
In general, beneficiaries are deemed liable for injury to persons or
property incurred on real estate held in trust.98 Certainly, the land trust
arrangement could not function if tort liability were imposed on the
trustee.
Liability in negligence arises primarily out of a duty and a breach
of duty. Such duty arises out of possession, control or management of
the property. Since the land trust trustee generally has no right in re-
spect of possession, maintenance, control or repair of the property, he
obviously lacks a duty to third parties regarding these attributes.97
Therefore, under the typical land trust arrangement, the trustee should
not be held personally liable for injuries occurring on the trust
94. H.W. KENOE, supra note 10, § 7.39 (1978).
95. FLA. STAT. § 734.02; FLORIDA PROBATE PRACTICE, § 20.1 (1973).
96. W.B. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 11.
97. Brazowski v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 280 I1. App. 293 (1935).
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property."
Trustee Liability to Third Parties
The essential function of a land trust trustee is to act as a vehicle
for holding title to real estate. As discussed earlier, both legal and equi-
table title is vested in the trustee for this purpose.99 "In reality the
transfer to the trustee is a formality involving a shifting of legal docu-
ments." 100 Under the typical land trust arrangement, the "trustee has
no duties in respect to the management or control of the property or to
pay taxes, insurance, or to be responsible for litigation."101 The duties,
rights and responsibilities attendant upon real property owners continue
to reside in the beneficiaries. While typically these duties are retained,
they may be delegated to third parties or to the land trust trustee.
As a practical matter, the only duties specifically imposed upon
the trustee are to convey and deal with matters concerning title to the
trust property. Under the typical land trust agreement, the trustee may
engage in these matters only upon the written direction of the benefi-
ciaries or the person named in the trust agreement as having the power
of direction. 02 Land trust trustees are empowered by statute and usu-
ally by agreement to execute various types of agreements and docu-
ments. As a result of this authority to contract with third parties, ques-
tions arise concerning land trust trustee liability. Under traditional
rules of trustee liability "[i] f a trustee makes a contract in the adminis-
tration of the trust, he is personally liable unless the contract provides
otherwise."103 If the land trust trustee wishes to avoid personal liability
98. Fields v. 6125 Indiana Ave. Apts., 47 I11. App. 2d 55, 196 N.E.2d 485
(1964).
99. See supra cases cited in note 4.
100. People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 Ill. 2d 479, 492, 389 N.E.2d 540,
545 (1979).
101. Robinson v. Chicago Nat'l Bank, 32 Ill. App. 2d 55, 58, 176 N.E.2d 659,
661 (1961).
102. Spachman v. Overtori, 16 Il. App. 3d 385, 306 N.E.2d 743 (1979).
103. G.T. & G.G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 454 (5th ed. 1973). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 262, 266-271A, 275 (1959). The trustee is of course entitled
to indemnification from the trust if the obligation was properly incurred in the adminis-
tration of the trust. A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 262 (3d ed. 1967).
This position of the trustee warranted by the nature of the land trust
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he should include an exculpatory provision in the contract instrument.
Failure to do so may render him personally liable on the agreement to
the same extent as if he held the property free of the trust.' °4
Florida's common law rules governing trustee liability to third per-
sons were changed in 1975 by legislative enactment. Florida Statutes
section 737.306 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not per-
sonally liable on contracts, except contracts for attorneys' fees,
properly entered into his fiduciary capacity in the course of admin-
istration of the trust estate unless he fails to reveal his representa-
tive capacity and identify the trust estate in the contract.
(2) A trustee is personally liable for obligations arising from own-
ership or control of property of the trust estate or for torts commit-
ted in the course of administration of the trust estate only if he is
personally at fault.
(3) Claims based on contracts, except contracts for attorneys' fees,
entered into by a trustee in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations
arising from ownership or control of the trust estate, or on torts
committed in the course of trust administration may be asserted
against the trustee in his fiduciary capacity, whether or not the
trustee is personally liable.
(4) Issues of liability between the trust estate and the trustee indi-
vidually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting,
surcharge, or indemnification, or in any other appropriate
proceeding.""5
The protection afforded by this statute has been held inapplicable
to land trust trustees. In Taylor v. Richmond's New Approach
• . * should be recognized by those dealing with the beneficial interest and
in preparing instruments which are to be presented to the trustee for signa-
ture. Any contract of sale, mortgage, or other security document, lease or
contract, which provides for the payment of money or the performance of
any representation or warranty should be so drafted that these obligations
are not those of the trustee. When presented with such an instrument the
trustee will refuse to execute it or will modify it so that the obligations are
those of the beneficiaries alone.
H.W. KENOE, supra note 10, at 4-38.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 261 (1959).
105. FLA.. STAT. § 737.306 (1979).
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Ass'n,10 8 a land development corporation conveyed title to property,
upon which they had developed a condominium, to the president and
secretary of the corporation as trustees pursuant to the Florida Land
Trust Act. After the developer's control of the association passed to
unit owners, the condominium association attempted to hold the trust-
ees liable for assessment against unsold apartments as well as for some
contractual obligations. Having lost the assets of the trust through a
mortgage foreclosure, the trustees were held personally liable for the
obligations. On appeal, the second district held that absent any con-
tractual provision indicating the trustees sought to limit their liability
in dealing with third parties traditional rules of trustee liability would
apply. The provisions of Florida's statute section 737.306 were found
inapplicable to land trust trustees. "In the absence of a more specific
pronouncement, we do not believe the legislature intended to extend
this protection to Florida land developers operating under an Illinois
land trust.110 7 The protections afforded by this section, the court said,
were intended to apply only to trustees acting under classical inter
vivos or testamentary trust arrangements. "Moreover, [the land trust]
statute prescribes that the trustee is vested with full rights of ownership
over the real property. 10 8
If the trustee of an Illinois land trust can deal with the trust prop-
erty as if it were his own, we believe it logical that he be subject to
personal liability for obligations which he has incurred to third per-
sons in his administration of the trust.109
Looking at the facts in Taylor the court's result appears correct.
But perhaps the legislature should consider whether Florida's statute
section 737.036 should apply to land trusts as well as inter vivos or
testamentary trusts. It is submitted that the protections afforded by
this statute should extend to land trust trustees.
As pointed out in Taylor, the Florida Land Trust Statute vests the
trustee with full rights of ownership over the real estate.110 But as a
106. 351 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
107. Id. at 1096.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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practical matter, while the land trust trustee is statutorily vested with
"power" to deal with property title, under the typical trust agreement
he lacks this right absent the beneficiary's direction. In contrast the
trustee of a typical inter vivos or testamentary trust, is vested not only
with the power to deal with the trust property but also with other dis-
cretionary powers prescribed by the trust agreement. Since the land
trust trustee's power (e.g., to sell, lease, encumber, manage and deal
with all matters affecting title to the real estate) are effected only upon
specific direction of the beneficary (unless the trust agreement vests the
trustee with discretionary authority and power to act in such matters)
the land trust trustee's ability to act in a representative capacity is
clearly more limited than the trustee of a conventional inter vivos or
testamentary trust. The trustee in a land trust is merely a conduit
through which passes the intent and the direction of the true own-
ers-the holders of the beneficial interests or those having the power of
direction.
"The land trust is, in fact a fiction which has become entrenched
in the law of this state and accepted as a useful instrument in the han-
dling of real estate transactions. Outside of relationships based on legal
title, the trustee's title has little significance." '111 Under these circum-
stances should not the protections afforded by Florida's statute section
737.036 more equitably apply to land trust trustees than to trustees of
an inter vivos or testamentary trust? If the legislature or judiciary rec-
ognize this limitation on liability, third parties dealing with land trust
trustees would certainly be more prudent. All third parties would rec-
ognize that, with respect to any obligations undertaken by the parties,
recourse would be limited to the trust res. If further assurances or
guarantees were deemed necessary to protect third parties, the benefi-
ciaries or the party with the power of direction could sign the agree-
ment as guarantor.
In situations, such as Taylor, where the trustee and beneficiary or
trustee and settlor are substantially similar in identity, a better ap-
proach for imposing liability would be to follow equitable principles
analogous to piercing of the corporate veil. If a land trust has been
used to intentionally defraud third parties and the trustee is personally
11I. People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 111. 2d 479, 492, 389 N.E.2d 540,
545 (1979).
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at fault for obligations arising from his actual control or management
of the property, then the trustee should be held personally liable for his
actions.
If section 737.036 did apply, and the trustee treated the property
as if it were his own, or failed to reveal he was acting in a representa-
tive capacity, or acted without regard to the beneficiaries' directions
then, absent any attempt to exonerate himself from liability, personal
liability would attach against the trustee. In regard to issues of this
nature, the courts and legislature should look to the realities of control
rather than the refinements of title. Liability should lie against those
parties who control the trust property, as well as those who enjoy the
benefits of ownership. Logic and equity, tempered by the realities of
the trustee-beneficiary relationship dictate that provisions of section
737.306 apply to land trust trustees.
Tax Aspects
Federal Taxation
Under the Florida Land Trust Act at least two documents are re-
quired: (1) a deed in trust conveying the property to the trustee and (2)
a trust agreement, setting forth the agreement between the trustee and
the beneficiaries. If there are multiple beneficiaries, it is recommended
that a third document be drawn, setting forth the relationships of the
beneficiaries among themselves.1 1 2
The beneficiary of a land trust may be an individual, sole proprie-
tor, partnership or corporation and will be taxed accordingly. However,
in the event the relationship between the beneficiaries is not carefully
structured, it is possible beneficiaries will be treated as a corporation
for income tax purposes. The result is double taxation on the trust
income.113
Homestead
Under the Florida Constitution, the homestead exemption is
112. See Weider, Florida Land Trust Tax Planning and Problems, 49 FLA. B.J.
308 (1975); Peckron, Tax Consequences of Land Trusts, 16 HAWAII B.J. 3 (1981).
113. Id.
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granted to "every person who has the legal or equitable title to real
estate and maintains thereon the permanent residence of the own-
er .... "114 Since the land trust beneficiary has neither legal nor equi-
table title, he is not afforded homestead protection. 1 5
As made apparent by Florida's Constitution, when a land trust at-
tempts to hold title to residential property beneficiaries are deprived of
the substantial protection against creditor's claims as well as the benefit
of potential ad valorem tax exemptions. This result should be carefully
considered when the land trust is used solely to hold title to property
utilized as the beneficiary's principal residence.
Contracts for The Sale of Trust Property
Though Florida has not yet ruled on whether a beneficiary may
validly execute a contract for the sale of the trust real estate, the Illi-
nois courts have concluded a sole beneficiary may execute such a con-
tract, provided he discloses the property is held in a land trust, and that
he is the beneficiary thereof.1 6 This may be true even if the beneficiary
does not disclose that the property is held in a land trust.11 7
Financing
As a practical matter commercial, personal or conventional mort-
gage loans may be secured by property held in a land trust. In the
typical mortgage context the trustee's legal and equitable title is used
as security for the loan. In such cases the trustee will be designated
mortgagor and must therefore execute all documents necessary to con-
sumate the transaction. However the trustee's authority and power to
encumber both legal and equitable title to the trust property must be
expressed in the trust deed. As the Florida Land Trust Act, subsection
1 provides:
[E]very conveyance ... [is] effective to vest in the trustee full
rights of ownership ...with full power and authority ...as
114. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6; See also FLA. STAT. § 196.031 (1981).
115. 074-313 Op. Att'y Gen. 111 (1974).
116. Madigan v. Buehr, 125 I11. App. 2d 8, 12, 260 N.E.2d 431, 435 (1970).
117. Lampinen v. Hicks, 73 I11. App. 2d 376, 378, 391 N.E.2d 1105, 1107
(1979).
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granted in the instrument. . . provided the instrument confers on
the trustee the power to . . encumber . . the property. 18
The trust deed should, therefore, contain an express provision em-
powering the trustee to mortgage, pledge, or otherwise encumber the
property held in trust for the trust's benefit. Mortgagees dealing with
the trustee and trust property"1 9 are protected under the Act; they are
not obligated to look beyond the four corners of the recorded trust deed
to determine the interests or rights of the beneficiaries, nor are they
liable for any unrecorded collateral declarations or agreements. 120
The trustee's mortgage obligation is secured by a lien on the trust
property. The mortgage terms, e.g., amount of debt, interest rate,
amortization period, etc., should be stated in the promissory note. In
order to limit the security to the trust res the promissory note should
limit the rights and remedies of the lender to foreclosure of the mort-
gaged property securing the debt. Unless other guarantees or collateral-
ization have been agreed to, the lender should acknowledge in the note
and mortgage document that no personal liability will be asserted
against the trustee or any beneficiary in the event of deficiency arising
from a foreclosure action. Beneficiaries may guarantee their personal
liability at the lender's insistence, and this may be included in the
promissory note or as a separate instrument.
A promissory note executed by a land trustee, which is payable
only out of the land trust property with no personal liability, qualifies
as a negotiable instrument under the Uniform Commercial Code.' 12
But when mortgage terms are incorporated in the note the note be-
comes non-negotiable. If the promissory note merely refers to the fact
that it is secured by mortgage on the trust res, this alone does not elim-
inate the negotiability of the note. 22 The question of whether the
promissory note should embody any of the essential terms of the mort-
gage instrument, other than the repayment terms and parties, will be
118. FLA. STAT. § 689.081(1) (1981).
119. Id.
120. FLA. STAT. § 689.081(2)(3) (1981).
121. Kitzer v. Kitzer, 20 I11. App. 3d 54, 56, 312 N.E.2d 699, 701 (1974); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-105(I)(H) (1980); FLA. STAT. § 673.3-105 (1981).
122. Holly Hill Acres Ltd. v. Charter Bank of Gainesville, 314 So. 2d 209, 211
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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based upon the lender's preference as to the negotiability of the instru-
ment and whether an assignment of the note and mortgage to a third
party is contemplated.
The beneficial personal property interest in a land trust 123 may be
assigned by the beneficiary as collateral for a loan, just as any other
form of personalty (e.g. stock certificates, bonds, certificates of deposit,
etc.) may be assigned. Lenders unfamiliar with the land trust concept
and assignment of beneficial interest transactions, may be hesitant
about accepting such assignments as loan collateral. Nonetheless, this
technique does have certain advantages for both lender and borrower.
First, it avoids the necessity of that complex documentation usually as-
sociated with use of real property as security for debt, such as mort-
gage documentation, recording, releases and application procedures.
Second, a collateral assignment of beneficial interest as security for a
debt may avoid the assignor's right of redemption2 4 eliminating lender
concerns over rights on foreclosure of the debt. 2 5 Third, a pledge of
personal property becomes security for the loan, and therefore assign-
ments of beneficial interest in a land trust fall within the purview of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 26 Foreclosure of a secur-
ity interest in personalty under Article 9 is less costly and less time
consuming than foreclosure of a typical real estate mortgage.
This form of financing transaction is well suited to unamortized
commercial or personal loans made on a demand or short term basis.
Transactiohs of this nature must be carefully documented. It has been
suggested that such transactions should involve trusts that were created
prior to the negotiation of the loan, 2 7 otherwise such a loan may be
characterized as a mortgage requiring125 legal foreclosure and full rec-
ognition of any rights and defenses a defaulting mortgagee may have.
Litigation resulting from this procedure has been based upon
claims that such assignment transactions were devices used to avoid
both mortgage foreclosure proceedings and borrower's rights of re-
123. FLA. STAT. § 689.071(4) (1981).
124. 229 So. 2d at 624.
125. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, § 18b. (1980).
126. FLA. STAT. § 679.101 (1981).
127. H.W. KENOE, supra note 10, at § 5.34.
128. FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1981).
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demption on loans secured by real estate."2 9 In Quinn v. Pullman Trust
and Savings Bank,18 0 the Illinois appellate court summarized and set
forth guidelines as to when an assignment of beneficial interest transac-
tion would constitute a mortgage:
A land trust may not be used as a device to circumvent the right of
redemption where the transaction of creation of the land trust and
borrowing of funds with the simultaneous pledging and assignment
of the beneficial interest are one transaction. However where, as
here, the trust contains no provision for the sale of the real estate
subject-matter on default in a debt, where it is set up for purposes,
other than a security for debt, where the pledge of the beneficial
interest is subsequent to the creation of the trust, and where the
pledged security transaction is of the trust beneficial interest only,
the transaction is valid and will not be construed to be a real estate
mortgage.
In later Illinois cases, Kortenhof v. Messick- Shefner v. Univer-
sity National Bank,18 2 the courts upheld the validity of the assignment
of beneficial interest transaction and refused to require the trust benefi-
ciary-creditor to follow statutory mortgage foreclosure proceedings. In
both cases the loan transactions adhered to Quinn's articulated
guidelines.
In Ferraro v. Parker,33 a land trust agreement was entered into
for the purchase and development of certain real estate. Ferraro, who
was both trustee and beneficiary, executed a demand note to the other
two trust beneficiaries for $18,572.10 and at the same time signed a
loan agreement putting up his 31 percent interest in the trust as collat-
eral security for the loan. Failing to satisfy the debt on time, his inter-
est, evidenced by a trust participation certificate, was deemed forfeited
and was sold to a third party. Ferraro thereafter sought a declaratory
129. DeVoigne v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 304 I1. 177, 189, 136 N.E. 498
(1922); See also Homey v. Hayes, 11 Ill. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957).
130. Quinn v. Pullman Trust & Savings Bank, 98 Ill. App. 2d 402, 404, 240
N.E.2d 791, 793 (1968).
131. Kortenhof v. Messick, 18 Ill. App. 3d 15, 309 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1974).
132. Shefner v. University Nat'l Bank, 40 Il1. App. 3d 978, 980-81, 353 N.E.2d
126, 128-29 (1976).
133. 229 So. 2d at 624.
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judgment declaring the loan agreement be deemed a mortgage on his
equitable interest in the trust. Ferraro also argued the defendants
should have foreclosed on the mortgage before depriving him of his
equity of redemption. In their motion to dismiss the defendants con-
tended that Ferraro, who failed to pay the note for more than one year
after it was due, had failed to redeem any equity he might have had. In
addition, defendants argued the loan agreement and assignment of Fer-
raro's trust participation certificate was not intended as a mortgage.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Florida's Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal affirmed stating "the interest [of Ferraro]
was not an interest in real estate nor would a pledge of that interest be
rendered a mortgage. ... ,'1 Responding to Ferraro's claim that his
pledged trust participation certificate was merely security for his loan
(constituting a mortgage) and that this required legal foreclosure, the
court found the loan agreement conveyed legal title to the certificate
and did not constitute a lien. The agreement was an absolute assign-
ment of Ferraro's interest and neither the loan agreement nor assign-
ment indicated an intention to secure payment of the obligation.
The essential result of these cases, where Quinn's guidelines are
met, is that an assignment of a land trust's beneficial interest for the
purpose of securing a loan does not convert the transaction into a real
estate mortgage requiring legal foreclosure proceedings and recognition
of debtor's redemptive rights.
A beneficial interest in a land trust is a "general intangible" under
section 9-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code.13 5 Pursuant to the
code, the security interest in a general intangible must be perfected by
filing a financial statement.13 6 The Illinois legislature, through an
amendment to their code provision, specifically exempted "a security
interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust or a
decedent's estate"' 37 from filing requirements. In Illinois, therefore, a
security interest in a land trust can now be perfected without filing a
financial statement. 38 In contrast, Florida's code states a financing
134. Id. at 624.
135. FLA. STAT. § 679.106 (1981); Levine v. Pascal, 94 111. App. 2d 43, 49, 236
N.E.2d 425, 431 (1968).
136. FLA. STAT. § 679.302 (1981).
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-302(I)(c) (1981).
138. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chicago v. Pogue, 72 Il. App. 3d
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statement will not be required to perfect "a security interest created by
an assignment of a beneficial interest in a decedent's estate."13' The
text of this section clearly differs from the U.C.C. and Illinois code
which exempts the beneficial interests created both "in a trust or a
decedent's estate."140
A literal reading of Florida Statutes section 679.302 requires Flor-
ida practitioners to file a financing statement to perfect the security
interest. Ironically the sponsors' notes to subsection (1)(c) indicate the
intent of this provision is to:
Overcome a growing body of case law requiring perfection by
filing of a security interest created by an assignment of a benefi-
cial interest in a trust or a decedent's estate. Most of these cases
involved trusts or estates which had as their corpus real property.
In a substantial percentage of these cases, the courts concluded
that the security party's interest was in personalty, i.e., any rights
in the real property were inchoate. These cases represent a dra-
matic departure from traditional principles of real property. In
Florida, the most recent judicial authority in this regard conforms
with the revisions .... 141
The inconsistency between statutory text and legislative intent has
not yet been reconciled by judicial construction or legisative amend-
ment. Therefore, as a matter of sound practice the careful practitioner
must continue to process and file financing statements in the course of
transactions involving collateral assignments of beneficial interests.
Conclusion
Both the legislature and courts of this state have come to recog-
nize that the so called "Illinois" land trust could become useful in the
growth and development of Florida real estate. Although used in Illi-
nois throughout this century, Florida lawyers, banks and trust institu-
tions have appeared cautious in their promotion and use of land trusts.
54, 58, 389 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1979).
139. FLA. STAT. § 679.302(l)(c) (1981).
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-302(1)(c) (1981).
141. FLA. STAT. § 679.9-302(1)(c) (1981) (emphasis added); But see In re Cow-
sert, 14 Bankr. 335 (1981).
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Perhaps this reluctance derives from what was traditionally perceived
as the greatest obstacle to utilization of land trusts in Florida-the im-
pact of the Statute of Uses on such trusts. But in recent years this
obstacle has been overcome by legislation and judicial decision. Per-
haps attorneys' and institutions' lack of familiarity with the practical
and beneficial aspects of such trusts has contributed to this result.
Florida case law concerning land trusts is still in its infancy. None-
theless, there remains sufficient legal foundation of which members of
the bar may take note. There are numerous unanswered questions con-
cerning application of the land trust to various situations. By starting
with a firm foundation and understanding of the basic advantages and
attributes of the Florida land trust we can resolve unanswered issues
and explore new areas of application.
Mitchell A. Sherman
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PRIVATE HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITY AND
FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW: Florida Board of
Bar Examiners, In re N.R.S.
Introduction
Homosexual conduct has existed for many years, but it has be-
come a politically and morally controversial topic in today's society.
Debates rage over the unnaturalness of sexually deviant behavior and
one's right to enjoy freedom of sexual choice and expression.
Laws imposing criminal sanctions on consenting adults who en-
gage in private homosexual behavior are historically longstanding" and
most have withstood constitutional attack.2 Despite the constitutionality
of statutes prohibiting this conduct, courts have recognized the counter-
vailing right of privacy which, although not explicitly provided for in
the United States Constitution, is considered an implicit and substan-
tive right.'
In this emotionally charged, and often misunderstood area, courts
reluctantly confront and resolve the legal issues. First, this comment
considers the legal issues presented when noncommercial homosexual
acts occur privately between consenting adults. Second, this comment
focuses particularly on the legitimacy of the Florida Board of Bar Ex-
aminers' inquiry into the private sexual behavior of a bar applicant as
part of the process in which his fitness to practice law in Florida is
1. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1202-03 (E.D. Va. 1975). In Doe, the court observed the Virginia statute has its
ancestry in Judaic and Christian law, and is immediately traceable to the Code of
Virginia of 1792. Id. at 1202-03.
2. Id. at 1203. See also Witherspoon v. State, 278 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1973). See
generally 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 3 (1977).
3. An in-depth discussion of the right of privacy and the recognition of privacy as
a fundamental right under the United States Constitution is beyond the scope of this
comment. But see Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosex-
ual Conduct, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1613 (1974).
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determined.
Background of In re. N.R.S.
The Florida Supreme Court's power and authority to regulate ad-
mission of persons to the practice of law in Florida is derived from the
Florida Constitution.4 The Florida Board of Bar Examiners (Board),
serving as an administrative arm of Florida's Supreme Court performs
regulatory and supervisory functions over Florida's practicing attor-
neys. The Board is answerable solely to the Florida Supreme Court,5
and its authority may neither usurp nor exceed the court's power under
the Florida Constitution.'
As part of its duty to regulate admission of persons to the Florida
bar, the Board is empowered to schedule informal hearings in order to
question the applicant's qualifications. Thus, the Board insures that all
applicants fully comply with the Florida Supreme Court's qualification
criteria before being admitted to practice law in Florida.7
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court, in Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, In re N.R.S.,s explicitly denied the Board authority to.
question an applicant regarding his proclivity towards private homosex-
ual conduct. N.R.S., a member of the New York State Bar, had com-
pleted all parts of the Florida Bar examination successfully. His appli-
cation for admission to the Bar revealed he had been classified 4-F by
the military "either because of a physical problem or because of his
homosexuality." 9 The Board conducted an informal hearing at which
N.R.S. refused to answer questions about his past sexual conduct. He
admitted a "continuing sexual preference for men but . . . indicated
that he had no present intention regarding future homosexual acts."1
4. FLA. CONST. art V, § 15: "The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted."
5. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1977).
6. id.
7. FLA. Sup. CT. R. RELATING TO ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Art. II, § 12 (1977).
8. 403 So. 2d 1315.
9. Id. at 1316.
10. Id.
135
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
Homosexuality and Bar Admission6:1982
He further stated he would obey all the laws of Florida.11
Following a review of N.R.S.'s testimony, the Board requested he
return for further questioning. This, he refused to do. Ultimately, the
Board refused to certify his admission to the Florida Bar, conceding
"that, except for the issue of sexual conduct, it (the Board) has no
adverse information concerning petitioner's fitness."1 2 N.R.S. subse-
quently petitioned the Florida Supreme Court seeking its order that the
Board certify his admission to practice.
The issue presented by the case was whether questioning a Florida
Bar applicant about private homosexual activity was rationally related
to proving fitness to practice law.1  The issue is a delicate one,14 and
one recently addressed by other jurisdictions in the context of other
employment areas.1 5 After reconciling the competing arguments, the
Florida Supreme Court refused to sanction the Board's inquiry into the
applicant's private sexual conduct, even though the applicant admitted
a continuing sexual preference for men.1
N.R.S.'s Constitutional Arguments
Florida Statute § 800.02 prohibits "unnatural and lascivious
acts,' 17 and has been construed to include homosexual acts between
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1317.
14. Id. at 1316.
15. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)(discharge of homosexual
employed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for immoral conduct
and possession of unsuitable personality traits held violative of substantive due process);
Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969)(male teacher who engaged in non-criminal relationship with another male can-
not be subject to disciplinary proceedings absent showing behavior indicated unfitness
to teach). But see Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wisc. 2d 286, 559 P.2d
1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (public knowledge of male teacher's homosex-
uality impaired his academic efficiency thus constituting sufficient cause for discharge).
16. 403 So. 2d at 1315. The court did sanction further inquiry by the Board, if
the Board in good faith, felt the conduct was other than private, noncommercial and
consensual.
17. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981) reads in part: "Unnatural and lascivious act.
Whoever commits any unnatural and lascivious act with another person shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor of the second degree. .. ."
521 1
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consenting adults.18 In the instant case, N.R.S. alleged the statute
could not be constitutionally applied to private consensual activity be-
tween adults, 19 but in a footnote the court declined to answer this as-
sertion, stating the statute had previously withstood constitutional
attack. 0
In Witherspoon v. State," applicants challenged the constitutional
validity of section 800.02, contending the words "unnatural and lascivi-
ous" contained within the statute were "so vague as to make an ordi-
nary person guess at their meaning, and so broad as to invade the right
to privacy and the constitutional rights of individuals guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Declaration of Rights of the State of Florida. 2 Florida's Supreme
Court answered that the words "unnatural and lascivious" were not
vague, but rather were "of such a character that an ordinary citizen
can easily determine what character of act is intended, and are thus
secure from constitutional attack. '2 Similar statutes in other states
have also withstood constitutional attack.24
Florida statutes set forth guidelines as to who may not practice
law in Florida. The category of excludable applicants includes those
persons "not of good moral character. ' 25 Florida courts have struggled
with the interpretation of the words "good moral character,12 6 as has
the United States Supreme Court.2
In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,28 an applicant was de-
nied admission to the California Bar because he had failed to show he
was a person of good moral character. There was some evidence appli-
18. 278 So. 2d 611.
19. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
20. 403 So. 2d 1315.
21. 278 So. 2d 611.
22. Id. at 612.
23. Id.
24. See generally 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § 3 (1977).
25. Florida statutes provide that "[njo sheriff or clerk of any county or deputy of
either, shall practice [law] in this state, nor shall any person not of good moral char-
acter . . . be entitled to practice." FLA. STAT. § 454.18 (1981) (emphasis added).
26. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); State
ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 146 So. 66 (Fla. 1933).
27. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
28. Id.
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cant had once been connected with the Communist Party, but the ap-
plicant refused on First Amendment grounds to answer questions about
his political associations and beliefs. The United States Supreme Court
sustained the denial of admission,29 but described the term good moral
character as unusually ambiguous."0 The Court warned that such am-
biguity could "be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discrimina-
tory denial of the right to practice law."31 In order to prevent arbitrary
denial of applicants' admission to the Bar, the United States Supreme
Court held that the standards imposed by the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution must be met.32
Petitioner in In re N.R.S. advanced the argument that he had
been denied due process and equal protection of the law. 3 Under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, government
cannot take away a person's life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law.34 There are two aspects of the due process guarantee: pro-
cedural and substantive. Procedural due process involves an individual's
right to a fair decision-making process, including notice.3 5 N.R.S. ar-
gued he had been denied procedural due process of law because Florida
Bar forms did not give notice that homosexual persons applying for
admission to practice would be subject to questioning about their pri-
vate sex lives.38
Petitioner also asserted that he had not been afforded equal pro-
29. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
30. Id. at 263.
31. Id.
32. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); U.S. CONST..
amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See Brief for Petitioner at 18, 23; 403 So. 2d 1315.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A discussion on the Court's interpretation of
the phrase "life, liberty, and property" is beyond the scope of this comment. See gener-
ally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383, 478 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
35. NOWAK, supra note 34 at 383, 499.
36. See Brief for Petitioner at 18; 403 So. 2d 1315. Substantive due process is
"[t]he right to be free from irrational and capricious government conduct resulting in
deprivation of life, liberty or property." J. Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory
Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA
L. REV. 527, 533 (1979).
1 6:1982
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tection of the laws.37 The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 38 guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be af-
forded equal treatment by the government.3 9 N.R.S. argued that "simi-
larly situated individuals" described all applicants to the Florida Bar,
whether heterosexual or homosexual. Since the Florida statute pro-
scribing "unnatural and lascivious acts" 40 had been applied to heter-
osexuals as well as homosexuals, 41 N.R.S. asserted that equal protec-
tion prohibited the Board from inquiring into his private sexual
behavior since the Board did not delve into the private sex lives of
heterosexuals. 2
In addition to the procedural due process and equal protection
constitutional challenges, petitioner asserted that inquiry into his pri-
vate sexual behavior violated his right to privacy under the United
States Constitution.43 Commentators recognized a right of privacy as
early as 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote a
person's privacy should be protected from intrusion by newspapers.4
Articulating what would later become a foundation for today's right of
privacy, Brandeis dissented in 1928 from the majority's view and wrote
that a person should be prohibited from government intrusion into his
private life.4
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
the right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized a right of pri-
vacy implicit in the express guarantees of the Constitution."8 The right
of privacy has been viewed by the Court as an element of "liberty"
37. See Brief for Petitioner at 23; 402 So. 2d 1315; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. NOWAK, supra note 32, at 519.
40. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981).
41. Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1975).
42. See Brief for Petitioner at 22-23; 403 So. 2d 1315.
43. Id. at 16.
44. S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of women during some
stages of pregnancy to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right of unmarried individuals to obtain contraceptives).
1524 Nova Law Journal
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 In the landmark decision,
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court found that the "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras .. .various guarantees create
zones of privacy."4 8 Griswold's "zones of privacy" emerged from such
fundamental constitutional guarantees as the First Amendment, limit-
ing forced disclosure of speech and association; the Third Amendment,
protecting a person from forced quartering of a soldier during peace-
time; the Fourth and Fifth Amendments limiting the extent to which
the government may demand information from a person; and the Ninth
Amendment, which guarantees that enumerated constitutional rights
shall not be construed as limiting other rights of the people.49 Thus, by
interpreting the specific constitutional guarantees as creating zones of
privacy, the extrapolated right of privacy was recognized as a funda-
mental right. 0
It is interesting to note that on November 4, 1980, Floridians
voted to amend the state Constitution,51 adding Article I, section 23,
which provides that every person has "[t]he right to be let alone and
free from government intrusion into his private life."'52 Had petitioner
brought his cause of action after the general election, he could have
asserted an explicit right of privacy under the Florida Constitution, and
that the Board's investigation constituted an unreasonable intrusion
into his private life. This argument was not raised in petitioner's brief,
presumably because the brief was filed prior to passage of the privacy
amendment. The court's opinion followed the amendment. While it
cannot be conclusively determined from the language of the N.R.S.
opinion, it is possible that the court foresaw the impact of Florida's new
section 23 and on that ground determined petitioner's right of privacy
47. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 39 (1923) ("liberty" includes right to marry,
establish a home, bring up children, and in general, enjoy those privileges essential to
an orderly pursuit of happiness); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(recognizing "liberty" includes parents' right to direct their children's upbringing and
education).
48. 381 U.S. 479, 484.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. G. Cope, A Quick Look At Florida's New Right of Privacy, 55 FLA. B.J. 12
(1981).
52. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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warranted protection from intrusion by the Florida Board of Bar Ex-
aminers. By resting its decision on the grounds that private noncom-
mercial sexual acts between consenting adults are not relevant to fitness
to practice law, the court apparently protected petitioner's right of pri-
vacy as explicitly written in the new Florida Constitution.
The constitutional arguments asserted by petitioner are not new. It
has been suggested by other courts that prohibition of homosexual be-
havior, even private homosexual behavior, may infringe on the right of
privacy, 53 deny equal protection, 54 and impair due process requirements
regarding liberty. 55 The Florida Supreme Court did not, however, ad-
dress petitioner's arguments asserted on these constitutional grounds.
Apparently, the court avoided the constitutional issues in keeping with
its rule56 to dispose of cases, where possible, without adjudication of
constitutional issues.57
Fitness to Practice Law
In addition to constitutional arguments, N.R.S. claimed the
Board's inquiry into his private consensual sexual behavior was not ra-
tionally related to prove fitness to practice law.58 Traditionally, states
grant bar examiners wide powers to regulate bar admission, but these
powers are not without restriction.59
As early as 1889, courts recognized that where an attorney's con-
duct did not affect his professional integrity, a board of bar examiners
could not suspend an attorney, even though that conduct might be "ir-
regular."60 Similary, "if the act does not disclose moral turpitude in the
perpetrator rendering him unfit to be entrusted with the confidences
53. Acanfora v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 259 F. Supp. 843 (D.
Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 836 (1974); 417 F.2d 1161.
54. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973).
55. Id.
56. Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1970).
57. Id.
58. See Brief for Petitioner at 6; 403 So. 2d 1315.
59. 353 U.S. 232.
60. State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 25, 28, 10 S.E. 408, 410 (1889) (conduct
of attorney who published false and libelous charge against judge in newspaper held
insufficient misconduct to disbar).
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and duties of the profession, it cannot appropriately be made the basis
of disbarment." 6'
According to the United States Supreme Court in Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners"2 "[a] State can require . . . good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the
bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the ap-
plicant's fitness . . . to practice law." 3 In N.R.S., petitioner asserted
that homosexual activity was "hardly dishonorable conduct relevant to
the legal profession,"64 and that such conduct cast no doubt on his in-
tegrity, honesty, and fairness.6"
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners' Position
The Board defended its inquiry into possible homosexual conduct
as an appropriate means of protecting the public and of maintaining
the integrity of the legal profession. The Board noted that it is an attor-
ney's sworn duty to uphold the laws of the state in which he practices,
including sodomy statutes and laws proscribing homosexual conduct.
Florida, along with twenty-two other states, has a criminal statute
prohibiting homosexual conduct. 6
The Board argued that questioning the applicant about his private
sexual conduct was relevant to determine "whether the applicant in-
tends to disobey the laws of Florida which he seeks to be be sworn to
uphold. 6 7 The Board suggested "that an applicant's past homosexual
acts are relevent to determine whether past conduct will prevent him
from achieving the social acceptance necessary to enable him to dis-
charge his professional responsibilities."68
In response to petitioner's privacy argument, the Board asserted
that the Florida Supreme Court had followed the United States Su-
61. Bartos v. United States Dist. Court, 19 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1927).
62. 353 U.S. 232.
63. Id. at 239.
64. See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6; 403 So. 2d 1315.
65. Id. at 6.
66. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981). See generally K. Lasson, Homosexual Rights:
The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 BALT. L. REV. 47 (1979).
67. 403 So. 2d 1315.
68. Id. at 1317.
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preme Court in limiting the right to privacy 69 and that the right did not
extend to homosexuals.70
The Court's Disposition
The Florida Supreme Court in In re N.R.S. stated: "Private non-
commercial sex acts between adults are not relevant to prove fitness to
practice law,"17 1 but did not specifically address the constitutional issues
raised by petitioner. However, the court used constitutional due process
language in reaching its decision. Holding that unless the Board
demonstrated, in good faith, a need to question further the petitioner
about other sexual conduct (i.e., conduct that was commercial, public
or nonconsensual), inquiries were to be limited to those "bear[ing] a
rational relationship to an applicant's fitness to practice law."1 2
The words, "rational relationship" are trademarks of the oft-
quoted minimal scrutiny test employed by the courts in assessing
whether due process and equal protection of the law have been vio-
lated.73 The means chosen under this test must be reasonably corre-
lated to the ends sought, and in N.R.S., the court concluded the
Board's inquiry failed to meet even this standard. Presumably then, no
reason existed for applying the "strict scrutiny" standard which is in-
voked only when a suspect class or fundamental right is involved.74
The argument could be made, however, that because the right of
privacy was, at least to some extent, involved in In re N.R.S., and be-
cause the right of privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right,
that is, a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, ' '75 the stricter standard
69. See Brief for Respondent at 3; 403 So. 2d 1315. See also Doe, 403 F. Supp.
1199; Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
70. See Brief for Respondent at 3; 403 So. 2d 1315.
71. 403 So. 2d at 1317.
72. Id.
73. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the minimal scrutiny
test employed by the Court, see generally NOWAK, supra note 34; Friedman supra
note 36.
74. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny test employed
by the Court, see generally NOWAK supra note 34; Friedman, supra note 36.
75. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (footnotes omitted).
1528 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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of review76 should have been invoked. Petitioner did not advance this
argument, nor did the court apply the stricter test, choosing instead to
hold implicitly the inquiry by the board failed to meet the rational rela-
tionship test, the lowest standard of review.
The court's opinion gives very little basis for its decision other than
the lack of a rational relationship between the Board's inquiry and at-
torney's fitness to practice law. The court considered the issue care-
fully, obviously recognizing its delicacy. 7 In the words of the court: "A
lawyer should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain from
all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in
society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen
public confidence in the legal profession."17 8 The court stressed the im-
portance of lawyers leading law abiding lives in order to maintain the
dignity associated with the legal profession and in keeping with the at-
torney's sworn duty to uphold the law.
The Board's concern is that the applicant for bar admission be
morally, as well as legally, responsible. Thus, good moral character
must be demonstrated before an applicant is admitted to the bar.79 The
definition given the term "good moral character" is considered unusu-
ally ambiguous, and the United States Supreme Court has warned
against its arbitrary use.8 0
Included in the Florida Supreme Court's definition of good moral
character are "conduct or acts which historically [do not] constitute an
act of moral turpitude."81 "Moral turpitude involves the idea of inher-
ent baseness or depravity in the private social relations or duties owed
by man to man or by man to society .... ,,12 "The sole purpose of
these requirements is to protect the public."83 Additionally, "[tihe lay-
man must have confidence that he has employed an attorney who will
represent his interests . . .[and] if an applicant has committed certain
illegal acts in the past, he may represent a future peril to society which
76. 381 U.S. 479.
77. 403 So. 2d 1315.
78. FLA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1978).
79. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, Re: G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
80. 353 U.S. 252.
81. 364 So. 2d 454.
82. Id. at 458.
83. Id.
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would justify denying the applicant admission."8 4
All attorneys are not of impeccable background, nor are they in-
fallible. Recognizing this, the Board has admitted persons to practice
who have violated laws,85 or engaged in unethical conduct86 at some
point in their lives. Similarly, attorneys who have been suspended from
practice for illegal conduct have subsequently been re-admitted to prac-
tice.8 7 Thus, conduct that may be unethical or illegal may not involve
an offense of moral turpitude for which a person should be excluded
from the practice of law.
In a 1978 advisory opinion requested by the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, Florida Board of Bar Examiners v. Eimers,8" the Florida
Supreme Court considered the relationship between homosexuality and
fitness to practice law. In Eimers, the applicant for admission had
passed all parts of the Florida Bar Examination, but had admitted his
preference for homosexuality during questioning at a hearing before
the Board. The applicant was not asked about any specific acts he may
have engaged in nor was there any evidence proving the applicant had
acted or planned to act on his sexual preference. The court stated that
in order to determine the reasonableness of the relationship between
homosexual orientation and fitness to practice law, consideration must
be given the purpose for ostracizing the morally unfit.89 The court
stated that an attorney's mere preference for homosexuality did not
constitute a threat to the Board's objective of protecting the public
84. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, In re Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1978).
85. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978) (debts
incurred later discharged by bankruptcy are not basis for denial of admission to Bar
where not incurred with reckless disregard for payment); In re Florida Bd. of Bar Ex-
aminers, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966) (conviction of petty larceny does not deprive indi-
vidual of right to be admitted to the practice of law, if otherwise qualified).
86. 365 So. 2d 164; 183 So. 2d 688.
87. The Fla. Bar v. Davis, 361 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1978) (issuance of worthless
checks constitutes unethical conduct by an attorney warranting suspension for twelve
months); The Fla. Bar v. Blalock, 325 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1976) (attorney suspended for
misappropriating funds will be reinstated when restitution made); In re Hill, 298 So.
2d 161 (Fla. 1974) (one year suspension for issuance of worthless checks and alcohol
problems).
88. 358 So. 2d 7, 9.
89. Id.
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from those morally unfit to practice law,90 and further, that homosex-
ual behavior among consenting adults did not render a person unable to
"live up to and perform . . . professional duties and responsibilities as-
signed to members of The Bar." '
In addition, the Eimers' court found the record devoid of evidence
which suggested a preference for homosexual behavior among con-
senting adults was "indicative of character baseness." 2 Implicit in this
statement is the message that homosexual conduct, while proscribed by
Florida's criminal law is moral turpitude of the degree which renders a
person unfit to practice law. Since under Eimers, private consensual
homosexual conduct was not deemed an offense of moral turpitude for
which a person should be denied admission to the bar, it follows that
inquiry into such conduct is not rationally related to fitness to practice
law.
Two strong dissents in N.R.S. present the competing arguments.93
As stated by Justice Boyd, "[h]omosexual acts are prohibited by the
criminal law." ' The state legislature is not prohibited "by any consti-
tutional principle of due process, equal protection, or privacy"9 5 from
enacting laws intended to "protect the public health, welfare, safety,
and morals." 96
Since the issue in N.R.S. was not whether the Board can deny
admission to someone who admits an orientation towards homosexual
lifestyle, but rather whether the Board can question the applicant as to
his private sexual activity, Justice Boyd stated that "[e]ven without evi-
dence of actual conduct, I am opposed to the admission of any person
whose admitted 'orientation' indicates a lifestyle likely to involve rou-
tine violation of a criminal statute." 7 Although the mere "likelihood"
of routine violation of the law is arguably weak grounds for denying an
applicant admission to the bar, Justice Boyd felt further inquiry into
petitioner's past and planned conduct would have been useful and
90. Id.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
93. 403 So. 2d 1315.
94. Id. at 1317.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1318.
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proper. Justice Boyd also stated that he would deny admission to any-
one whose lifestyle involved routine violation of legislatively defined
standards of moral conduct, 8 and believed the court had invaded the
province of the legislature.99
The majority made no attempt to reconcile this viewpoint with
their decision. Ignoring the competing argument, the court held that
inquiry into an applicant's "orientation" to private consensual homo-
sexual conduct was beyond the Board's purview, even though, as Jus-
tice Boyd stated, such conduct is violative of a criminal statute.100 The
majority denied the Board authority to determine through further ques-
tioning, whether petitioner's past conduct involved violation of a crimi-
nal statute.101 Instead, the court seemed to rely on petitioner's assertion
that he would obey the laws of Florida and that he had no present
intention regarding future homosexual conduct. Thus, the possibility
exists that an applicant who may have violated a Florida criminal law
will be admitted to practice in Florida, without further determination
of the frequency or seriousness of the past behavior.
Justice Alderman's separate dissent in N.R.S. addressed the dan-
ger of admitting to the bar persons who may have violated the law. He
stated that further inquiry was relevant in the area of homosexual con-
duct just as it would be into any other area of illegal or immoral con-
duct.10 2 Without futher inquiry into petitioner's private homosexual
conduct, Alderman argued the Board would be unable to determine
with certainty the applicant's moral fitness. Further investigation by
the Board may well have revealed the nature and extent of petitioner's
past and planned conduct. However, since in the majority's view orien-
tation or proclivity towards a homosexual lifestyle is not grounds for
denial of admission to the Bar, any inquiry with regard to such private
consensual homosexual behavior is not rationally related to fitness to
practice law.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981).
101. Id.
102. 403 So. 2d 1315.
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Implications
The Florida Supreme Court has refused to sanction questioning of
a Florida Bar applicant regarding his or her private, noncommercial
sexual conduct even though their behavior may be in violation of Flor-
ida law.10 3 Such private conduct, the court held, is not rationally re-
lated to fitness to practice law in Florida.
The court's refusal to grant the Board authority to further inquire
into petitioner's private sexual behavior is apparently grounded in the
belief that orientation or mere preference for a homosexual lifestyle is
not an offense of moral turpitude or behavior which renders a person
unable to meet the standard of good moral character.
Arguably, some conduct which is illegal is not conduct demon-
strating moral turpitude. Current Florida law deems cohabitation to be
a violation of the law. 10' Despite this status of the law, no applicant has
been denied admission to the Florida Bar in recent years because of
cohabitation. Apparently, although this conduct is illegal in Florida, it
is not conduct involving moral turpitude nor conduct which fails to
meet the standard of good moral character, and thus, not grounds for
denial of admission to the bar.
The dissenters' opinions are grounded in Florida's criminal law.
The dissenters were concerned about past and possible future violations
of the criminal statute by petitioner. While at first blush the reasoning
of the dissent appears practical, a closer examination reveals the im-
practicality of the position. The dissenters apparently would have the
definition of good moral character narrowed to law abiding. Such rea-
soning in effect would allow admission to the bar only to those individu-
als who could evidence a strict compliance with Florida's criminal stat-
utes. Anyone who had violated any law in Florida would be subject to
Board inquiry and investigation regardless of whether the offense met
with the Board's definition of conduct involving moral turpitude. How-
ever, since moral turpitude is the standard which the Board applies in
screening candidates for admission, inquiry into an area for which ad-
mission cannot be denied would be irrelevant and not rationally related
to fitness to practice law.
103. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1981).
104. FLA. STAT. § 798.02 (1981).
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Conclusion
The court in N.R.S. apparently felt the petitioner's preference for
a homosexual lifestyle was not conduct demonstrating moral turpitude
such that it warranted denying his admission to the bar. Consequently,
the court concluded any inquiry into his private sexual behavior would
be irrelevant. However, since no clear rationale for its conclusion is
stated, one must surmise and draw inferences regarding the reasoning
and logic underlying the result. The majority opinion denied the Board
authority to further question N.R.S. about his private homosexual be-
havior since this was not rationally related to his fitness to practice law,
but the opinion fails to explain why such inquiry is not rationally
related.
While the dissenters' view appears legally sound in that homosex-
ual behavior is violative of Florida's criminal law, their approach is
fraught with impracticalities because their inquiry would extend into
areas for which an applicant cannot be denied admission. The major-
ity's opinion takes the more practical approach but leaves unanswered
the assertion that such inquiry violates due process, equal protection,
and the right to privacy. Without elaborating why private homosexual
behavior is unrelated to fitness to practice law, the court denied the
Board authority to inquire into this area.
Leslie J. Roberts
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Liability of Commercial Premises Owners to Injured
Invitees: Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's Pier
Introduction
In the early morning hours of December 24, .1978, John Starling,
inebriated to the point of unconsciousness, rolled off a commercial fish-
ing pier into the surrounding waters and drowned. His estate sued the
pier for negligence because the pier employee failed to provide for
John's safety after knowing of his drunken condition. This case com-
ment explores the issues raised by Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's
Pier1 as they pertain to the duty owed by owners of commercial prem-
ises to invitees who become incapacitated and then injured. This com-
ment also examines Florida courts' position in the area of premises lia-
bility2 and analyzes traditional classifications of visitors with the
concurrent duties and immunities these classifications confer upon
premises owners and occupiers.
While not emphasizing the distinctions, Estate of Starling exem-
plifies the outmoded distinctions between certain classes of visitor
plaintiffs. Plaintiff classification is often the critical element in deter-
mining landowner liability; thus this comment considers the different
results courts can reach depending on plaintiff classification. Finally,
since classification is frequently unjust and anachronistic in contempo-
rary society, this comment advocates its replacement with a single duty
of reasonable care in view of foreseeability of injuries to others.
Estate of Starling
On December 24, 1978, John Starling decided to walk out onto
1. Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 411 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981).
2. The Starling court did not elaborate on the distinctions between classifications
of persons who come upon property. John Starling was classified as an invitee without
any discussion. This case comment will expand the court's analysis and illustrate how
different results may follow depending on the initial classification.
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the fishing pier located off the City of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea. Perhaps
John wanted to see whether the fish were biting or perhaps he wanted
to "toast in" Christmas eve while out on the pier as he carried a bottle
of liquor with him through the entrance pay booth. The pier employee
and operator of the bait shop, August Poehler, apparently also wanted
to join in the celebration. John and August partook in the drinking of
the holiday spirits while in the bait shop.8 John, however, proceeded to
get thoroughly drunk and stumbled back out onto the pier where he
subsequently passed out near the pier's edge.
August failed to take any precautions to safeguard his unconscious
customer. Later, John Starling rolled off the fishing pier into the sur-
rounding ocean waters and drowned. 4 His estate sued the pier owner
and August Poehler because as pier employee, August failed to take
precautionary steps to provide for John's safety after seeing John in a
drunken condition.
The Lower Court
Starling's estate claimed the pier was negligent in failing to re-
move Starling from a position of known danger when he could have
been easily removed by the pier employee without any danger to that
employee.
In defense, the pier relied principally on Reed v. Black Caesar's
Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc.,5 which involved an intoxicated res-
taurant patron who recovered his keys from the valet parldng attendant
and proceeded to drive his car into Biscayne Bay where he drowned.
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal found no restaurant liability
because the proximate cause of Reed's death was his own negligence in
driving while intoxicated. Thus, the owners of the fishing pier in Star-
ling argued the proximate cause of decedent's death was his own negli-
gence in becoming intoxicated.
To bolster its defense, the fishing pier proprietors in Starling ar-
gued that the liquor the deceased consumed was not sold or supplied by
the pier.' Since Florida does not have a Dram Shop Act, a bar is under
3. Brief for Appellants at 2.
4. Id.
5. 165 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
6. Brief for Appellee at 5-6. The plaintiff in Starling cited a case in which a
1 536 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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no duty to protect an intoxicated person from injury to himself.7 There-
fore, defendant contended, a fishing pier that did not serve alcoholic
beverages would be under even less of a duty than a bar that supplied
its patrons with intoxicating liquors.8 Additionally, argued the pier,
neither the condition of the premises presented a danger nor did any
act of the pier operator place Starling in a perilous situation.9 Had de-
fendant not kept the premises in a safe condition, or failed to warn
plaintiff of a hidden peril which defendant knew or should have known
about, the breach of duty would have been clear.10
The only duty the pier recognized was the duty of a business es-
tablishment to protect its patrons from harm by other patrons or em-
ployees, when notice of a specified danger was apparent.", This duty
arguably does not extend to a duty to protect a guest from himself.
Generally, there is no duty "to come to the assistance of a person who
is so ill or intoxicated as to be unable to look out for himself. '12 The
Broward County Circuit Court, persuaded by the defendants' argument
and reliance on Reed, dismissed the Starling estate complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. s
plaintiff was struck by an automobile after being ejected from a bar because he was
intoxicated. One basis for liability was the violation of a statute prohibiting a bar from
serving or selling liquor to an intoxicated person. Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831
(La. 1976).
7. Florida, along with more than half the states, does not have a Dram Shop Act.
4D PERSONAL INJURY AcTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 1.02 (L. Frummer & M.
Friedman eds. 1971). Such statutes impose liability on one who dispenses liquor to an
already intoxicated person and are designed to protect, not the intoxicated person, but
innocent bystanders who are injured by him. The primary purpose of the act is to
protect the "economic, social and moral well-being and the safety of the state and all
its people," Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (3d Dist. Ct. App.
1943).
8. Brief for Appellee at 6.
9. Id. at 4. The defendant relied on the fact the open horizontal railing, in and of
itself, presented no danger. He ignored the fact that it was this condition that became
dangerous by being insufficient to prevent the victim from rolling off the pier.
10. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63 (1966).
11. Brief for Appellee at 2 (citing Warner v. Florida Jai Alai, Inc., 221 So. 2d
777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
12. Brief for Appellee at 203 (citing 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 41 at 389
(1971)).
13. Brief for Appellants at 3 (citing to the record at 33).
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The Appellate Decision
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the Broward
County Circuit Court's dismissal of Starling estate's complaint. The
appellate court recognized the general rule that a chance bystander has
no duty to come to the aid of an intoxicated person. However, the busi-
ness relationship existing between the pier and the invited patron pro-
vided the necessary relationship in order to impose an ordinary duty of
care.14 Accordingly, if the facts of Reed were altered, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal probably would have held the restaurant liable.
The Fourth District hypothesized that, if in Reed the restaurant had
knowledge that an unconscious patron was left unattended in the res-
taurant parking lot and injury resulted, restaurant liability probably
would lie. In other words, the Starling court implicitly recognized that
both knowledge of the patron's incapacity coupled with control over the
patron's actions are the requisite elements to find premise owner liabil-
ity for injuries sustained by the patron.
A case factually similar to Starling aided the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in the duty of care analysis, and the court looked to
the West Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Hovermale
v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483.15 In Hovermale, a Moose
Lodge member was found dead in his car after drinking at the lodge
bar the previous night. Whether the victim was ill or drunk was dis-
puted at the trial. The evidence did show after a few drinks Hovermale
collapsed at the bar and was taken to his car at the direction of the
bartender in order to "sleep it off."16 When the lodge closed for the
night no one checked the condition of the victim "asleep" in his car.
When the lodge re-opened the next morning, Hovermale was found
dead. He had suffered a heart attack within hours after being placed in
his automobile.
The West Virginia court, relying on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, found the lodge owed Hovermale an ordinary duty of care:
[A] possessor of lands open to the public is under a duty to those
members of the public who enter in response to its invitation to
14. 401 So. 2d. 1136.
15. 271 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 1980).
16. Id. at 337.
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give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they
are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for
by others.1
Thus the supreme court considered whether under the circum-
stances defendant complied with its duty to render aid to an invitee
known to be ill or injured and whether this factual question had been
improperly taken from the jury. Finding that it had, the supreme court
of appeals reversed the Morgan County Circuit Court and awarded a
new trial.18
Starling and Hovermale may be distinguished to the extent that
the plaintiffs' incapacities resulted from different causes.1 9 The Starling
court said, however, that regardless of the initial reason for the disabil-
ity, the end result - total incapacity - was the same. Liability to the
business depends on the proprietor's knowledge of the victim's condi-
tion, the foreseeability of danger, and the ability to render aid to the
intoxicated patron.
A proprietor simply cannot ignore and step over an unconscious
customer lying in a dangerous place upon his premises and he must
take some minimal steps to safeguard any customer upon his prem-
ises from extreme danger, even though the customer has allowed
himself to be exposed to that danger in the first place. 20
Intoxication Issue
In Starling,1 Chief Judge Letts stated that gross misconduct on
the part of the decedent might affect the case's outcome: "[W]e would
expect that a jury would find the drowned man comparatively negligent
17. Id. at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 314A (1965)).
18. Id.
19. See supra text accompanying note 16.
20. 401 So. 2d 1136. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Fisherman's Pier
alleged a conflict between the Reed and Starling decisions. In Reed, a commercial
establishment was under no duty to protect an intoxicated person from harm to him-
self, while in Starling, an affirmative duty was imposed. Brief for Petitioner at 2. The
Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari based on jurisdictional grounds. Starling, 411
So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981).
21. 401 So. 2d 1136.
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in large or even total measure ... 22 However, the Chief Judge also
stated the issue of comparative negligence was not the test of whether a
cause of action was stated.2
Prior to 1973, Florida followed the common law rule that any con-
tribution by a plaintiff to his own injury, would totally bar the plaintiff
from recovery, even though the defendant was clearly more at fault.
However, with Hoffman v. Jones2 4 Florida adopted the law of compar-
ative negligence which does not completely bar the negligent plaintiff's
recovery but rather reduces it in proportion to the plaintiff's own con-
tributory negligence. Florida's abrogation of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine caused considerable modification in the assumption of
risk defense as well. "Assumption of the risk in certain instances
merges with comparative negligence . . . [and] the fact finder is enti-
tled to consider all facts and circumstances in order to determine the
extent to which the plaintiff may be at fault. ' 25 Still the standard of
care for intoxicated plaintiffs is the same: that of sober individuals.28
Therefore, because comparative negligence is not a total bar to recov-
ery, a cause of action could exist for Starling's estate.
The issue of plaintiff's intoxication at the time of injury is properly
a matter for the jury's consideration. 27 A jury might well deny recov-
ery; however, plaintiff's incapacity precipitates a duty of care upon the
defendant proprietor. "The evidence of intoxication goes to the jury
question of whether [the defendant] should have known, in the exercise
of reasonable care, that the deceased was in need of attention."'2 ,
Total incapacity of a plaintiff renders a duty on the proprietor to
take precautions to guard the plaintiff's safety.2 9 Despite the fact that
the plaintiff was initially negligent in becoming drunk, once he is in a
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
25. Hall v. Holton, 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) quoted in Heath
v. First Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
26. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, comment d (1965).
27. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Houston, 209 Ark. 217, 189 S.W.2d
904 (1945); Mills v. Silbernagel & Co., 204 Ark. 734, 164 S.W.2d 893 (1942); Sand-
ers v. Brown, 73 Ariz. 116, 238 P.2d 941 (1952).
28. 140 So. 2d 702 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
29. Small v. Boston & Me. R.R., 85 N.H. 330, 159 A. 298 (1932).
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drunken stupor the law recognizes the impossibility of requiring sober
conduct.30 Therefore, the question for the jury to decide was whether a
breach of duty occurred under the circumstances. While it is true that
a proprietor "is not an insurer and as such should not be held responsi-
ble for events over which he has no control and could not reasonably
foresee,"8 1 in a particular situation a jury might well decide what ac-
tions a reasonable person would be expected to take.32 For instance, the
pier proprietor in Starling knew the victim had passed out and was
situated in a dangerous position. How far one must go to protect a
person from injury depends on the foreseeability of injury, the plain-
tiff's capacity to watch out for his own safety, and what a reasonable
person would do under the circumstances.
There are other special situations in which a higher duty of care
may be imposed. For example, one charged with the custody of an-
other, such as a police officer in a police-prisoner situation,3 3 or a com-
mon carrier in service of a passenger," has been held to a higher than
ordinary duty of care.35 Thus where an intoxicated prisoner was injured
after a fall from his bunk bed, the jailer was found liable for failing to
secure the plaintiff to prevent a foreseeable injury."6 Putting a passen-
ger off a train in the middle of the night when the passenger was so
30. Id.
31. 271 S.E.2d at 339.
32. The Hovermale court cited a case where a train conductor failed to render
aid to a passenger suffering from a stroke, assuming that the man was drunk, and
stated:
[t]he case turns, not on what the conductor assumed or thought, but on
what he should, in the exercise of reasonable prudence, have done in light
of the facts which were brought to his notice .... The fault of the con-
ductor was not in making the wrong diagnosis, but in rashly assuming that
he was competent to make any diagnosis at all.
Middle v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499 at ., 108 N.E. 192 at 197 (1915) quoted in
Hovermaleo 271 S.E.2d at 339.
33. Barlow v. City of New Orleans, 228 So. 2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Shuff v.
Zurich-Am. Ins. Co., 173 So. 2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Wilson v. City of Kotzebue,
627 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1981).
34. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 46 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1950).
35. Barlow v. City of New Orleans, 228 So. 2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Swilley
v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 46 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1950); Bourgeois v. Toye
Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 192 So. 379 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
36. Shuff v. Zurich-Am. Ins. Co., 173 So. 2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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intoxicated as to be totally unaware of any danger was found to be a
breach of duty owed by the train to its passenger.37 One "whose mental
and physical facilities are so impaired, that he is incapable of exercis-
ing due care for himself, where he is in the custody of another who is
charged with the duty of caring for his safety, ' 38 should not be sub-
jected to rules of contributory or comparative negligence. Alternatively,
where a plaintiff-prisoner was found not so drunk to be unable to pro-
tect himself, the burden on the defendant was correspondingly lighter
and no breach of duty was found.39
The degree of plaintiff's incapacity determines whether a higher
degree of care will be imposed in a custodial relationship. The "degree
of vigilance and caution which is necessary . . . may vary according to
the capacity of the person with respect to whom the duty to exercise
care exists."'40 Total incapacity, as in the Starling case, logically would
require more care than that required toward one who was only slightly
drunk. When the defendant knows of the plaintiff's incapacity and then
allows the plaintiff to expose himself to great peril, the defendant has
committed a culpable act.41
Intoxication of a person does not relieve others of the obligation to
exercise care to avoid injuring him, but may, on the contrary, im-
pose a duty of exercising greater care than would otherwise be suf-
ficient, where his appearance and actions indicate such a degree of
37. Johnson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 104 Ala. 241, __, 16 So. 75, 77
(1894). In that case, the conductor ejected a drunk passenger in the middle of the
tracks for not having the fare. See also Pence, 326 So. 2d 831. An additional basis for
recovery in Pence was founded on the defendant's duty to avoid affirmative acts which
increase the peril to an intoxicated patron. The Pence court stated:
If it should be conceded that [plaintiff] contributed to his death by drink-
ing until he became drunk and unconscious, it would not follow that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. If a person lies down upon a
railroad track in a state of helpless intoxication, the company will not be
justified in running a train over him, if it can be avoided in the exercise of
reasonable care, after the person is discovered in his exposed condition.
Id. at 837 (quoting Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa 533, 3 N.W. 541, 542 (1879)).
38. Wilson, 627 P.2d at 631.
39. Manuel v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 140 So. 2d 702 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
40. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 12 at 587 (1956). See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d
Negligence § 39 (1971).
41. Johnson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 104 Ala. 241, 16 So. 2d 75 (1894).
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intoxication as affects his capacity to care for his own safety."'
Liability to Trespassers, Licensees and Invitees
In his often-quoted concurring opinion from Heaven v. Pender,"3
Master of the Rolls Brett stated the basic negligence principle:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a posi-
tion with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who
did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary
care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circum-
stances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property
of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid
such danger.4
Premises liability, which departs in some respects from this principle,
deals with the liability of owners or occupiers of real property to in-
jured visitors or guests.4 5
The status of the injured person, as invitee, licensee or trespasser,
"affects to some degree the liability of the owner . . . since it may
determine the extent of the obligation which the duty of due care im-
poses upon the possessor."'4 6 It is this status factor which distinguishes
such cases from other negligence actions.
The special rules of premise liability are frequently said to be at-
tributed to the special place in which land has historically "been held
in English and American thought, the dominance and prestige of the
landowning class in England during the formative period of the rules
governing the possessor's liability, and the heritage of feudalism. 4 7
Traditionally, persons entering the premises of another have been
42. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 12 at 587 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
43. 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883).
44. Id. as quoted in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 180, 183, 443 P.2d 561,
564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
45. 62 AM. JUR. 2d Premises Liability § 215 at 226 (1971).
46. Id.
47. 69 Cal. 2d 180, 184, 443 P.2d 561, 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1968). The
Rowland court refers to 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS at 1432 (1956).
For discussion of the origins and history of premises liability, see W. L. PROSSER, Busi-
ness Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573 (1942). See also Comment, The
Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1957).
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divided into three categories: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Each
has commanded a different degree of care due from the owner or per-
son in control of the premises. For example, a landowner owes the least
duty to a trespasser. The landowner must warn of known dangers once
he knows of the trespasser's presence, and must refrain from wantonly
injuring the trespasser. A landowner owes the greatest duty to invitees.
He must inspect the premises for unsafe conditions and repair any de-
fects which are known or should be known,48 "and . . give timely
notice of latent or concealed perils . . . not known to the [invitee]."4
The duty owed to a licensee, one on the property for social purposes,
falls somewhere between the duties owed to invitee and trespasser.
At times difficulties in classifying persons on others' property has
led to confusion where premises owner liability has been at issue. Tres-
passers enter the land without the landowner's permission, licensees are
tolerated, and invitees are desired or even asked to enter the premises
for business purposes. 50 However, licensees may be designated as gratu-
itous, bare, or "mere" licensees.51 In an increasing tendency to find lia-
bility where none might otherwise exist, the courts have sometimes
strained to include certain visitors 52 in one category rather than
another.
Typical of the difficulties in this classification system is the conflict
of opinion over the definition of "invitee." One basis for invitee status
rests upon an economic benefit theory.53 The price for the economic
48. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 357.
49. Waterman v. Graham, 228 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) quoted
in Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
50. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 996 (1964).
51. 62 AM. JUR. 2d Premises Liability § 74 at 328. For further discussion of
Florida's treatment of classifications of visitors upon the premises, see text at pp. 545-
47 infra.
52. "While it has been said often enough that 'mutuality of interest' may be
indirect and remote from the object of the particular visit, there is at least ground for
suspecting that in some of these cases, at least, it has been dredged up for the occa-
sion." PROSSER, supra note 22, at 388. See, e.g., Cameron v. Abatiell, 127 Vt. 111, 241
A.2d 310 (1968), holding a policeman on duty to be an invitee, rather than a licensee,
and thus allowing recovery.
53. One authority discusses nineteenth century English contract law as one of the
origins of premises liability. Comment, supra note 47, at 188. Other areas of the law
which have been drawn upon and at times confounded by the then newly emerging
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benefit derived from the visitor's presence is the landowner's duty to
make the premises safe.' When there is no benefit to the landowner,
generally, he is under no duty. Exactly what constitutes an economic
benefit can also become a complex determination. Professor Prosser
stated that economic benefit may take the form of good will, like
merely making a public restroom available. 5 Other courts have found
economic benefit as the possibility of future sales to an accompanying
friend of a patron.56 Some cases have applied merely a public invitation
test.5 7 There is an implied representation that one who holds his prem-
ises open to the public is presumed to have made them safe, 8 whether
an economic benefit is involved or not.
Without much discussion Florida's Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in Starling classified Starling as an invitee. Presumably defen-
dants could have argued that because Starling used the premises for
drinking, a purpose not held out to the public, Starling lost his invitee
status. Moreover, the pier could also have argued that by drinking
Starling violated a local ordinance and therefore lost his invitee sta-
tus. 59 Then the question would be whether Starling was a licensee or a
trespasser and what effect this would have on the duty of the pier oper-
ator. Conceivably, defendant's duty might be diminished if Starling
was classified a trespasser.
In Florida prior to 1972, a licensee was one who entered the prem-
ises for his own benefit, with the permission of the landowner. In Post
v. Lunney," Florida's mutual benefit test or economic benefit test for
determining invitee status was replaced with the broader invitation test
principles of negligence include: the law of nuisance on the highway, the law of fraud,
and the distinction between acts of omission and commission.
54. PROSSER, supra note 26 at 386, (citing FIRST RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
332, 343, Comment a (1938)).
55. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 388.
56. Id.
57. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 996 (1964).
58. PROSSER, supra note 26 at 388.
59. The Chief Judge noted, but did not specifically address, the fact that the
consumption of alcoholic beverages on the pier was in violation of a municipal ordi-
nance. He also observed in a footnote that the pier operator had consumed alcoholic
beverages with the drowned man. 401 So. 2d 1136.
60. 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972).
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found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332.1 This test qualified
business invitees, public invitees, and social guests for the same degree
of care from the landowner. The unjust results of the mutual benefit
test were clearly illustrated by Post v. Lunney where Mrs. Lunney
while on a garden club tour tripped on a piece of transparent vinyl
protecting an oriental rug and sustained injury. Mrs. Lunney sued Mrs.
Post, the owner of the home, who had offered her home to the tour for
charitable purposes. Mrs. Post received no compensation for allowing
the tour of her estate, though Mrs. Lunney had paid to go on the tour.
Mrs. Lunney was in the home with Mrs. Post's permission but there
was no business relationship between them and thus no invitee status.
The trial court denied recovery but the Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed holding the instruction to the jury, that plaintiff was
a licensee, was incorrect. She was an invitee and should be allowed to
recover. The plaintiff could have reasonably assumed she was an invitee
and would be under the Restatement test.6 2 Public invitees and busi-
ness invitees were found preferable to the exclusive use of the mutual
benefit test formerly stated in McNulty v. Hurley.3
Even though the class of business invitees was enlarged to include
public invitees without the requirement of an economic benefit, in
Wood v. Camp6 4 the Florida Supreme Court confirmed its commitment
to retain different degrees of care depending on the status of the plain-
tiff. The Wood case involved a father's action against a landowner for
his child's death when a bomb shelter which the child had entered ex-
ploded. The child was an invited guest. At issue was the inclusiveness
of the class of invitees and the appropriate standard of care. By revolv-
ing the distinction around the invitation, whether express or implied,
61. Id. at 148.
62. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 defines invitee:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on the
land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held
open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land
for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealing with
the possessor of land.
Id. at 176.
63. 97 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
64. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
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the supreme court expanded the group of invitees to include licensees
and social guests applying to both a single standard of responsible care
under the circumstances. But the Florida Supreme Court specifically
retained the class of uninvited licensee and trespasser, although it ad-
mitted there is only a fine distinction between these latter two catego-
ries."5 Wood then overruled Cochran v. Abercrombie66 which had disal-
lowed recovery for a licensee to whom there was only a duty not to
purposely injure. 67
, Argument for Elimination of Categories
While a person's status may be relevant in predicting the foresee-
ability of his presence, once his presence is known reasonable burdens
upon the landowner vary with the circumstances.
Thus, although the foreseeability of harm to an invitee would ordi-
narily seem greater than the foreseeability of harm to a trespasser,
in a particular case the opposite may be true. The same may be
said of the issue of certainty of injury. The burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach may often be greater with
respect to the trespassers than with respect to invitees, but it by no
means follows that this is true in every case. In many situations,
the burden will be the same, i.e. the conduct necessary upon the
defendant's part to meet the burden of exercising due care as to
invitees will also meet his burden with respect to licensees and
trespassers.6 8
The Wood court's main criticisms of abolishing the distinction are
that once abolished, no guidelines can be offered to a jury, and the
landowner would be subjected to too great a burden, making him an
insurer of those who come upon his premises.6 9 But a reasonable guide-
65. Id. at 695.
66. 118 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
67. In Cochran, a case with facts strikingly similar to the Wood case, plaintiff
was looking at the car motor upon defendant's request. When defendant started the
car, which had been left in gear, plaintiff was injured. 118 So. 2d 636.
68. 69 Cal. 2d 180, 186, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968).
69. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
Liability of Premises Owners6:1982
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line for a jury is that a defendant will only be held liable in those situa-
tions where a "reasonable [person] would have realized plaintiff's grave
danger, and lack of danger to himself, and where reasonably effective
means of rescue were easily accessible as defendant knew or should
have known .... "o70 If this reasoning were applied to the Starling
case, regardless of how the decedent was classified, liability would lie.
But if the status distinctions -were retained and Starling had been clas-
sified a trespasser, perhaps because he went beyond the scope of his
invitation, then liability might not lie, even though all other factors
have remained constant.
A major problem with retaining different degrees of care is that at
times an individual's status might change during the course of a single
visit. That is, an invitee might become a licensee or trespasser because
of changes in the reason for his visit, the scope of this invitation,7 1 the
particular location of the premises where the injury occurred, or even
the length of his stay.72 A good example of this status inconsistency is
illustrated by the following fact pattern:
A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a
trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until
you do business with him is he an invitee. Even when you have
done business with him, it seems rather strange that your duty to-
ward him should be different when he comes to your door from
what it is when he goes away. Does he change his color in the
middle of the conversation? What is the position when you discuss
business with him and it comes to nothing? No confident answer
can be given to these questions. Such is the morass into which the
law has floundered in trying to distinguish between licensees and
invitees.73
In Starling, even though the plaintiff was not specifically invited to
the pier to drink, and even if he stayed on the pier after closing hours,
70. Fowler V. Harper and Fleming James, Jr., 2 THE LAW OF TORTs, § 18.6 at
1046 (1956), (citing J. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112-13 (1908)).
71. Robillard v. Tillotson, 118 Vt. 295, 108 A.2d 524 (1954).
72. Hickman v. First Nat'l Bank of Great Falls, 112 Mont. 398, 117 P.2d 275
(1941).
73. Comment, supra note 47, at 193-94 n.31 (citing Dunster v. Abbott, 2 All
E.R. 1572 (1953)).
Nova Law Journal
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the defendant knew of Starling's drunken condition and could foresee
the likelihood of injury resulting. The pier operator was clearly in the
better position to safeguard Starling without danger to himself.
Whether Starling was originally an invitee who became an uninvited
licensee or even a trespasser, is a purely academic question under these
circumstances since the same duty of care should be imposed upon the
pier and its operator.
Prigden v. Boston Housing Authority74 presented the question of
the duty owed a trespasser"5 known to be in a position of peril. After
initially trespassing onto the premises, the child plaintiff was injured
because the property owner failed to take safety precautions even after
the condition of peril was known; the child fell down the elevator shaft
of an apartment building. The agent of the premises owner knew of the
child's position and refused to turn off the power to the elevator. A
third person put the elevator into operation and serious injury resulted
to the child. The court found inapplicable any rule which exempted a
property owner who did not act when he was in a position to act where
he could prevent injury or further injury. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court therefore extended the duty of exercising reasonable care to pre-
vent injury to include the duty to take affirmative action to protect a
trespasser in a known position of peril. Prigden clearly exemplifies the
reason to eliminate different duties of care owed to individuals on an-
other's property. If the Massachusetts court had applied the traditional
common law duty owed to a trespasser, that child would probably have
been barred from recovery.
In 1963, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a com-
mon duty to all lawful visitors, 7 but would not go as far as California
74. Prigden v. Boston Housing Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 308 N.E.2d 467 (1974).
75. Another example of the duty owed to a trespasser who was intoxicated and
allowed to remain in a place where injury was foreseeable is illustrated in the following
case. An intoxicated passenger of another railroad company was aroused from a
drunken stupor and placed on a depot platform. Shortly thereafter, he was observed by
employees of the defendant company sleeping between the tracks. It was found that the
employees had a duty to either see him safely out of the railroad yard or watch out for
him as the engine moved. The employees did neither and the company was found lia-
ble, even though plaintiff was a trespasser. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. v.
Marrs' Adm'x., 27 Ky. 388, 85 S.W. 188 (1905).
76. Prigden v. Boston Housing Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 697, 308 N.E. 2d 467, 477
(1974).
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had in Rowland v. Christian77 which placed a trespasser in the same
category as licensee and invitee. While the California decision made
status a factor in determining liability, status was not the dispositive
factor.
In Rowland v. Christian, the California Supreme Court advocated
a single duty of reasonable care in all circumstances 78 to replace the
difficult and often arbitrary application of the common law's anachro-
nistic distinctions.
7 9
Whatever may have been the historical justifications for the com-
mon law distinctions, it is clear that these distinctions are not justi-
fied in the light of our modern society and that the complexity and
confusion which has arisen is not due to the difficulty in applying
the original common law rules-they are all too easy to apply in
their original formulation-but is due to the attempts to apply just
rules in our modern society within the ancient terminology.8"
The factors that should be weighed in determining liability or im-
munity may or may not have anything to do with the original classifica-
77. 69 Cal. 2d 180, 184, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1968).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. In refusing to adopt the rules relating to the liability of a possessor of
land for the law of admiralty, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee
were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture which
traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort to do
justice in an industrialized urban society, with its complex economic and
individual relationships, modern common-law courts have found it neces-
sary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclas-
sifications among traditional common-law categories, and to delineate fine
gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to each. Yet
even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and subclassifications
bred by the common law have produced confusion and conflict. As new
distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become obscured.
Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and
with hesitation, towards "imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty
of reasonable care in all circumstances."
Id. (footnotes omitted in original). Note also that England has rejected the common
law distinctions in the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31.
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tions.81 "[T]o focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee in order to determine whether the landowner has a
duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian
values."82 Plaintiff's status is relevant insofar as it bears on the deter-
mination of what constitutes reasonable care.83
Whether Starling was an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser, the
pier operator knew of his condition and the likelihood of injury. These
are the gauges which should be used to measure degree of care. The
jury should be asked if "an ordinary reasonable and prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances, stand[ing] in the shoes of the
defendant, could foresee a risk of some harm to the particular
plaintiff?" 8
While Florida has not gone as far as California, and in fact has
expressly repudiated the reasoning that favors discontinuing the classi-
fications, the Starling case demonstrates that the duty owed by an oc-
cupier of premises should be expanded. A jury might well find no liabil-
ity on the part of the pier operator depending upon the jury instructions
given regarding the duty owed to invitees or licensees. If there was a
single duty of care, the status of the injured person would be only a
factor in determining whether the pier operator owed the plaintiff a
duty of ordinary care. It would not only simplify the law, it would
make it manifestly more just.
Conclusion
By finding that a cause of action had been stated, Estate of Star-
ling demonstrated the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal's will-
ingness to expand the liability of premises owners to those who lawfully
come upon the premises.
The facts of this case illustrate the inadequacy of variously classi-
fying persons for purposes of defining premise owners' duty. Neither
the victim's classification nor the voluntariness of his condition should
be the basis of liability. Once a presence is known, if the forseeable
81. 69 Cal. 2d at 187, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
82. Id.
83. Comment, supra note 47 at 199.
84. Id.
5511
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danger is great, while the risk of preventing injury is small, the pier
operator should be under a duty to act.
Roberta Kushner
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Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. By Martin Sha-
piro. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. ix + 245.
$20.00.
Reviewed by Arthur S. Miller*
Martin Shapiro, a political scientist who is a member of the law
faculty of the University of California at Berkeley, has done more than
anyone to illumine the political nature of law. His Law and Politics in
the Supreme Court" is a minor classic, even though it is largely ignored
by those who edit the coursebooks used in law-school constitutional law
classes.2 His latest entry into the field of "political jurisprudence" is
Courts, a slim volume that should be required reading for all law stu-
dents. In it, Shapiro forces one to think beyond the sterile turgidities of
appellate opinions that are the usual fodder of legal education, and to
consider both the political and the sociological functions of judiciaries.
This he does by showing, in his opening chapter, that "courts are
much less independent and adversarial" than the conventional model
suggests; and "much less prone to follow pre-existing legal rules."3
Shapiro, moreover, believes that appeal, rather than being a means of
vindicating individual rights, is in fact a way by which central gov-
erning authorities extend and solidify control over the hinterlands. The
remainder of the volume is devoted to testing those conclusions by ana-
lyzing the judiciaries of England, civil law systems, China, and tradi-
tional Islam. Courts, then, is a wide-ranging analysis of the politics of
judiciaries. Tightly written, with prose more prosaic than limpid, it de-
mands close attention to what Shapiro is saying.
What one gains is worth the effort. Professor Shapiro suggests how
"uncourtlike" courts often are, "uncourtlike" in the sense that the ac-
tual judicial process often deviates from the orthodox model of what he
calls a triadic structure-an independent judge applying preexisting
norms in an adversary proceeding with a winner-take-all judgment. In
fact, Shapiro argues, courts are not really independent but rather are
* Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.
1. M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964)
2. E.g., W. LOCKHARD, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (5th ed. 1980) has no mention of Shapiro's book.
3. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at viii.
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part of the political regime, often creating their own legal rules and
mixing mediation with litigation to produce compromises. Let me illus-
trate by quoting some passages, some of which are truistic but nonethe-
less ignored by the professoriate (and even by practitioners).
1. "Most courts make some law as they go along, and when they
do it is usually with the assistance of the parties."4 That situation is
one of today's commonplaces, to be sure. Since the Legal Realists
showed that judges make, not find, law, it is agreed that courts are
mini-legislatures-and not just for the parties before the bar of a court.
Courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States, make law
for generations yet unborn; they promulgate general norms-legislative
norms-the law of the land rather than the law of the case.5 But even
though a truism, this reality has not yet percolated very far into the
minds of those who edit coursebooks in any area of law study. Law
students, therefore, are persuaded (directly or indirectly) to believe that
law preexists, and that the task of courts is to find the one rule that will
fit the particular factual situation at bar. Why there is such a wide-
spread failure to concede in teaching materials what most legal educa-
tors readily acknowledge in conversation is an unexplained mystery. I
am unaware, for example, of any constitutional law book that proceeds,
as it should, from Chief Justice Earl Warren's candid valedictory;
from Justice Byron White's equally candid observation in his dissenting
opinion in Miranda v. Arizona;7 from Justice William Brennan's con-
curring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, or from
Justice William 0. Douglas' assertion in The Court Years, his autobi-
ography.9 Shapiro cites none of these statements, but each buttresses
4. Id. at 13.
5. See Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Commen-
tary on Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 573 (1981).
6. Retirement of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 395 U.S. vii, xi (1969) (Justices
bound only by the Constitution and "our own consciences"). The Constitution, of
course, does not answer questions; it merely provides a point of departure for judicial
lawmaking.
7. 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (admitting that the Court
always has and always will create constitutional law).
8. 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980): "judges are not mere umpires, but ...
lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government".
9. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 8 (1980) (quoting Hughes, C.J., to the ef-
fect that ninety percent of the Justices' decisions are made on emotion with the other
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ten percent supplying reasons for supporting predelections).
10. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 19.
11. Id. at 34.
his conclusion quoted above. If judges are willing to tell us that they
make up the law as they go along, why shouldn't law professors be as
willing to accept and act upon such a conclusion?
I do not propose to delve into the psychology of legal educators.
No doubt there are reasons for professorial acceptance and defense of
the orthodox model of the judiciary. Shapiro, alluding to some of them,
stated: "More of the resources of legal scholarship and argumentation
are spent on building up the ideology of judicial independence than on
any other part of the prototype precisely because the court's basic so-
cial logic as triadic conflict resolvers rests on this element."10 That ob-
servation, however, does not tell us why legal scholars accept the "basic
social logic" of courts-why, that is, scholars do not probe deeply into
the judicial apparatus and analyze its sociological functions. It is as if
the Legal Realists, who forever and conclusively smashed the ortho-
doxy concerning judges and courts, had never existed.
2. If judges are in fact lawmakers, what does that do to the no-
tions of "independence, preexisting legal rules, adversary proceedings,
and dichotomous solutions?" Says Shapiro:I"
[L]awmaking and judicial independence are fundamentally incom-
patible. No regime is likely to allow significant political power to
be wielded by an isolated judicial corps free of political restraints.
To the extent that courts make law, judges will be incorporated
into the governing coalition, the ruling elite, the responsible repre-
sentatives of the people, or however else the political regime may
be expressed.
There can be little doubt that Shapiro is correct. Although this is
neither the time nor the place to expand on that statement, two bits of
evidence-one a scholarly study and the other a recent Supreme Court
decision-are in order. In The Politics of the Judiciary (for some inex-
plicable reason not cited by Shapiro), Professor J. A. G. Griffith cbn-
cludes: "The judiciary in any modern industrial society, however com-
posed, under whatever economic system, is an essential part of the
system of government and. . . its function may be described as under-
170
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/1
556 - Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
pinning the stability of that system and as protecting that system from
attack by resisting attempts to change it.""2 Griffith wrote principally
about the British experience, but his observations have wider relevance.
He effectively shows that a legal system cannot be regarded as operat-
ing in a political vacuum. Both Griffith and Shapiro conclusively
demonstrate that the State and the legal system, including the judici-
ary, are closely intertwined. That, again, is a sociological truism admit-
ted by all who think about it but not purveyed to la* students-no
doubt because of the prevailing ideology of "legalism."
The other example is Dames & Moore v. Regan,13 the Iranian hos-
tage case decided in July 1981 by the Supreme Court. There the Court,
speaking through Justice William Rehnquist, upheld President Carter's
hurried agreements with Iran to obtain release of the fifty two hos-
tages. Although crafted in familiar lawyers' language, Rehnquist's
opinion reeks with the odor of compromise forced by necessity. Princi-
ple, as usual, gave way to realpolitik. The Justices, in the last analysis,
had no choice save to sustain the validity of the executive agreements.
The Court, quite obviously, was in fact (though not in theory) an arm
of the political branches of government. To paraphrase one of
Machiavelli's principles ("A republic or a prince should ostensibly do
out of generosity what necessity constrains them to do"),1' a repub-
lic-the United States-should purport to do under the law what polit-
ical necessity requires that it do. Said even more bluntly, Dames &
Moore is a pure example of a political Hobson's choice: the Justices not
only had to take the first horse in Mr. Hobson's livery stable, it was the
only horse there.
Furthermore, to speak of judicial independence and impartiality is
to forget, once again, the teaching of Mr. Oliver Wendell Holmes who
in 1873 wrote forcefully and persuasively about the noneutrality of law
and of courts: the notion, he said, that law was neutral, impartially
imposed by judges, "presupposes an identity of interests between the
12. J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 213 (paperback ed. 1977). See
Miller, The Politics of the American Judiciary, 49 POL. Q. 200 (1978).
13. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). For discussion, see Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan:
A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. REV. - (1982).
14. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 325 (Walker trans. 1950). (This was
originally published in 1531).
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different parts of a community which does not exist in fact."15 We may
hope, he went on to say, that compassion will temper self-interest, but
"all that can be expected from modern improvements is that legislation
should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accor-
dance with the will of the de facto supreme power in the community."1 6
If Holmes was correct, as surely he was (and is), then the liberal the-
ory of the rule of law is thoroughly discredited. As Holmes said, law is
"a means by which a body, having the power, puts burdens which are
disagreeable to them on the shoulders of somebody else."117
Shapiro does not mention Holmes, nor does he inquire into the
question of who the "de facto supreme power" in a given community
might be. This is not to fault him; rather, it is merely to say that he has
opened the door to more comprehensive analyses of the politics and
sociology of courts. One hopes that others will pick up from where he
ends, and go on to produce a complete sociology-a political sociol-
ogy-of how courts, in the United States and elsewhere, operate-and
who benefits from their decisions.
3. Despite the common belief to the contrary, the civil law system
does not differ in any marked respect from the common law. "Far from
being a complete set of preexisting legal rules, civil law nations like
common law nations, depend on their courts to legislate many of their
legal rules as they conduct litigation."18 On reflection, it is readily seen
that things could scarcely be otherwise. There is no possible way for a
code, however detailed, to anticipate all the many disparate factual sit-
uations concerning disputes among litigants. This conclusion, it is
worth noting, makes nonsense out of the insistence in Louisiana that
since it is governed by the Code Napoleon it differs from the other
states. It can call itself a civil law state, but that does not mean that
either its law or its legal system is not basically the same as, say, the
systems in force in Texas or South Dakota.
15. Holmes, Comment: The Gas-Stokers'Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582 (1873). For
discussion, see Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. (1979).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 155.
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II.
I do not suggest that this is all Professor Shapiro has to say in
Courts. There is much more. In my judgment, he makes a persuasive
case for his model of the judicial process. If he is accurate, as surely he
is, then the traditional model-what he calls the prototype-must not
only be completely reexamined, it must be replaced by a model more in
accord with political and sociological facts. Courts presents a challenge
to all law and political science professors; one that must be met if ever
there is to be an adequate conception of law and of judging. I am not
at all sanguine on that score: Speaking generally, law schools are re-
verting to what they were before the Legal Realists.19 As such, and
again speaking generally, they are not even very good trade schools.
Courts does not give all the answers or even pose all the questions, but
it is a solid first step toward a greater understanding. The prose tends
to be muddy, and there are too many typographical errors, but those
small faults are unimportant compared to the very real service Shapiro
has accomplished.
19. Cf. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205
(1981); Miller, Reductionism in the Law Schools,16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 891 (1979).
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